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FOREWORD
This report on “moving towards universal health coverage in Bangladesh” is the fourth such report presented by the 
Bangladesh Health Watch (BHW) on the state of  health in Bangladesh. BHW, a multi organisation civil society network, 
was founded in 2006 to hold the state and non-state sectors accountable for their performance in delivering quality health 
care to the citizens. Each year, BHW brings out a report that is timely and relevant to the discussions taking place in the 
national and global arena, which deserves priority attention. As a citizen's initiative, BHW prides itself  on its quality of  
work and independence as well as non-partisan nature of  its contributions. These qualities have now, hopefully, been 
established over the course of  three successive reports, the first one focusing on the theme of  health equity, the second 
one on the status of  the health workforce, and the third on the governance of  the health sector in Bangladesh. These 
three reports have been widely used as objective measures of  the state of  health in Bangladesh by various stakeholders 
including the government, professional and civil society organisations, service providers and users, media and the 
international development agencies.
As the movement for Universal Health Coverage (UHC) intensifies globally, there is an imperative to prepare Bangladesh 
for it. The key challenges to financing for universal coverage in Bangladesh are the high and potentially impoverishing 
out-of-pocket spending on health; poor quality of  service delivery in the public sector; a large and mostly unregulated 
private sector that dominates provision of  care; the increasing burden of  non-communicable diseases requiring high-
cost individual care; and lack of  experience with insurance schemes through pre-payment and risk pooling mechanism. 
In this year's Bangladesh Health Watch Report, several studies have been undertaken to investigate Bangladesh's 
preparedness to achieve UHC within the foreseeable future, and identify opportunities as well as challenges which need 
to be overcome.  The studies have looked at Bangladesh's experiences with public sector in-patient health care; demand 
side financing; health care financing by NGOs; and for profit private health insurance. Several messages emerge from 
these studies. These include, first, the need to establish a shared understanding of  universal coverage. Two dimensions 
are important: a comprehensive set of  quality services according to need and financial protection in accessing care 
ensuring that individuals are not economically compromised in paying for care. 
Second, strong arguments can be made for UHC on grounds of  both shortfalls and opportunities for coverage. The 
shortfalls in health coverage include: limited coverage of  priority interventions such as skilled attendance at birth, 
inequities in the patterns of  coverage (e.g. rural/urban, vulnerable groups), and shortfalls in financial protection arising 
from a health care system that is financed primarily out of  pocket. However, the rationale for UHC can be drawn from 
current and future opportunities: universal coverage is possible (e.g., Expanded Program on Immunization); 
significantly more resources will be available as Bangladesh moves towards a middle-income country in the next ten to 
fifteen years, and increasing demands for 'integrated' and 'portable' care amongst the population. 
Third, educating and empowering consumers is important as the complexities of  insurance schemes such as the design 
of  benefit packages and payments is not clear to many. Fourth, provision of  more equitable and efficient health services 
is needed to gain trust in any system of  pre-payment. Fifth steps should be taken towards developing prepayment and 
pooling of  finances for health in Bangladesh. Several options can be considered such as more and better government 
financing; redesigning non-government insurance schemes; and use of  a portion of  official development assistance 
towards health insurance. Sixth, information and evidentiary systems need to be developed to support UHC. The 
government, communities and individual consumers need to remain well informed, and understand the level and types 
of  services available to ensure optimum use of  services. There needs to be a sensitized system for insurance premiums 
and claims which takes into consideration the catastrophic expenditures on health incurred by the poor. Finally, it is 
critical that the relevant technical expertise be available to ensure that UHC is established in an efficient and equitable 
manner. 
I firmly believe this report will not only raise awareness about the manifold challenges related to moving towards 
universal health coverage, but more importantly it will catalyze concrete actions by government as well as non-
government agencies to address these challenges which will result in a comprehensive and equitable delivery of  health 
services to all our citizens.
Rounaq Jahan
Convener, Advisory Board
Bangladesh Health Watch
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Universal health coverage (UHC) refers to organized 
health-care systems in which “all people have access to 
essential health services without the financial hardship 
associated with payment” (Lancet 2010). The WHO 
defined UHC as 'access to key promotive, preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative health interventions for all at 
an affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in access' 
(WHO 2005). Despite continuing improvements in the 
health sector in recent times in Bangladesh (NIPORT, 
Mitra & Associates, and Macro International 2009, 
Streatfield et al. 2010), the income erosion effect of  ill 
health for the poor households is also well documented 
(Sen 2003). This is because in Bangladesh, like any other 
LMIC countries, the main source of  financing health 
care is out-of-pocket (OOP) payment at the point of  
service which currently exceeds 60% of  the total health 
expenditure (BNHA 2010). This frequently leads to 
catastrophic health expenditures ('health shocks') and 
according to a report, accounts for 22% of  all shocks in 
the lives of  poor households in Bangladesh (WB 2008). 
Thus, improving poor people's ability to access 'good 
health at low-cost' has a potential poverty-alleviating 
effect. Some forms of  insurance involving risk pooling 
and pre-payments have been the call of  the day to 
achieve this (WHO 2010).
In this year's Bangladesh Health Watch Report, studies 
are done to investigate Bangladesh's preparedness to 
achieve UHC within foreseeable future, and identify 
opportunities as well as challenges which should be 
overcome. For this purpose, seven studies were 
commissioned by the secretariat on different aspects of  
UHC in Bangladesh by experts in the field. They made 
state-of-the-art reviews of  their respective field based 
on secondary data available, and attempted to carve a 
road map for the policy makers. This overview summa-
rises the key findings from the different studies 
including conclusions and recommendations.
Universal Health Coverage: the next frontier
In this introductory chapter, the authors introduced the 
concept of  UHC and discussed how it can contribute to 
the existing poverty reduction strategies in Bangladesh. 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for accessing health-
care is one of  the most regressive way of  financing 
healthcare and is responsible for pushing a substantial 
no. of  households into poverty annually in Bangladesh. 
Thus, some form of  pre-payments through insurance 
and other mechanisms (on the principle of  'from each 
according to his ability, and to each according to his 
community clinic which replaced the door-to-door 
approach promoted in the '80 and '90s. From the 
stsecond-half  of  the 1  decade of  the new millennium, 
issues such as pro-poor focus, community voice and 
accountability, public-private partnership for service 
need') will help in achieving UHC for the population. 
For this, challenges such as raising resources, reducing 
OOP expenditures, and inefficient and inequitable use 
of  resources, have to be overcome. Recent experiences 
from countries such as Thailand, Ghana, and Rwanda 
which were successful in implementing health 
insurance schemes in varied context can be used for 
carving out a path for Bangladesh.
Health sector changes in historical perspectives and public 
health expenditures
In the next two chapters, the authors sketched the 
changes taking place in the policies and associated 
reforms in the health sector of  Bangladesh since 
independence in 1971 from a historical perspective (See 
Figure below). Since the '80s, the participation of  
donors in financing health sector increased gradually 
over the years. Simultaneously, the policy environment 
changed as also the focus from family planning alone to 
an integrated, rights-based health and family welfare 
approach, and relevant reforms instituted. Prominent 
among these were: transition from a vertically 
integrated project-based approach to an horizontally 
integrated sector-wide approach, unification (and later 
segregation) of  the health and family planning wings of  
the MOHFW, introduction of  an Essential Service Package 
(ESP) (comprising basic preventive and curative 
services found as cost-effective), and providing one-
stop preventive services fromonly 8% in case of  the 
poorest 10% (BNHA 2003). The authors argue the case 
for some forms of  insurance through prepayments and 
risk-pooling mechanism to reduce the income-erosion 
effect of  illness and concomitant OOP health 
expenditures. Finally, a simulation exercise shows that 
total public health expenditure for universal health 
coverage (as per WHO estimate of  US$ 24 per person 
annually) has to be increased from 274 crore to 300 
crore taka between 2009/2010-2014/2015 and the 
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delivery and demand-side financing gained 
momentum. The implications of  these for growth of  
the health sector are detailed.
An analysis of  the National Health Accounts data 
revealed various level of  inequity (with respect to age, 
sex, SES, divisions) in resource allocation and 
expenditure incurred with little gain on the parts of  the 
poor. For example, the richest 10% of  the population 
enjoyed 15% of  the national health expenditure 
compared to health budget has to grow by 35+% 
during the same period (See Table below). 
Inpatient health care
In further pursuance of  the issue of  public funding for 
achieving UHC, chapter 4 dealt with the distribution 
and utilization of  existing inpatient care facilities in the 
public, private (for-profit) and NGO (not-for-profit) 
 
 
sectors including human capital and financing mecha-
nism. There are 14,557 hospitals (10-50 bed) at the 
Upazila level, 46 hospitals (100-150 bed) at district level 
and 11 hospitals (200-250 bed) in the public sector but 
only 59.6% have 100% or higher bed occupancy rate 
(See Table below). The distribution of  public hospitals 
across geographic regions is proportion to population 
size and equitable. However, at the upazila level, only 
1.2% hospitals have 100% or higher bed occupancy rate 
which is much higher at the district and higher levels. 
This is not surprising as shortage, inappropriate skills-
mix and inequitable distribution of  human resources 
for health (HRH) hampers access and delivery of  
quality services (Ahmed et al. 2011), especially at the 
upazila levels (Sharif  2010). The government allocates 
resources from revenue and development budget to the 
public hospitals based on number of  beds and staffs of  
the hospitals and not on disease burden. To make 
 
 
 
Table: Public Expenditure required for universal health coverage  
 
Indicators 2009/2010 2014/2015 2019/2020 2024/2025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Population 158,665,000 178,682,560 197,279,985 217,813,044 
B. Total public health expenditure Ideally required for universal health 
coverage (million Taka) 274,173 308,763 340,899 376,381 
C. Estimated health care budget with 6% growth rate (million Taka)  68,320 91,427 122,350 163,732 
D. Deficit to achieve universal health coverage (million Taka) (B – C) 205,853 217,335 218,549 212,648 
E. Amount of  budget if  GOB provides 50% of  ideally required budget 
(50% of  B) (million Taka) 137,086 154,382 170,450 188,190 
F.  Amount of  budget if  GOB provides 40% of  ideally required budget (40% 
of  B) (million Taka) 109,669 123,505 136,360 150,552 
G. Required budget if  GOB provides 25% of  ideally required budget (25% 
of  B) (million Taka) 68,543 77,190 85,224 94095 
Source: Bangladesh Health Watch 2011 
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Figure: Health sector reforms, changes and policies in Bangladesh: 1971-2010
Source: Bangladesh Health Watch 2011
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resource allocation method more equitable for 
inpatient care, disease-specific cost using Diagnosis 
Related Group (DRG) should be followed for the 
hospitals or health facilities (Ghaffari et al. 2009).
Demand-side financing
In Bangladesh, most of  the health programmes 
(including maternal and child health programmes) 
pursued through supply-side interventions failed to 
achieve the stated objectives of  reaching the poor. This 
was due to factors such as distance to health facilities, 
poor quality of  services provided, shortage of  medicine 
and supplies, extraction of  unofficial fees, long waiting 
time, social exclusion etc. (Cockcroft et al. 2007,  
Ahmed et al. 2011). This led the researchers and policy 
makers to look into the demand-side of  the problem, 
and to improve targeting of  the vulnerable groups and 
also, provider efficiency (Ensor and Cooper 2004). Of  
late, demand-side financing for reducing the OOP 
expenditure related to use of  skilled birth attendants is 
being experi-mented in the public sector in 44 upazilas. 
The pregnant women can exchange the vouchers given 
free of  cost against services from providers in the 
public sectors thereby stimulating competition among 
them for better quality of  services. Initial experiences 
with this voucher scheme is not rosy: mis-targetting due 
to political influence and non-adherence to exclusion 
criteria properly, differential practice of  beneficiary 
selection followed by govern-ment health workers, 
delay in disbursement of  fund creating frustration 
among consumers and providers, increased demand for 
services at public facilities without concomitant 
increase in human resources etc. were some of  the 
pitfalls encountered. Improvement in institu-tional 
delivery was seen as also management of  complications 
by skilled hands. However, concern was raised about its 
probable negative effect on family planning especially 
among the poor. Similar schemes in private sector are 
also in place e.g., those initiated by ICDDR,B, RTM 
International and Marie Stopes. All these donor funded 
vouchers programme have been found to increase the 
use of  ANC, PNC and delivery care. Also, the 
sustainability of  the high-cost voucher programme is a 
limiting issue to be resolved. It can be said that DSF is a 
first step in achieving UHC for pregnancy care; 
however, it needs rigorous cost-benefit evaluation 
before scaling.
Healthcare financing by NGOs
Not-for-profit non-governmental development 
organizations (NGOs) are one of  the major players in 
the field of  health service provision especially at the 
grassroots (ILO 2008). These NGOs provide health 
services through micro health insurance (MHI) as well 
as payment-for-services basis. The NGO health budget 
is mainly financed by development partners and share 
of  NGO's own expenditure on health as a percent of  
total health expenditure (national) ranges from 1-2% 
only.  Their modus operandi varies from NGO to 
NGO: BRAC charges only the cost of  medicine and 
other services through community health workers, 
Division Upazila Health Complex Secondary and tertiary level hospitals All hospitals 
10-50 bed 100-150 bed 200-250 bed 
Total  Hospitals 
with 100% 
or higher 
BOR**
Percentage of  
hospitals with 
100% or 
higher BOR*
Total  100% or higher 
BOR* 
Total Hospitals with 
100% or higher 
BOR** 
Percentage of  
hospitals with 100% 
or higher BOR* 
Barisal 33 4 12.1% 4 1 1 0 20.0% 
Chittagong 85 5 5.9% 9 6 3 2 66.7% 
Dhaka 103 13 12.6% 11 6 3 0 42.9% 
Khulna  50 9 18.0% 8 5 2 2 70.0% 
Rajshahi 111 21 18.9% 11 9 2 1 76.9% 
Sylhet 31 0 0.0% 3 2 0 0 66.7% 
Total  413 52 12.6% 46 29 11 5 59.6% 
xv
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Source: Source: Bangladesh Health Watch 2011 
Table: Distribution of  utilization (bed occupancy) of  public hospitals in Bangladesh, 2010
while Marie Stopes charges at a flat rate of  Tk 5 to 10 
per visit and covers the cost of  medicine as well. Marie 
Stopes and Dhaka Community hospital also provide 
services through Health Card-based MHI to selected 
groups such as garments workers. Any higher level care 
is provided free or at a heavily subsidized cost. 
Vulnerable groups like poor and ultra-poor receive free 
treatment from all. However, a comparative assessment 
of  the different NGO financed health care showed that 
they were lacking in equitable health care financing 
through cross-subsidy. Only GK succeeded in 
implementing progressive premium and co-payment 
scheme through its pioneering MHI scheme. 
Experiences show that MHI requires different 
expertise and experience than managing microcredit 
and that poor are not good candidate for MHI. These 
need to be overcome before success of  MHI can be 
convincingly demonstrated.
For-profit private health insurance
Voluntary private health insurance (for-profit) may aid 
in achieving UHC by helping households to cope with 
large health expenditures without drawing on its 
resources. However, the private Health insurance 
market is in a very nascent stage now in Bangladesh. 
Figure: Annual healthcare financing through 
private health insurance in Bangladesh
Source: National Health Accounts (WHO 2010). The series has been 
inflation adjusted using GDP deflator with 2008 as base year.
The above figure suggests that between 2001 and 2008 
the total healthcare financing (in nominal terms) 
annually increased by about 11% and rose from $263 
million to about $550 million. Controlling for inflation 
for the same period actually leaves the growth curve of  
financing through private health insurance essentially 
flat. 
Currently, there are about 44 enlisted insurance 
companies in Bangladesh mainly focusing on general, 
life and accident insurances. Out of  these, 14 
companies offer some forms of  health insurance 
products of  which group health plan for the office or 
factory employees is most common. Besides, individual 
policies are also available, usually supplemental to some 
other insurance schemes such as life insurance. 
Interestingly, the packages are mostly homogeneous 
and the main component of  any scheme is coverage for 
hospitalization. Annual coverage usually reaches up to 
only Tk 150,000 even for the most generous policies. 
These companies also offer individual mediclaim policies 
for people traveling abroad. However, the private health 
insurance market in Bangladesh is yet to take-off  and 
the contribution of  the private health insurance 
companies in healthcare financing is minimal. A 
number of  factors may be responsible: a large informal 
sector and therefore difficult to reach by conventional 
insurance companies, lower willingness-to-pay for 
health, high transaction costs and even the highest 
coverage not covering very large expenditure. For 
development of  the sector, proper guidance and 
regulation from govern-ment is required and only then 
it will be able to complement public and not-for-profit 
sectors' effort to provide UHC in Bangladesh.
Micro health insurance: choice of  model and regulation
Micro Health Insurance (MHI) is a type of  health 
insurance where accessibility to essential health services 
is ensured to individuals and families, who are unable to 
afford formal health insurance schemes provided by the 
private sector, through affordable premiums and low 
prices for health services (WEEH 2003). This chapter 
dealt with some technical aspects of  a MHI scheme 
such as 'appropriate size of  the risk pool, the delivery 
mechanism as well as the regulatory regime'. Different 
models of  MHI in the literature included (a) the 
partner-agent model (b) the community-based model 
(c) the full service model whereby an organization 
'operates its own insurance scheme absorbing full risks 
and income but typically engages a provider who is 
responsible for service', and finally, (d) the provider 
model, where the risk-carrier also delivers the service. 
For choosing a particular delivery model, factors such 
as awareness, trustbuilding, transaction cost, claim 
settlement and risk pool and inclusivity need to be 
considered. An analysis of  the different NGO health 
xvi
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services found these to be providing subsidized care 
instead of  risk shifting which is a hallmark for 
insurance. Other constraints to develop a self-
sustaining MHI model included supply and demand-
side constraints, distribution and quality of  services, 
absence of  a functional referral system, comprehen-
siveness of  package etc. Finally, a set of  regulatory and 
supervisory directives that respect both product and 
process innovations and uphold the goals of  cost 
efficiency, financial viability and client inclusivity is put 
forward for reflection.
Conclusions and recommendations
In the concluding chapter, seven common messages 
emerging from the chapters are drawn together which 
constitute an agenda for action moving forward.  These 
are:
While there appears too little disagreement with the 
idea of  Universal Health Coverage, its precise 
definition is difficult to pin down.   WHO suggests that 
two dimensions of  coverage should be secured: 1) a 
compre-hensive set of  quality services according to 
need; and 2) financial protection in accessing care 
ensuring that individuals are not economically 
compromised in paying for care (WHR 2010). These 
principal axes of  UHC, however, require further 
definition and operationalization in the specific context 
of  Bangladesh.
All of  the chapters in this Report provide important 
perspectives on the many reasons for a concerted 
mobilization towards universal health coverage in 
Bangladesh beginning immediately. The primary and most 
important rationale relates to shortfalls in coverage in 
the current context.   There are three components of  
these unacceptable shortfalls: limited coverage of  
priority interventions such as skilled attendance at 
birth, inequities in the patterns of  coverage, and 
shortfalls in financial protection arising from a health 
care system that is financed primarily by individual 
households.   
The rationale for UHC also draws inspiration in a much 
more positive way from a spectrum of  opportunities: 
universal coverage is possible (e.g., EPI); as Bangladesh 
1. Establishing a shared understanding of 
Universal Health Coverage
2. Making a strong case for UHC
moves towards a middle-income country in the next 10-
15 years, total resources for health will grow 
significantly; growing demand for “integrated” and 
“portable” care amongst the population.     
Every country that has made a concerted effort towards 
a universal health coverage system has taken steps 
towards “prepayment and pooling” (WHR 2010). What 
options, therefore, should be considered in moving 
towards more pre-payment and pooling of  finances for 
health in Bangladesh? These may be: more and better 
government financing of  health, re-designing non-
governmental insurance schemes, promoting a more 
conducive environment for health insurance, and 
shifting official development assistance (ODA) towards 
health insurance. As a concrete first step, the ODA 
community could assist the Government of  
Bangladesh in preparing a UHC financing strategy. A 
second step for the ODA community to consider would 
be to examine how their current donor flows could be 
rechannelled to support more pre-payment and pooling 
of  finances for health.   
As many experts have pointed out in this report and 
elsewhere, the value of  health insurance to the 
consumer is not immediately clear, especially if  it entails 
finding scarce cash to pay premiums when one is 
otherwise healthy. This under-appreciation of  benefits 
dampens demand for health insurance and erodes the 
sustainability of  voluntary membership schemes. There 
are a number of  options for managing this challenge: to 
develop clear communications or education messages 
related to the advantages of  the pre-payment system, 
active engagement of  representatives of  consumers in 
the design of  benefits packages such that there is under-
standing and awareness of  consumer needs and 
expectations, and to make premium payment simple 
and sustainable.
More and better prepayment financing systems for 
health care that are well understood and friendly to 
clients of  different economic means and health needs, 
are critical ingredients to UHC but on their own 
3. Moving to pre-payment financing is 
imperative
4.  Educating and empowering beneficiaries
5. Accelerating provision of more equitable and 
efficient health services
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insufficient. A further vital input is the robust, high 
quality and trusted provision of  health services. Should 
health services be of  low quality, health providers 
absent or unresponsive to the needs of  patients, or 
inaccessible due to informal systems of  under-the-table 
payments, then the trust in any pre-payment system will 
evaporate very quickly. Therefore, identifying what 
services are covered and how they are delivered is an 
extremely important part of  any systems striving for 
UHC.
The information, measurement and evidence demands 
related to health insurance systems add significantly to 
the complexity of  information systems in the health 
sector. This requires first and foremost investment in 
the development of  an information strategy to support 
UHC. This strategy would involve at a minimum i) 
strengthening the basic information systems required 
for design of  packages; ii) building management 
information systems for insurance premiums and 
claims; and iii) developing more reliable and valid 
measures related to effective coverage of  health 
services and protection from impoverishing health care 
expenditure. Besides, development of  common 
6. Transforming information and evidentiary 
systems 
frameworks for monitoring and evaluation and 
establishing a learning environ-ment for UHC among 
government policymakers, programme implementers, 
researchers etc. are also needed. 
Designing, implementing and evaluating efforts 
towards UHC places special demands on the health 
professional workforce that go well beyond those 
related to clinical provision of  services. These include 
the need for highly specialized professionals like 
actuaries to inform insurance design, to a wide range of  
practical skills involved in implementation like 
premium collection and pooling; benefit identification; 
provider payment; cross-subsidization mechanisms, 
and a diverse set of  management skills at various levels 
related to policy and design, sustainable and 
accountable financing, and effective information 
systems. A full inventory of  these skills needs is 
required to inform the scope and design of  appropriate 
training programmes.  
This seven point agenda is not meant to be a blueprint 
for UHC but to guide debate to inform decisive actions 
towards a more equitable and just health system in 
Bangladesh.
7.  Acquiring core competencies for UHC
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if  Bangladesh has to move forward with the same pace 
of  progress. 
 
One of  the important building blocks for a health 
system is financing. Health financing, in general, has 
three objectives, viz., generate resources (revenue 
collection), use resources optimally (purchasing), and 
ensure financial access to health services by all citizens 
(pooling) (Normand and Weber 2009). Although health 
financing is commonly misconstrued as only revenue 
collection or generating resources, indeed, from a 
citizens perspective, it is more important to understand 
how is this resources used and who gets what. This 
chapter introduces the concept of  universal health 
coverage (UHC) which deals more with the latter issues 
of  resource redistribution.
Universal Health Coverage  the next frontier
It is now well recognized that poverty is not just about 
income or employment. Poverty is the manifestation of  
a much deeper array of  deprivations that includes 
healthcare, access to education and environmental 
protection. In health, it has been shown in Bangladesh 
and many other countries that income erosion through 
health shocks and catastrophic illnesses leads to 
impoverishment and further poverty. For many people 
living in low and middle income countries, health 
services is obtained through out-of-pocket (OOP) pay-
ments at point of  service. Globally such costs account 
for 19% expenditures on health. But for low income 
countries such as Cambodia, Ghana, India, Pakistan or 
Vietnam, it accounts for over 50% of  total health 
expenditures (Garrett et al. 2009). For Bangladesh, the 
OOP is nearly 60% (Rannan-Eliya 2010). Bangladesh 
has one of  the highest rates of  catastrophic illnesses, 
varying, depending on how it is defined, from 7 to 25% 
which drive up to 3.8% of  the population or 5.7 million 
people into poverty every year. According to a World 
INTRODUCTION
angladesh has made important progress over the Bpast few decades. This is particularly true in the 
social sector which led some observers to call it 'a near 
miracle' (Huq 1991). Many of  the inequities and 
deprivations that characterized this nation historically 
has either been corrected or reduced significantly. In 
human development, life expectancy has increased by 
over 50% - from about 45 years in the early 1970s to 
over 65 years currently. More importantly, women now 
live a longer life than men, as expected biologically and 
experienced around the world. The infant mortality rate 
has reduced from about 150 per 1,000 live births three 
or four decades ago to 51 in 2007 (NIPORT et al. 2009). 
The recent report of  decline in maternal mortality ratio 
to under 200 per 100,000 births bears testimony to the 
nation's ability to address the pervasive social issues. 
Many strides have also been made in education, 
particularly at the primary level. The net enrolment rate 
has reached nearly 90%. Here also, the gender inequity 
has been removed. At the time of  independence in 
1971, girls' enrolment in school was about half  of  boys 
which has now been corrected with girls going to school 
in the same rate as boys (CAMPE 2009). The 
agricultural production has been trebled over the years 
since independence outpacing the population growth 
which just doubled during the same period.
However, challenges remain. Although Bangladesh is 
poised to achieve a few of  the millennium development 
goals such as child health by 2015, the country has to 
strive harder to compete with others in South Asia such 
as Sri Lanka. It appears that the country has harvested 
all the 'lower hanging' fruits very successfully. So, the 
next challenge is to identify and act on the more difficult 
and formidable ones. The issues in health systems 
strengthening such as efficiency and good governance 
will require increased attention in the immediate future 
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Bank report, health is the most important shock that 
happens to Bangladeshis accounting for 22% of  all 
shocks (WB 2008). High OOP payments restrict long-
term economic survival and lead to further poverty and 
impoverishment. Worldwide, 150 million people suffer 
serious financial hardships and up to 100 million people 
are forced into poverty (Carrin et al. 2008). Based on a 
study across many countries, Krishna (2010) found 
health shocks as the main reason for people falling into 
poverty. It has been argued that catastrophic health 
spending is not necessarily caused only by high cost 
medical procedure or any single hospitalization. A 
steady and continuous medical bill for chronic illnesses 
or disabilities can force people into poverty as well 
(WHO 2010).
Direct payments through user fees (formal and 
informal) deter people from using health services. It is 
estimated that about 1.3 billions of  the world's poor 
cannot access healthcare because of  their inability to 
pay. In Bangladesh, primary healthcare services are 
'officially' free at upazila (sub-district) and levels below 
it. There is a nominal fee for services at tertiary and 
specialized hospitals. However, according to studies 
such as the Bangladesh Service Delivery Survey of  
2003, 80% of  the respondents reported paying for 
services, with 20% making direct payments to service 
providers (ILO/KFW Study team 2008). In addition, 
problems in terms of  the quality of  care such as the 
absenteeism of  personnel, shortage of  medical supplies 
and behavioural issues discourage people, particularly 
the poor, from accessing services at government 
facilities. They either forgo care or turn to private 
practitioners. It is well known that the private caregivers 
in great majority are informal providers who provide 
services of  unknown or doubtful quality (BHW 2008). 
The cycle of  illness, impoverishment, and further 
poverty is best interrupted by the introduction of  pre-
payment schemes and health insurance through UHC. 
The UHC promises a better way of  paying for health 
services against the regressive OOP methods. Instead 
of  burdening the poor and the sick, this shares the costs 
more equitably across all population. The origin of  
UHC can be traced back to Bismarck's Germany which 
adopted social legislation that included the Health 
Insurance Bill of  1883, Accident Insurance Bill of  1884 
and Old Age and Disability Insurance Bill of  1889. In 
the first half  of  the twentieth century, other countries 
of  Europe began to follow Germany in adopting UHC. 
In Britain, the National Insurance Act marked the first 
step that led to the creation of  National Health Service 
after World War II. Article 25 of  the Universal 
Declaration of  Human Rights in 1948 declared health 
as a human right, thus strengthening the need for UHC. 
The adoption of  'Health for All' agenda at Alma Ata in 
1978 reflected the continuing evolution of  coverage for 
all. 
The World Health Assembly in May 2005 endorsed a 
resolution urging its member countries to work towards 
health financing, defining UHC as access to appropriate 
thhealth services for all at an affordable cost. The 64  
World Health Assembly in May 2011 re-emphasized the 
2005 resolution and endorsed the various activities 
undertaken towards institutionalizing UHC in member 
countries and called upon the Director General to work 
towards having a UN General Assembly resolution on 
the subject (see Box 1.1 for the May 2011 resolution). 
The 2010 World Health Assembly has convened an 
international advisory panel for the Ministerial Working 
Group on Scaling up Primary Health Systems, with an 
emphasis on achieving UHC. The 2010 World Health 
Report was devoted entirely to universal health 
coverage, stressing that “reaching the 'highest attainable 
standard of  health', as stated in the WHO Constitution, 
requires a new or continued drive towards universal 
coverage in many countries” (WHO 2010). The 
Executive Board of  the WHO, of  which Bangladesh is 
an active member, has recently decided to recommend a 
new resolution in the World Health Assembly to 
endorse UHC in stronger terms: “to ensure that health 
financing systems evolve so as to avoid significant direct 
payments at the point of  delivery, and include a method 
of  pre payment of  financial contributions for health 
care and services, as well as a mechanism to pool risks 
among the population in order to avoiding catastrophic 
health-care expenditure and impoverishment of  
individuals as a result of  seeking the care needed” 
(EB128/SR/10). Preparations are also being made to 
table a resolution in the UN General Assembly in 
September 2012 along the same line. Nobel Laureate 
Professor Amartya Sen and many other high profile 
personalities including human rights activist and 
former President of  Ireland Mary Robinson and 
Harvard University Dean Julio Frenk have also signed up 
as 'global ambassadors' to promote the case for UHC.
Universal Health Coverage: The Next Frontier
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According to WHO, the health financing system for a 
country should be designed in such a way that it (a) 
provides all its citizens access to needed and sufficiently 
good quality health services (including prevention, 
promotion, treatment and rehabilitation), and (b) 
ensures that use of  these services does not lead the user 
to financial hardship (WHO 2010, Carrin et al. 2008). 
Although the models vary by country, the fundamentals 
of  UHC include:
Instituting risk-pooling and an equitable health 
system where the ability to pay determines 
financing contributions and the use of  services is 
on the basis of  needs for care
!
!
!
· Reducing user fees and other out-of-pocket 
payment
Increasing the level of  pre-payment in order to 
maximize the size of  the pool.
Indeed, there is hardly any country in the world where 
some population groups are not covered at all 
(Wagstaff  2010). There are two ways through which 
countries are trying to reach UHC: the state financed 
National Health Service (NHS) as implemented in UK 
(also called the Beveridge model) and the insurance based 
model as implemented in Germany and many other 
countries (also called the Bismarck model). With the 
3
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thThe 64  WHA urges the member states, inter alia:
(1) to ensure that health-financing systems evolve so as to avoid significant direct payments at the point of  delivery 
and include a method for prepayment of  financial contributions for health care and services as well as a 
mechanism to pool risks among the population in order to avoiding catastrophic health-care expenditure and 
impoverishment of  individuals as a result of  seeking the care needed;
(2) to aim for affordable universal coverage and access for all citizens on the basis of  equity and solidarity, so as to 
provide an adequate scope of  health care and services and level of  costs covered, as well as comprehensive and 
affordable preventive services through strengthening of  equitable and sustainable financial resource budgeting;
(3) to continue, as appropriate, to invest in and strengthen the health-delivery systems, in particular primary health care 
and services, and adequate human resources for health and health information systems, in order to ensure that all 
citizens have equitable access to health care and services;
(4) to ensure that external funds for specific health interventions do not distort the attention given to health priorities 
in the country, that they increasingly implement the principles of  aid effectiveness, and that they contribute in a 
predictable way to the sustainability of  financing;
(5) to plan the transition of  their health systems to universal coverage, while continuing to safeguard the quality of  
services and to meet the needs of  the population in order to reduce poverty and to attain internationally agreed 
development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals;
(6) to recognize that, when managing the transition of  the health system to universal coverage, each option will need 
to be developed within the particular epidemiological, macroeconomic, sociocultural and political context of  each 
country;
(7) to take advantage, where appropriate, of  opportunities that exist for collaboration between public and private 
providers and health-financing organizations, under strong overall government-inclusive stewardship;
(8) to promote the efficiency, transparency and accountability of  health-financing governing systems;
(9) to ensure that overall resource allocation strikes an appropriate balance between health promotion, disease 
prevention, rehabilitation and health-care provision;
(10) to share experiences and important lessons learnt at the international level for encouraging country efforts, 
supporting decision-makers, and boosting reform processes;
(11) to establish and strengthen institutional capacity in order to generate country-level evidence and effective, 
evidence-based policy decision-making on the design of  universal health coverage systems, including tracking the 
flows of  health expenditures through the application of  standard accounting frameworks;
Box 1.1. World Health Assembly Resolution 58:33, May 2005 on universal health coverage
Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare being the 
provider of  both financing (through salaries of  health 
staff, and meeting costs of  supplies and hospitals, etc.) 
and services, Bangladesh may be considered a NHS 
model. However, with very high OOP and inefficient 
use of  resources, as mentioned above, Bangladesh 
seems to be an unsuccessful and failed example for the 
model. The challenge is whether and how the country 
can move to an insurance-financed model? 
Why UHC?
The WHO defined universal health coverage or UHC 
as 'access to key promotive, preventive, curative and 
rehabilitative health interventions for all at an 
affordable cost, thereby achieving equity in access 
(WHO 2005). There is hardly any difference of  opinion 
on the merit of  and need for UHC. Indeed, all countries 
and leading health agencies have enthusiastically 
endorsed it. Dr. Margaret Chan, the director general of  
WHO said, 'All countries, at all stages of  development, 
can take immediate steps to move towards universal 
coverage (WHO 2010). Lamenting the failure to ensure 
UHC, leading medical journal the Lancet said, 'That 
universal coverage is so distant for so many people is 
unacceptable' (Lancet 2010). 
There are at least three major reasons for countries to 
act fast on moving towards UHC. Briefly, these are:
1. It is ethically and morally correct; it represents social 
solidarity for poor and ill people as its successful 
implementation ensures health service to them
2. It is economically feasible; in line with the first law of  
health economics, spending on health is growing 
rapidly with the unprecedented growth of  the 
economy as a proportion of  the GDP, with an R-
squared of  0.96 (Fig. 1.1 for 2004 figures). The 
increased health spending can be opportunistically 
utilized to meet the extra requirements for UHC. A 
small marginal investment can bring big return as 
has been shown in case of  Ghana where an addi-
tional US$40 per year for six years spearheaded a big 
jump towards UHC (Rockefeller Foundation 2010).
3. It is politically timely; as democracy holds its foot 
in many countries the governments find it 
advantageous to win popular support through 
UHC reform as seen in Thailand (Pitayarangsarit 
2004), Mexico and Brazil.
Figure 1.1. Link between total health spending 
and GDP, 2004
Source: Gaag and Stimac (2008)
For Bangladesh, the run-away OOP expenditures and 
the number of  people moving to poverty due to health 
shocks and catastrophic spending every year are 
absolutely unfortunate and not acceptable, either 
morally or ethically. For any country it is an 'avoidable 
tragedy' (Bennett et al. 2010). For any popularly elected 
government this should be an issue of  immense 
political significance. The civil society has been 
clamouring for reforms that would reduce the burden 
on the poor and other disadvantaged groups. With a 
marginal increase and simple readjustment of  the 
current spending, Bangladesh can perhaps quickly 
move towards an effective UHC. With a lower base of  
capital assets and human resources, it will probably take 
many years to achieve a full-fledged UHC. As has been 
shown for many countries, with right policies and 
strategies, and more importantly, political commitment, 
Bangladesh can achieve substantial progress quite 
rapidly. According to a recent report, UHC is essentially 
a 'journey'; it starts with a broad coverage of  a larger 
section of  the population with a limited set of  benefits 
but as countries consolidate and more resources are 
available the benefit package increases. It has been 
shown that substantial progress can be made in a short 
period of  time if  right vision, policy and strategies are 
adopted (Rockefeller Foundation 2010).
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The example of  China is relevant here. Before 1978, 
basic services were made available to all virtually free. 
With the transition to a more market-based approach 
the direct payments increased to 60% (from 20% in 
1980). In 2009, the Chinese government reverted its 
earlier decision and decided to return to UHC and 
provide 'safe, effective, convenient and affordable' care 
to all (Meng and Tang 2010, WHO 2010).
Three challenges for UHC
The WHO report 2010 identified three challenges for 
countries moving towards universal health coverage. It 
also opined that every country could do more in 
addressing such challenges. Here are they:
Raising resources for health: Inadequacy of  resources 
for health is a perennial problem. This is true 
irrespective of  whether the country is rich or poor. 
Interestingly, achievement of  UHC is not always related 
to the country's wealth. The United States with a per 
capita health spending of  US$ 7,000 achieved almost 
the same coverage as Rwanda which has a per capita 
spending of  US$ 37. It is essentially the way the 
countries decide to use their scarce resources. 
Nevertheless, implemen-ting UHC will require 
additional resources and many countries have found 
innovative ways to raise this. Indonesia, for example, 
has been able to raise its tax collection by encouraging 
compliance, a part of  which is used for health. Ghana, 
as another example, meets most of  its funding needs for 
its national health insurance scheme through a 2.5% 
levy on VAT. Bangladesh spends only US$ 16 per capita 
for health annually, a part of  which comes from 
development partners. The country's tax base is small, 
only about 9% of  GDP, one of  the lowest in the world. 
However, there may be innovative ways to mobilize 
internal resources. These may include new taxes 
(earmarked and un-earmarked), diaspora bonds for the 
large number of  overseas Bangladeshis, and 
(additional) excise tax on unhealthy products such as 
cigarettes, foodstuff  and ingredients. The WHO 2010 
report recommends many such innovative financing 
mechanisms. Improving the nego-tiating capacity of  
MoH with MoF could yield positive results in terms of  
increased allocation for health in the national budget 
paving the way for quick transition to UHC. More 
importantly, with the rise in the country's GDP, there 
will be more money available for health. A recent 
analysis shows that between 1998 and 2007, nominal 
growth rate of  GDP per capita was 8.5% per annum 
whereas health expenditure rose by 11.1% (PI 
consulting 2011).
Reducing out-of-pocket expenditures: The devastating 
effects of  user fees and direct payments (formal and 
informal) have been described already. A best way to 
deal with this is to share it. While on average only 5% of  
people fall ill in a given year, these people bear the brunt 
of  national health spending. Introduction of  some 
form of  insurance or risk pooling is recommended as 
an effective measure to curb OOP spending. Similar to 
home or car insurance, which is used to protect oneself  
in case of  an 'unplanned' emergency (a legal 
requirement in many countries), health insurance pools 
risk across the nation (or for a particular group in the 
population) and is used only in case of  'unplanned' ill 
health or health-related emergency (Rockefeller 
Foundation 2010). The 2010 WHO report narrated the 
story of  a poor Thai casual labourer who met with a 
serious accident involving his motorcycle and describes 
how the UHC scheme helped him pay for all his 
treatment costs, recover and resume his normal life. 
However, the efficiency of  such a risk-pool depends to 
a large extent on its size, the bigger the pool the more 
efficient and effective it is. The pooling is a most 
important aspect of  UHC and will be covered in more 
detail subsequently.
Reducing inefficient and inequitable use of  resources: 
Calling it 'haemorrhaging of  money', the 2010 WHO 
report estimates that 20-40% of  health resources 
worldwide are wasted. Reducing this waste would 
definitely help health systems perform better, reach 
more people with effective services and reduce inequity. 
Apart from cutting costs which maybe possible in 
selected cases, large gains can be made by improving 
governance. The 2010 WHO report identified ten 
leading causes of  inefficiency in the health systems 
which included eliminating unnecessary spending on 
medicines, equipment, diagnostics and hospitalization, 
inappropriate staff  mix and increasing their motivation, 
reducing medical errors and containing health systems 
leakages through waste, corruption and fraud. Having 
an insurance mechanism which separates providers 
from purchasers can help reduce inefficiency by 
introducing some form of  pay for performance at 
different levels of  services.
5
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Risk-pooling and health insurance
Risk pooling (in health) has been defined as the 
'aggregation of  individual financial contributions to 
cover the total health costs of  a broader population' 
(Lagomarsino and Kundra 2008). Risk pooling and pre-
payment are integral to any insurance product, 
including health insurance. Indeed, there are three 
elements in any health insurance plans: revenue 
(premium) collection, pooling of  all revenues into a 
common fund and its management, and purchasing 
(meaning transfer of  health pool money to providers of  
health for providing the best possible services to the 
insured). Researchers have identified several benefits 
for a health insurance system as a way to ensure health 
services to all:
· Reduces out-of-pocket spending
· Improves final risk protection to all, particularly 
the poor and vulnerable
· Increases access to care and its utilization
· Improves quality of  care
· Enhances equity
· Empowers women to seek care for themselves and 
their children
· Increases accountability and transparency of  health 
system
· Gives freedom to people to choose providers 
thereby improving quality.
There are three types of  health insurance systems that 
are commonly implemented in different parts of  the 
world (Ensor 2007). These are:
Social health insurance (SHI): Much of  the health 
insurance implemented in Germany and other OECD 
countries (the so-called Bismarkian model) belong to 
this type. This is financed largely from earmarked pay-
roll tax based on both employee and employer 
contributions calculated as a percentage of  earnings. As 
it stipulates collecting contributions from the payroll, it 
is a less appropriate mechanism for the informal sector, 
and that is for the many developing countries where the 
formal sector is small. In some countries, social health 
insurance is supplemented by other schemes that 
purport to cover others. In Vietnam, for example, the 
SHI covers the formal sector but to cover others the 
government has introduced separate schemes for the 
poor, young children and the elderly with state subsidies 
and voluntary schemes to include the 'nearpoor' such as 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
farmers. This is now being extended to include the 
students as well (Tien et al. 2011).
Community or micro-insurance: In societies where 
there is a large informal sector, micro or community 
health insurance have been tried as an alternative. This 
is voluntary in most cases in the sense that the people or 
community members are given the choice to join or not. 
Since this is voluntary the pool is generally small leading 
to smaller benefits for the members. On the other hand, 
this is claimed to increase social solidarity as richer 
sections opt to contribute voluntarily on behalf  of  the 
community. Indeed, most of  the SHIs that are 
implemented in most Bismarkian Europe can trace 
their origins to some forms of  community schemes 
based around workplaces implemented earlier. The SHI 
is resulted through merger of  such small schemes. The 
Thai UHC can also trace their origin to a few smaller 
schemes (health card). Ghana, for example, has 
extended coverage by linking several NGO-based 
schemes with social insurance (Ensor 2008). In 
Bangladesh, several NGOs are implementing 
community-based micro-insurance schemes with 
mixed success. One challenge with the community-
based schemes is subsidizing for the poor. As 
mentioned by Ensor (2008) some level of  government 
subsidy would entitle the poor to reap benefit of  such 
schemes.
Private insurance: Private or commercial insurance is 
another way to insure for health. The private companies 
usually assess individual risk as a basis for premium 
calculations and pool risk of  those buying insurance. In 
some countries such as India, the government contracts 
private insurance companies to provide insurance 
service to schemes financed by the state. The Rashtriya 
Shwasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) is an example in this 
regard (see later).
Lagomarsino and Kundra (2008) have documented 
various health insurance schemes implemented in low 
and middle income countries. In their opinion, the 
'transition to a national health insurance model requires 
either a wholesale shift in existing government health 
expenditures away from direct delivery and into 
insurance, or a significant increase in funds from 
another source (such as general taxation, payroll-taxes 
and donations)'. There are only a few examples of  
government-led reforms. Rwanda, Ghana, and some 
states in India are among in this list of  countries. 
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Rwanda has done it with support from donors, 
particularly the Global Fund and the state of  Andhra in 
India has done it through generous support from the 
central government. Other countries such as Colombia, 
Philippines and Thailand have used the opportunity of  
higher economic growth that facilitated more money 
for health. The community-based schemes also offer 
hopes as they may become building blocks for a future 
and larger national coverage scheme. 
Dror (2006) studied the perceptions of  the Indian poor 
population in seven states and found that most people 
were ready to pay for health insurance. As the poor were 
heterogeneous, he suggested that any insurance 
product should respond to their 'context specific needs, 
costs and willingness to pay levels'. He concluded that 
there was a solvent market for health insurance among 
the poorer population of  India.
Experiences
As has been mentioned earlier, many countries have 
made significant progress in their march towards UHC 
in recent times. They comprise of  countries from both 
low and middle income backgrounds. However, each 
country has taken a different strategy based on its own 
socioeconomic context, health status and political will. 
In the following we narrate the cases of  four countries 
where significant attention has been given to UHC and 
important progress made. Table 1.1 shows how these 
countries have addressed different issues related to 
UHC implementation (Joint Learning Network 2010, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011, Rockefeller Foundation 
2010, WHO 2010, World Bank 2008). 
Thailand: A long but successful road to UHC
In 1963, Thailand's formal health coverage was 
estimated to be 9%. In 1975, the Thai government 
introduced the Medical Welfare Scheme (MWS) or 
“Free Medical Care for Low Income” funded through 
general taxation, raising the coverage rate to 20%. This 
marked the beginning of  Thailand's transition to UHC. 
In 1980, the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme 
(CSMBS) was created to cover for government 
employees, their dependents and retirees.
Recognizing the problem of  high OOP payments 
which was highly regressive, the Thai Ministry of  Public 
Health (MOPH) initiated the Health Card Scheme 
(HSC) in 1990 that was voluntary in nature and 
subsidized by the state. The voluntary nature of  HSC 
led to problems of  bias selection with the healthy 
opting out but the sick seeking to be a member. In 
addition to targeting the poor and near-poor through 
voluntary health cards, MOPH implemented in 1992 
the compulsory Social Security Scheme (SSS) whereby 
all private employees must contribute to a common 
fund through a tri-party arrangement: employees, 
employers, and the central government. This scheme 
now includes all private companies including those 
small businesses with only 1 employee. This type of  
scheme utilizes the notion of  “risk-pooling” to 
maximize resources. In addition, in 1993, the Thai 
government introduced free medical care for children 
and subsequently, in 1995, for the elderly defined as 60 
years and above.
In 1997, the Financial Crisis struck Thailand with 
devastating impacts on the near poor, poor and lower 
middle class. The adverse economic impacts of  the 
Crisis lent a push towards reforms which ranged from 
political to financial as well as allowed health to be on 
the political agenda. The momentum for change and 
new bold policies resulted in the election of  Thaksin 
Shinawatra from the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, in 
2001, who won by promising populist policies which 
include the '30 Baht' Health Care Scheme. 
In 2001, the four existing health schemes mentioned 
above, combined with a small percentage of  private 
health insurance, covered approximately 75% of  the 
population. The adoption of  Thaksin's '30 Baht' 
scheme, which required the patient to pay 30 Baht 
(approx. 1 USD) per medical visit, steadily put Thailand 
onto attaining UHC. From 2006, the Democrat Party's 
government abolished the 30 Baht co-payment except 
for non-emergency services from unregistered 
facilities, and all Thais are eligible to utilize public 
medical services under the Universal Coverage Scheme 
(UCS), which are financed through general taxation. 
Currently, approximately 98% of  all Thais are covered 
under the UCS (Table 1.1).
Ghana:  UHC through community-based health 
insurance schemes
In 1957, Ghana gained independence and began to 
provide healthcare to its population through a network 
of  primary care facilities, which was financed through 
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general taxation as well as contributions from 
international donors. In 1985, user fee was introduced 
that created greater inequities in health because access 
to basic and essential clinical services was limited by 
financial ability. Of  the people who sought public 
healthcare they often faced catastrophic health 
expenditures which eventually resulted in bankruptcy. 
In 1997, the Ghanaian government with support from 
development partners initiated a pilot project  the 
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). Before 
this, the Christian Health Association of  providers 
began to experiment a 'community health insurance'. 
Soon, there were at least 57 district-wide health 
insurance schemes and over 100 other group-based 
schemes. In 2000, the New Patriotic Party (NPN) led by 
John Kufuorn was sworn into power, promising better 
healthcare and ending of  user fees. In 2003, the 
parliament passed the National Insurance Act paving 
the way for the community-based NHIS. By 2009, there 
were 14.5 million people of  Ghana were insured or 
approximately 70% of  the population. 
Financing under the community-based NHIS is done 
through several mechanisms:
· 2.5% health insurance levy added to VAT
· 2.5% from the Social Security and National Trust 
(2.5% deducted from payroll of  formal sector 
workers)
· Interest earnings from the combined funds
!
!
!
!
!
· Allocations from the Ghanaian Parliament
· At local level, premiums from informal workers 
and subsidies from National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF)
Some of  the challenges of  the CBHI are that each of  
the mutual health insurance schemes that form the 
national scheme is actually operating as a separate risk 
pool. This implies that fragmentation remains an 
important issue as well as long-term sustainability of  
each community-based scheme (Table 1.1).
India:  Health insurance for the 'below poverty 
line' population
Like Bangladesh, India's health care is financed through 
a variety of  sources from individual OOP payments, 
central government and state tax revenues, donor 
assistance and private sector profits. It is estimated that 
20% of  total healthcare spending in India is publicly 
financed while over 75% is paid for by individual, 
unpooled OOP. In 2008, the government of  India 
launched the Rashtriya Swasthya Bhima Yojana (RSBY) 
programme in 2008 for those living below the poverty 
1line (BPL), implemented by the Ministry of  Labour . 
The central and state governments co-finance the 
premium to the insurer who is selected based on a 
competitive bidding process. Beneficiaries contribute 
Rs.30 (approximately $0.66) to register for the 
programme in which coverage extends to a family of  
five members. 
 1. It may be mentioned here that RSBY is one of  the many schemes being implemented, perhaps the largest in terms of  enrolment and geographical 
reach. Another scheme which has gained international attention is the Rajiv Aarogyasree model being implemented in Andhra Pradesh. India is also 
home to many micro-insurance projects implemented by NGOs.
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Table 1.1. UHC implementation in four countries
Country Date 
imple-
mented 
Name 
health 
scheme 
Cove-rage 
level 
Primary source of  funding Types of  benefits Provider 
payment 
mechanism 
Service delivery system 
India  2008 Rashtriya 
Swasthya 
Bhima 
Yojana 
(RSBY) 
100 million The primary source of  
funding is general 
government revenues. 
Members pay a 
registration fee of  Rs.30. 
Insurance premiums are 
calculated at the state-
level and vary from 
Rs.400 to 600.  
Hospitalization coverage 
up to Rs.30,000 ($700) per 
year per household. 
Covers primarily inpatient 
care. 
Diagnosis 
Related Groups 
(DRG) 
A network of  2,067 hospitals 
(1,516 private and 551 public) 
that work with the insurance 
company selected by the state. 
Insurance companies are tasked 
with recruiting and overseeing 
service providers. 
Ghana 2004 National 
Health 
Insurance 
Scheme 
(NHIS) 
14.5 million 
(70% of  
pop.) 
70% of  total funding is 
from a 2.5% health 
insurance levy added to 
VAT. 23% comes from 
contributions made by 
formal workers to the 
Social Security and 
National Trust (SSNIT). 
5% comes from Premium 
payments. 
Benefits package offers 
extensive coverage. About 
95% of  health problems 
reported by Ghanaian 
healthcare facilities are 
covered under the NHIS. 
These include in-patient as 
well as out-patient services, 
as well as dental care and 
maternal care, including 
antenatal and postnatal 
care. 
DRG A total of  2,334 service providers 
(1,368 facilities are public 
providers and 966 are non-state 
providers) are part of  the NHIS. 
A primary healthcare facility is 
the first point of  service, and 
includes health centers, district 
hospitals, polyclinics, quasi public 
hospitals, private hospitals, 
clinics and maternity homes.  
Rwanda 2002 Communit
y-based 
Health 
Insurance 
(CBHI) 
9 million 
(85% of  
pop.) 
Premiums ranging from 
$4.30 to $19.90 depending 
on the programme. Co-
payment is set between 
$0.17 to $0.16 per disease 
episode. The government 
covers the premium and 
co-payments for indigents 
and other vulnerable 
groups. The government 
and donors also 
contribute to the fund. 
Two types of  packages 
exist: 
1) Minimum Package of  
Activities (MPA) covers all 
services and drugs provided 
at health care centers: 
pre/post natal care, 
vaccinations, family 
planning, minor surgeries 
and essential and generic 
drugs. 
2) Complementary Package 
of  Activities covers a 
limited number of  services 
at district hospitals 
including hospitalization 
costs, caesarian operations, 
minor and major surgeries 
and all diseases afflicting 
children under 5. 
Capitation Public health centers, district 
hospitals, government-assisted 
health facilities and private health 
facilities provide primary and 
secondary care. Government-
assisted health facilities account 
for 40% of  primary and 
secondary care delivered in 
Rwanda, and are run by NGOs, 
religious groups and other third 
parties, and are partially funded 
by the government. 
Thailand 2001 Universal 
Coverage 
Scheme 
(UCS) 
66 million 
(98% of  
pop.) 
The primary source of  
funding is general tax 
revenues. When the 
scheme was launched in 
2001, a co-payment of  30 
Baht (approx. $1) was 
charged per medical visit 
in order to discourage 
over-utilization. This was 
abolished in 2006 for 
political reasons. The 
utilization rate did not 
vary significantly after the 
end of  the co-payment. 
Benefits are comprehensive 
and include both out- and 
in-patient care. The Thai 
UCS also emphasizes 
preventive care such as 
vaccinations, family 
planning, ante natal care, as 
well as pre-marital 
counseling. Recently, ARV 
treatment for HIV and 
renal therapy have been 
included under the UCS. 
Capitation and 
DRG 
Providers under UCS include 
both public and private facilities. 
A private provider will have to 
submit the required 
documentation as well as meet 
the standard criteria set by UCS 
prior to registration as part of  the 
scheme. Public facilities are 
automatically registered under 
the network. The Thai scheme 
emphasizes the primary care 
provider as the gatekeeper to 
UCS. 
Sources: http://www.jointlearningnetwork.org  (Last accessed 17/02/2011) Rockefeller Foundation, 2010  
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IT enabled and connected to the server at the district 
level.
! Portability: A beneficiary who has enrolled in one 
district can use his/her smartcard in any RSBY 
hospital across India. This makes the scheme highly 
user friendly to those families who have to migrate 
for work.
! Cash-less: Transactions under the RSBY scheme are 
completely cashless. Beneficiaries do not pay cash for 
any services except if  they exceed the Rs. 30,000 per 
annum coverage package. Claims between providers 
and insurers are also paperless as these are conducted 
electronically.
To date, RSBY is operational in over 25 states in India 
and has issued smartcards to nearly 30 million BPL 
households covering 150 million individuals and over 
2,500 hospitals are part of  the scheme.
Rwanda: community-based health insurance 
schemes in a low-income country
Rwanda is a small, landlocked and low income country 
in Central Africa with 10.7 million inhabitants. It has 
gone through a devastating civil war and a genocide that 
left between 500,000 to one million people dead. 
Although much left is to be done, Rwanda has made 
remarkable progress despite the violence it has 
endured. Rwanda has restored its economy to the pre-
1994 level as well as achieved political and social 
stability. Today, Rwanda has a GDP/capita of  $951 
compared to $390 in 1994 (PPP-adjusted). Life 
expectancy is 55 years for men and 58 years for women, 
80% of  the population lives in rural areas and an 
estimated 50% lives below the national poverty line. In 
2004, Rwanda lost 597 disability-adjusted life years 
(DALY) per 1,000 lives  more than double the world 
average and higher than nearly all of  its Sub-Saharan 
African peers. In addition, Rwanda faces an acute 
shortage of  physicians  2 doctors and 2 paramedics per 
100,000 people. 
Despite these daunting challenges, the government has 
committed itself  to providing health coverage to its 
population. The Rwandan health care scheme began in 
1999 with the initial design and development of  
prepayment services, followed by 54 community-based 
pilot health insurance (CBHI) schemes. Once these 
CBHIs were set-up, local populations began enrolling 
in the schemes. Families paid about $4.30 to enroll and 
The benefits package include hospitalization expenses 
of  up to Rs. 30,000 annually (approximately $700) per 
family per year. Most diseases and surgical treatments in 
which hospitalization is required are covered under the 
scheme. Package rates for approximately 727 inpatient 
surgical procedures have been pre-defined and these 
also include maternity and newborn care. Furthermore, 
the benefits include one day pre- and five days post-
hospitalization expenses as well as a transportation 
benefit that covers Rs. 100 per visit to the patient. RSBY 
does not cover some forms of  treatment or procedures 
such as OPD expenses or expenses in the hospital 
which do not require hospitalization, congenital 
external diseases, drug and alcohol induced illnesses 
and sterilization and fertility related procedures.
Key features:
! Beneficiar y empowerment: RSBY provides the 
beneficiary the freedom in the selection of  the 
hospital because they can access any public or private 
provider in RSBY's network all over the country.
! Business model for all stakeholders: RSBY is designed as 
a business model, with incentives built in for each 
stakeholder.
#Insurers: The insurer is paid a premium for each 
household enrolled in RSBY.
#Hospitals: Payment to the provider is made for each 
beneficiary treated. As such, both private and 
public hospitals are incentivized to treat an RSBY 
beneficiary. Insurers are incentivized to monitor 
providers that no fraud or duplications exist in 
order to keep payments under control.
#Intermediaries: RSBY includes intermediaries such 
as NGOs and MFIs as these organizations have a 
stake in assisting those living below the poverty 
line (BPL). Intermediaries under the scheme also 
act as service providers and are paid for the 
services they render to BPL households.
#Government: The inclusion of  public service 
providers into the scheme makes for a competitive 
environment where the both the private and 
public providers have to engage in healthy 
competition.
! Smart card: Every household registered under RSBY 
is issued a smart card that includes their fingerprints 
as well as photographs. Patient information is 
retrievable through the smart card as information is 
electronically stored. All hospitals under RSBY are 
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co-paid $0.17 per treatment episode. Within one year, 
88,000 members were enrolled or about 8% of  the 
population. 
In 2002, the pilot was extended to cover the entire 
nation with CBHIs as the core strategy of  health care 
coverage in Rwanda. The Ministry of  Health, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of  Local Affairs and 
external partners including the Global Fund designed 
scale-up models that now cover 85% of  the population. 
The Rwanda model has two benefit packages:
#The minimum package of  activities (MPA) which 
covers all services and drugs provided at the health 
centers, including pre- and postnatal care, vacci-
nations, family planning, minor sur-geries and 
essential and generic drugs.
#The complementary package of  activities (CPA) 
with a higher premium covers a limited number of  
services at the district hospitals, including the cost 
of  hospitalization, caesarian operations, minor 
and major operations, medical imaging and all 
diseases afflicting children under five.
Government assisted and partially funded health 
facilities account for 40% of  primary and secondary 
care in Rwanda and are mostly run by NGOs, religious 
groups and other third parties. Tertiary care is offered at 
four hospitals of  which three are public and one private.
Rwanda is the exemplar case of  a low income country 
that has implemented a universal health coverage 
programme. Yet, achieving a high coverage rate is not 
an end to itself. Many challenges lay ahead, for example, 
building local institutional capacities to manage the 
health system as well as building capacities of  local 
human resources in health. See Table 1.1 for more 
details.
Bangladesh: the way forward
The world is moving ahead in ensuring health coverage 
for its population. What was seen in 2005 (the time 
when the first WHA resolution on UHC was adopted) 
as laudable but unrealistic is now bold and achievable. It is now 
desirable and unavoidable (Preker et al. 2009). Twenty 
years ago Abel-Smith (1991) had said, “(HI) has the 
prospect of  bringing in more money to the health 
sector, and it does not place at risk access to health care 
for the poorest and neediest.”  As the latest WHO 
report says, many countries in different levels of  
economic development are undertaking health finance 
reform and the programme that is seen closest to 
addressing the needs of  their populations is 
'prepayment and pooling' (WHO 2010). Instead of  
burdening the poor and the sick, such programmes 
share it equitably. As has been shown in the text, many 
countries have already achieved UHC and many more 
are on their way to achieving it. With the rise in the 
momentum for UHC as is seen now, few countries will 
remain untouched. Bangladesh cannot afford to miss 
the bus. For all conceivable reasons Bangladesh should 
embrace the challenge. The regressive system that has 
unfortunately been developed over the years must 
change and any decision to move towards UHC would 
shake it vigorously leading to a more equitable system. 
UHC means improved health and reduced poverty; it 
means that rich and poor, women and men, young and 
old, sick and healthy, urban and rural  are all covered 
with a set of  affordable health service packages.
It is not expected that Bangladesh will achieve UHC 
overnight. This is simply not possible for a variety of  
reasons including financial constraints, inadequate 
availability of  service provisions and shortage of  
appropriate human resources. What is important, 
however, is for Bangladesh to express its strong political 
will and chart a road map with clear timeline. In this the 
government must play its stewardship and leadership 
role. The civil society and development partners will 
also have important responsibilities including making 
sure that the schemes benefit the poor (Joint NGO 
Briefing paper 2008, Gwatkin 2010). 
The following is a tentative agenda that the country can 
consider pursuing with flexibility for in-course 
modifications. 
1. Articulate clearly and unambiguously the 
government commitment to UHC through the next 
Health Nutrition and Population Sector 
Programme (HNPSP). This should include a 10-
year road map with clear goals for 2015 and 2020.
2. As a step towards more accountability and better 
implementation, separate the purchasing function 
of  MOHFW from the provider function by creating 
an independent purchasing authority in the like of  
NHSO in Thailand or RSBY in India.
3. Explore possibility for introducing health insurance 
(HI) for different groups in the population (through 
pilots if  necessary), including:
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The above proposal to introduce HI for specific groups 
may be seen as fragmentary and perhaps inefficient 
(producing smaller pool). But this may be necessary to 
creating the space and demand which can in the future 
be amalgamated as was done in many countries.
4. Encourage the big players in the NGO sector, such 
as ASA, BRAC and Grameen to join hands to 
develop and provide HI to their micro credit 
borrowers and the greater public through creating a 
joint pool. The three may also consider setting up a 
specialized health insurance company for the 
purpose. BRAC is already moving towards 
developing a scalable model for HI for its 
beneficiaries.
5. Involve and engage the media, professional groups 
such as the Bangladesh Medical Association and 
Bangladesh Economic Association and the civil 
society for advocacy work.
Fortunately, Bangladesh is not sitting idle. A lot has 
already being initiated as evidenced by the amount of  
activities being generated. The Prime Minister Sheikh 
thHasina in her inaugural address at the 64  World Health 
Assembly in Geneva in May 2011 made her 
commitment to achieve universal coverage for all its 
2citizens . A host of  activities are already taking place 
(See Annex for an account of  the current activities 
towards UHC). From the government side, there is an 
increased interest to learn more about its feasibility. The 
Health Economics Unit of  MOHFW has already 
started the ground work for piloting health insurance in 
two upazilas. The civil society groups are already 
piloting their versions of  health insurance with their 
members. The media has also started covering UHC. If  
the nation sets the goal to reach UHC by 2020, it may 
not be too ambitious. As mentioned in the text, UHC is 
a 'journey' and the first step has to be made 
immediately!
2.  http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2011/wha64/sheikh_hasina_speech_20110517/en/index.html.
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the academic community and the civil society. In January 
2011, the Minister of  Health and Family Welfare Prof  Ruhal 
Haque and a high-level delegation visited the Thai National 
Health Security Office in Bangkok to know for themselves 
how the Thai UHC system worked. Similarly, a delegation 
from Bangladesh attended a training workshop in Kerala, 
India on the functioning of  the Indian Rashtriya Shasthya 
Bima Yojana (RSBY). In June 2011, a high level delegation led 
by the Chairman of  the Parliamentary Standing Committee 
on Health Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim visited Thailand and 
4India . Included in the delegation were MPs, senior officials 
of  MoHFW, the Prime Minister's Office and NGOs and 
representatives of  the media. They saw for them-selves how 
the UHC system worked in these two countries and how the 
learning could be used to develop a similar system for 
Bangladesh. 
Leveraging the micro-finance (MF) platform:  
Bangladesh is the pioneer in popularizing micro-credit for 
poverty alleviation and women's em-powerment. More than 
half  of  the country's 160 million population are borrowers 
of  MF and are connected with micro-finance institutions 
(MFIs). The Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) is an 
apex body through which the government provides funds to 
MFIs to carry out MF activities. The PKSF has recently 
decided to initiate a pilot to test how the MF borrowers 
(numbering over 10 millions) served by its 250+ partner 
organizations could be offered better health care through HI. 
Some big MFIs such as Grameen, BRAC and others are 
already piloting different insurance products. BRAC is also 
exploring possibilities of  bringing HI to its all 7.5 million 
borrowers.
Pilot by ICDDR,B: The Centre for Health and Population 
Research (popularly known as ICDDR,B) is embarking on 
testing the feasibility of  HI in Chakoria upazila in Cox's Bazar 
district. Chakoria is one of  their field sites. This will make use 
of  the availability of  a large number of  private providers in 
the area to provide HI services.
Bangladesh Health Watch (BHW) report: The BHW is 
an influential civil society initiative in the country that 
monitors progress in attaining good health for the people. 
With support from a selection of  Bangladesh's leaders in 
health, the BHW has already produced three influential 
annual State of  Health reports ('Challenging inequities in 
health'; 'Health human resources: who constitutes the health 
Introduction
As the movement for universal health coverage (UHC) 
intensifies in other parts of  the world, there is an imperative 
to prepare Bangladesh for it. Bangladesh, being a low income 
country with a vast majority of  its people living in poverty, 
needs to protect its citizens against health shocks and run-
away out of  pocket expenses (OOP). This will also be an 
important and significant anti-poverty measure for which the 
country is pledge-bound. Fortunately, the country is not 
sitting idle and a good amount of  investment is already being 
made by the government, NGOs and development partners. 
The following gives a summary of  the different 
interventions/activities being implement-ted and/or are 
planned.
Government of  Bangladesh: The government is 
committed to ensuring effective access to health services by 
the people, particularly the poor, as reflected in various plan 
documents. The Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in her 
thinaugural address at the 64  World Health assembly in May 
2011 declared her commitment to universal coverage for all 
3of  its citizens . A variant of  demand-side finan-cing (DSF) 
for pregnancy care and delivery is being piloted in 35 upazilas 
(sub-districts) and the government has recently given a 'go 
ahead' to its Health Economics Unit to pilot a health 
insurance (HI) scheme in two upazilas. A few other activities 
are also being planned/imple-mented, some of  which are 
narrated below. The vision for health financing is being 
articulated in the new document for the next Health 
Nutrition and Population Sector Programme (HNPSP).
Indo-Bangladesh Dialogue: In the last Indo-Bangladesh 
Dialogue (February 2010) in Dhaka, a session was exclusively 
devoted to UHC in which three papers describing 
experiences from Bangladesh, India and Thailand were 
presented. The participants, who included top government 
officials, civil society leaders and academics from the India 
and Bangladesh including Nobel Laureate Professor 
Amartya Sen, discussed the need and feasibility for UHC in 
the Bangladeshi context. 
High-level visit to India and Thailand: Thailand has 
already attained UHC and India is moving fast towards it. To 
expose the policy makers in Bangladesh to such experiences 
in these countries, exposure visits by top officials of  the 
Ministries of  Health and Family Welfare are being 
undertaken. The delegation also includes representatives of  
ANNEX: MOVEMENT FOR UHC IN BANGLADESH
3. Her Excellency Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of  Bnagladesh: Speech to the Sixty-fourth World Health Assembly. 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2011/wha64/ sheikh_hasina_speech_20110517/en/index.html.
4. In India they visited the Rajib Aarogyasree programme in Andhra Pradesh and RSBY in Delhi and Haryana.
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system?'; 'How healthy is health governance in Bangladesh?'). 
For this year, the BHW is focusing on UHC.
Health insurance for Social Safety Nets beneficiaries: 
Bangladesh implements a number of  social safety nets 
programmes, most of  which target the extreme poor 
population. A pilot programme to introducing HI for the 
beneficiaries is being planned by an NGO in collaboration 
with relevant government departments. Similar HI 
programmes are also being planned for the country's large 
ready made garments sector which employs millions of  
women workers.
Mutual insurance Company: An international MFI 
network with operations in Bangladesh, INAFI, that set up a 
mutual micro-insurance company has decided to offer health 
insurance to the poor micro-credit borrowers. 
Centre of  Excellence (CoE) on UHC: The BRAC 
University James P. Grant School of  Public Health in Dhaka 
has set up a CoE on UHC. The purpose of  the Centre is to 
engage in research, training and advocacy for UHC. In 
addition, the CoE will also work as the co-Secretariat (with 
Results for Development or R4D in Washington DC) for the 
Global Task Force which is being set up to promote UHC 
globally.
International Conference on UHC: Bangladesh hosted an 
international conference on UHC in March 2011. This will be 
repeated every year until 2015. The purpose is to provide a 
platform for discourses on UHC in low income settings.
The Lancet series on Bangladesh: The Lancet has decided 
to publish a series on Bangladesh. Although the paper titles 
are yet to be finalized, a potential candidate is health financing 
and universal coverage. 
Engagement of  development partners: Several 
development partners in Bangladesh have expressed their 
clear interest in promoting UHC. They include, among 
others, GTZ, KfW, The Rockefeller Foundation, Unicef  and 
the World Bank (the protection cluster).
Media interest: The media is getting more interested in the 
area of  UHC. In the recent past there has been a number of  
special reports in leading dailies such as the Prothom-Alo. The 
Presss Institute of  Bangladesh (PIB) is planning to initiate a 
capacity development project for journalists who would be 
writing on health issues that affect the common people 
including the provision of  UHC for the poor.
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INTRODUCTION
ealth services in Bangladesh is primarily guided 
by its Constitution which says, 'Provisioning of  H
medical care to improve material and cultural standard 
of  living of  the people' (Article 15a of  the 
Constitution).  World Health Organization (WHO) 
defines health in a broader context where the 
Constitution limits it into medical care only. By the 
Alma-Ata Declaration signatories (noted as Health for 
All) in 1978, it was believed that Health for All would 
contribute to a better quality of  life. Accessibility of  
health services can not be achieved without a well-
functioning health financing system. The terminology 
of  Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is new in the 
sector and has come to a discussion in 2005 when 
member states of  the WHO committed to develop 
their health financing systems with an aim of  ensuring 
accessibility of  health services of  all without financial 
hardship paying for them (WHO. 2005). The goal is 
defined as universal health coverage. In WHO Health 
Report (2010), it emphasizes three fundamental 
questions to achieve this goal:
1. How is such a health system to be financed?
2. How can they protect people from the financial 
consequences of  ill-health and paying for health 
services?
3. How can they encourage the optimum use of  
available resources?
Although equity and reliability are important, UHC is 
broadly focused on financing health services. 
Given that total spending on healthcare is mainly 
determined by the macro-economy, the most important 
question is whether total resources available are 
sufficient to meet the needs of  universal coverage. A 
second factor is whether a sufficient proportion of  total 
spending on health-care can be channeled to finance a 
core package (Ensor 2008). This chapter does not 
consider that universal primary health care (PHC) 
would only constitute universal coverage. There is a 
need to cover priority services such as emergency 
obstetric care, care for life threatening injuries that can 
only be provided in hospitals. In this chapter, universal 
coverage includes PHC, maternal and child health, 
family planning (MCH-FP), and Essential Services 
Package.
In this chapter, we will touch upon the issues on policy 
and reforms of  the health sector which have an effect 
on universal health coverage.
The health sector in Bangladesh has experienced policy 
formulation and reforms during last forty years. The 
issues such as integrated and comprehensive service, 
pro-poor service, vertical approach, door to door and 
one stop service, cost-effective essential service 
package, etc dominate the reforms and policy. 
Since independence, Bangladesh did not have a 
coherent health policy for the first three decades.  
Immediately after the independence, population 
control received the top most priority as the population 
density was 531 people per square kilometer with an 
annual population growth rate of  2.6. A stated objective 
of  First five-year plan (1973-1978) was to create a rural 
health infrastructure for providing integrated and 
comprehensive health services. In early 1974, the 
country's population sector was overwhelmed with 
external assistance (Buse 1999) and the government 
began to initiate policy and organizational changes 
following donor prescriptions (Jahan 2003). The World 
Bank became involved with an appraisal for a first 
population project and evolved in 1975 along with six 
development partners that acted as co-financiers (Buse 
and Gwin 1998). The population projects were based 
on vertical family planning service delivery and the 
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bifurcation of  the health and family planning services 
of  MOHFW, with most resources and programme 
interventions targeted to family planning. Since the 
mid-1970s until 1990s, the family planning programme 
was largely supply-driven and incentive-based. Along 
with the government, NGO participation was 
remarkable. The main strategy of  first population 
policy (1976) was to provide comprehensive health and 
family planning services through clinics and field 
workers, with a strong emphasis on doorstep services to 
rural women. It was an attempt to ensure coverage of  
the family planning services among the people in need.
The Second five-year plan (1980-85) encouraged the 
private sector and NGOs to share responsibilities to 
deliver services to the people. Secondly, following the 
Alma Ata Declaration (1978), the country adopted a 
comprehensive community-based PHC system. 
Instead of  providing these services, the system 
primarily focused on child health, especially growth 
monitoring, oral rehydra-tion, breastfeeding, and 
Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI). 
Despite government repeated commitments, 
Bangladesh largely failed to translate the Alma Ata 
principles in its PHC system. 
In the early 1980s, Bangladesh led the world in 
formulating an essential drug policy, the National Drug 
Policy (Drugs (Control) Ordinance, 1982) and updated 
and revised it in 2004 (MOHFW 2005). The home-
grown Drug Policy played the far-reaching role and was 
defended by the political leadership in the face of  
serious external reservations (Chowdhury 1996 and 
White 2007). This was instrumental in the country in 
making essential medicines available at low cost and was 
appreciated as the share of  out-of-pocket expenditure 
by households in total national expenditure is 
exceptionally high.
By the early 1990s, the portfolio of  donor involvement 
reflected global concern with health sector reform. 
When the government started negotiations with the 
donors for the preparation and financing of  the Fifth 
five-year Health and Population project in 1995, the 
1donors  pressed for policy and structural reforms. The 
health sector has been shifting its health policy priorities 
and investment from a focus on family planning to 
comprehensive services. Equity was important 
consideration and the country put poverty issues on the 
agenda at a joint government-donor consultation in 
Paris in September 1995 (Jahan 2003). The first SWAp, 
Health and Population Sector Programme (HPSP) was 
launched in 1998 for five years to 'improve the health of  
women, children and the poor.' The core strategy of  
HPSP approach is to earmark about 60% of  the 
national health budget for ESP to be delivered through 
the PHC system, i.e., at upazila level and below. HPSP 
was designed not to operate in urban areas as urban 
health is the responsibility of  the city corporations and 
municipalities and not of  the health ministry. 
The HPSP got approval from an administrative body 
(ECNEC) not from the legislative body, i.e., the 
parliament. A number of  reforms have been carried 
out: a) Transition from a vertically integrated but 
horizontally segregated project-based approach 
towards a sectorwide approach; b) Unification of  the 
health and family planning wings of  the MOHFW at 
upazila level; c) Introduction of  an Essential Service 
2Package  (ESP) which included basic services; d) The 
doorstep approach was phased out in favour of  services 
3delivered through 16,000 new community clinics , each 
serving a population of  around 6,000. The intention 
was to access health services by enabling community to 
meet their needs in one single visit. The health and 
family planning workers who previously made home 
visits were gradually redeployed and based in these 
1. In general, the reforms supported by the donors were geared towards improving the efficiency and financial sustainability of  the health system. However, 
Different donors promoted different issues (detail Jahan 2003, Buse 1999)
2. The package includes a) reproductive health care-including safe motherhood, family planning, other reproductive services including sexually transmitted 
diseases; b) child health care-including acute respiratory infections, diarrhoeal diseases, vaccine preventable diseases and adolescent care implemented 
through an integrated management of  sick approach; c) communicable diseases control including tuberculosis, leprosy, malaria, filarial, kala-azar, and 
emerging diseases; d) limited curative care concentrating on first aid, for trauma, medical and surgical emergencies, asthma, skin diseases, eye, dental and 
infectious ear diseases; and e) behavior change communication is meant influencing health behaviours and health-care-seeking practices across all of  the ESP 
components (MOHFW 1998)
3. Few health professionals do not consider community clinic as a reform as five basic maternal, child and public health services were previously delivered from 
one single service point.
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facilities. In the first three years of  HPSP 
implementation (1998-2000), the government started 
to build 'one-stop' community clinics to provide ESP. 
There was also a paradigm shift regarding NGO and 
private sector involvement in the HPSP which sets out 
the basic principles for government-NGO colla-
boration. 
Prior to SWAp and followed by the World Bank's 
publication of  'An Agenda for Reform' and global 
influence, the user fees were introduced in Bank's 
projects (MOHFW 1997). There was a strong push by 
encouraging the private sector to take care of  health 
service delivery and resource mobilization in public 
facilities. NGOs implemented a number of  cost-
recovery schemes, such as, selling of  family planning 
commodities, and community financing/health 
4insurance. The user fees were introduced  in 1997 to 
increase revenue in the health sector. An outpatient fee 
of  Tk. 3 and an admission fee of  Tk. 5 were introduced 
at THC level but the practice was discontinued from 
March 1998. The practice was continuing in the Thana 
Functional Improvement Pilot Project (TFIPP), a pilot 
project of  the DGHS was implemented during 1992-
1999. The project ultimately tried to increase the 
demand for health services through community 
involvement. However, under the user fees scheme, the 
cost recovery was less than 15% (NHA 1996-97) and 
coverage levels. These were not the aim of  HPSP and 
also it does not satisfy the issue of  protecting people 
from ill health according to UHC.
The first National Health Policy was introduced in 2000. The 
Policy does not include any guideline related to finance 
for private sector health service system and regulation. 
It only discusses about user fee system and introducing 
the health insurance system. There is no guideline how 
to respond to financial consequences of  ill health and 
paying for health service. There are some provision of  
financial support system during care service through 
social welfare ministry, but comprehensive support for 
ill health specially for chronic diseases are absent in 
health policy.  
After 2003, when the HPSP ended, the SWAp was 
continued under the name of  Health, Nutrition and 
Population Sector Programme (HNPSP). During 
HPSP the policy was targeting more resources towards 
facilities at upazila and below as lower income groups 
predominantly use these facilities. Under HNPSP, this 
policy has been adjusted with greater emphasis to 
providing more resources to poorer households. In 
resource and implementation terms the programme 
remains largely focused on a targeted delivery strategy.
The nutrition component started with the first major 
nutrition project called the Bangladesh Integrated 
5Nutrition Programme  (BINP 1995-2002) with World 
Bank funding. Despite criticism (INFS 1999, MOHFW 
2002, Haider et al. 2004, Hossain et al. 2005, White 2005, 
World Bank 2005a, World Bank 2005b, White and 
Masset 2007) the government went ahead with a scaled 
up version of  the project titled National Nutrition 
Programme (NNP) and it was launched in 2004 and 
became in conjun-ction with the HNPSP. The 
6Programme  had coverage of  11.9 million under-2 
children and 3 million pregnant women. 
The HNPSP reverted to the unification of  the health 
and family planning wings of  the MOHFW, with a 
partial return to the earlier practice of  domiciliary 
services and suspended community clinics where about 
10,000 of  planned 16,000 were already constructed. 
Some observers point to the clinics as fallout from the 
unification episode, others argue that the failure of  the 
4. According to a pattern established by the Secretary, MOHFW through general circulars issued by Ministry of  Finance, the sources of  user fees collected and 
distributed at district hospitals and medical college hospitals.
5. The project had three inter-related objectives: (a) To improve the capacity of  national level nutrition institutions in Bangladesh in the areas of  advocacy, 
analysis of  causation and consequences of  malnutrition, policy advice, operational research, and operational support of  national programmes; (b) To improve 
the capacity of  communities, households and individuals in the project areas to better understand their nutritional problems in practical terms and take 
appropriate actions to address them at their own level; (c) To improve the nutritional status of  the population in the project area, with particular emphasis on 
children and pregnant and lactating women.
6. The project itself  claims to have reduced prevalence of  low birth-weight, improved exclusive breastfeeding practice, and reduced moderate and severe 
malnutrition better than the national average. The validity of  these claims is difficult to judge, however, since as a recent review notes authentic supervision 
and monitoring mechanism does not seem to exist at any level of  NNP (IRT 2009a). The project's own monitoring report is based on recording by NGO 
partners who are implementing most of  the activities. Since these are not technically supervised or monitored and there are no external evaluations of  the 
activities of  the NGOs, the success claimed by them is open to question.
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clinics was indeed politically motivated (White 2007). 
The programme adopted demand side financing (DSF) 
options and this project distributes vouchers to 
pregnant women entitling them to access free antenatal, 
delivery, emergency referral, and postpartum care 
services, as well as providing cash stipends for 
transportation and cash and kind incentives for 
delivering with a qualified health provider. The analysis 
of  DSF and its effect on universal health coverage is 
presented in greater detail chapter 5. 
During this time, two major NGOs responsible for 
health care of  urban people: a) NGO Service Delivery 
Project (NSDP), supported by USAID; and b) The 
Urban Primary Health Care Project (UPHCP), mainly 
financed by ADB and DFID and Nordic Development 
Fund. The main objective of  the project was to provide 
ESP services and curative care with a focus on women, 
children and reproductive health, and that was operated 
by the local government. The partner NGOs were 
supposed to mobilize resources through user fees. This 
initiative has increased coverage of  health services and 
among poor in the urban area. 
During 2005-2010, Bangladesh has successfully 
accessed grants of  US$265 million from Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) and 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
7(GFATM) in a number of  rounds . Till 2011, the funds 
are being used to strengthen current DOTS (Directly 
Observed Treatment Short course)activities to involve 
the private sector more closely in fighting TB; to create 
demand by conducting advocacy and social 
mobilization communication campaigns and to 
develop joint TB-HIV/AIDS collaborative activities. 
This is an example of  government-NGO cooperation. 
The relationship and support started by the 
government to ICDDR,B for ORS; the government 
manufactured ORS in its own factory, while Social 
Marketing Company (SMC) developed the marketing 
chain. The cooperation has been able to serve more 
people in need.
A summary of  reforms and changes are shown 
graphically in Figure 1.
7. The government of  Bangladesh, the principal recipient of  the Global Fund HIV grants, signed an agreement with Save the Children USA as the Management 
Agency (MA) to manage the projects at national scale in both rural and urban settings. Save the Children USA has been managing the grants through 
facilitating the implementation by sub-recipients at the NGO, institutional, private sector and community level. For TB, the GFATM works in coordination 
with the government and with BRAC, the latter being responsible to coordinate fund disbursement to NGOs.
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Figure: Health sector reforms, changes and policies in Bangladesh: 1971-2010
Source: Bangladesh Health Watch 2011
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Despite initiating health sector reforms, the MOHFW 
of  Bangladesh could not channel the target allocation 
(60-65% of  total resources) towards upazila and lower 
administrative levels. Moreover, there remains inequity 
in resource distribution across administrative units.
Financing the huge amount of  resources required for 
the universal health coverage might not be feasible for 
the public sector alone. To achieving universal health 
coverage, policy makers, therefore, need to assess the 
feasibility of  devising non-traditional mecha-nism for 
financing, such as, introduction of  social health 
insurance, private health insurance and community 
financing. 
Bangladesh, in its reforms and policy, has proved 
quite good at achieving outcomes which are 
immediately and directly linked to visible 
intervention and is less interested on those which 
took time to have substantial changes in the health 
system. The disruption of  delivery of  ESP is an 
example of  putting less emphasis in the reforms and 
policies. All these result in prevailing socio-
economic and geographical inequity in health 
outcome. There is a need to be consistent in priority 
setting in the policy and reform to achieve UHC.
· The government's leadership and ownership is vital 
to achieve UHC in the country as it is a reform and 
policy issue. The high level policy makers need to 
have commitment to adopt a homegrown and 
contextualized policy and strategy.
· There is a need for an appropriate mix of  supply side 
subsidies and demand side financing. Ultimately 
UHC depends largely on compulsory payments 
whether general taxation or payroll taxes, known as 
social insurance. The extent to which the country 
can provide this type of  funding largely determines 
whether UHC is possible. Another observation is 
that how the money is used. Health financing 
strategy is immediately needed in the sector 
programmes and policy.
·
RECOMMENDATIONS
!
!
!
DISCUSSION
The analysis of  policy and reforms of  the last forty 
years in Bangladesh reveals that the government, 
through reforms and policy, has emphasised the 
coverage of  services in an equitable way. There is no 
guideline and strategy of  how these services to be 
financed or how to protect people from catastrophic 
expenditure or how to encourage the optimum use of  
resources.
The government of  different time periods has always 
been eager to look at the indicators which give quick 
and visible results rather than systematic changes where 
gains will be attained in the long run. For example, one 
of  the major factors in reducing IMR is universal 
coverage of  child immunization which is target 
oriented and visible. Despite progress in reducing IMR, 
neonatal mortality remains high: 39.2 per 1000 live 
births (BDHS 2007) and a reduction cannot be 
achieved through immunization only. Improvements in 
the health system  to ensure quality, sustained 
supervision, and monitoring (Arifeen 2008) and 
placement of  appropriate staff  at the health facility, 
blood transfusion, and other essential logistics (BMMS 
2011) are essential in reducing neonatal and maternal 
mortality. Achievement from the investment in these 
areas takes time, specifically for universal coverage.
The government ownership and leadership in policy 
formulation and reform are not strong enough; most of  
the steps are influenced by the donors. Even the Health 
Policy and sector reforms have not been debated in the 
National parliament. It is often said that sector reforms 
serve more the interest of  donors than national interest 
(IEG 2006). The delivery of  universal coverage of  
essential service package (ESP) was disrupted because 
of  a number of  systems issues that were not fully 
addressed in the reforms and policies. For example, the 
unification decision of  health and family planning 
services which was reversed with great political fall-out 
within the country. Construction of  community health 
clinics was partially implemented, yet very few became 
operational, was scrapped by the government for 
political reasons. Under upcoming Sector plan, this 
initiative will be implemented with an aim of  
community involvement; however the effort does not 
mention about the mechanism of  resource 
mobilization and use.  
21
Bangladesh Health Watch Report 2011
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Ms Simeen Mahmud, 
Syed Masud Ahmed, Dr Abbas Bhuiya, Dr Timothy G 
Evans for their suggestions and comments. The 
authors wish to acknowledge Ms Tahmina Begum, 
Consultant, GTZ, Dr Tim Ensor, Principal Consultant 
(Health Economics), Oxford Policy Management 
Limited (OPML), Mr M M Reza, former Secretary, 
Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare, Mr Syed Khaled 
Ahsan, Institutional Development Specialist, World 
Bank, and Dr M A Sabur, former Team Leader, 
Programme Support Office, Health, Nutrition, and 
Population Sector Programme, Ministry of  Health and 
Family Welfare for their suggestions, discussion, and 
comments on the earlier version of  this chapter.
REFERENCES
Arifeen SE (2008). Child Health and Mortality, J Health Popul 
Nutr 2008 Sept: 26(3):273-79
BDHS (2007). National Institute of  Population Research and 
Training (NIPORT), Mitra and 
Associates, and Macro International. (2009). Bangladesh 
Demographic and Health Survey 2007. Dhaka, Bangladesh and 
Calverton, Maryland, USA.
BNHA (2003). Bangladesh National Health Accounts, 1996-
1997. Dhaka: Health Economics Unit, MOHFW, 
Government of  Bangadesh.
BMMS (2011). Bangladesh Maternal Mortality and Health 
Care Survey 2010: Summary of  Key Findings and 
Implications. Dhaka: USAID, ICDDR,B, NIPORT, 
AUSAID, UNFPA, and Measure Evaluation.  
Buse K (1999). Keeping a tight grip on the reins: donor 
control over aid coordination and management in 
Bangladesh. Health Policy and Planning, 14(3): 219-28
Buse K & Gwin C (1998). The World Bank and global 
cooperation in health: The case of  Bangladesh. The 
Lancet: 351(9103), 665-69
Chowdhury Z (1996). The Politics of  Essential Drugs The 
Makings of  A Successful Health Strategy: Lessons from 
Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh. The University Press 
Limited
Ensor T (2008). Universal Coverage in Developing 
Countries, In: Heggenhougen K and Quah S [Editors]. 
International Encyclopedia of  Public Health, San Diego: 
Academic Press 2008. (6): 441-52
Haider SJ, Hussain D, Nayer I, Maleque A, Ashaduzzaman 
and Khan AR (2004). Impact Evaluation of  Bangladesh 
Integrated Nutrition Project. Dhaka: IMED, Planning 
Commission, Government of  Bangladesh.
Hossain SMM, Duffield A & Taylor A (2005). An 
Evaluation of  the Impact of  a US$60 Million Nutrition 
Programme in Bangladesh. Health Policy and Planning 20(1)
IEG (2006). “Bangladesh Fourth Population and Health 
Project (Credit No. 2259) and Health and Population 
Program Project (Credit 3101),” Project Performance 
Assessment Report. World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
IEG (2009). Denise Vaillancourt. “Do Health Sector- Wide 
Approaches Achieve Results”?  Emerging Evidence and 
Lessons from Six countries, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
(IEG Working Paper 2009/4)
IRT (2009). Bangladesh Health Population and Nutrition Sector 
Programme (HPNSP): Annual Progress Review (APR), Vol. I: 
Main Consolidated Report. Dhaka: Independent Review Team, 
Ministry of  Health, Family and Welfare, Government of  
Bangladesh. 
INFS (1999). Mid-Term Evaluation of  the Bangladesh Integrated 
Nutrition Project. Dhaka: Institute of  Nutrition and Food 
Sciences, University of  Dhaka. 
Jahan R (2003). Restructuring the health system: 
experiences of  advocates for gender equity in Bangladesh. 
Reproductive Health Matters 11: 183-91
MOHFW (1997). Health and Population Sector Strategy 
1996 Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare, Dhaka: 
Government of  Bangladesh,
MOHFW (1998). Health and Population Sector 
Programme 1998-2003: Programme Implemen-tation Plan, 
Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare, Dhaka: 
Government of  Bangladesh
MOHFW (2002). Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project: 
Monitoring Report January 2002. Dhaka: Ministry of  Health 
and Family Welfare, Government of  Bangladesh. 
22
Dynamics of Health Sector Policy and Reforms
World Bank (1993). World Development Report: Investing 
in Health. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
World Bank (2005a). Maintaining Momentum to 2015? An 
Impact Evaluation of  External Support to Maternal and Child 
Health and Nutrition in Bangladesh. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank.
World Bank (2005b). Implementation Completion Report: 
Bangladesh Health and Population Sector Program. Report No. 
34755. Washington, D.C.: Operations Evaluation 
Department, World Bank.
World Health Organization (2005). Resolution WHA58.33. 
Sustainable health financing, universal
coverage and social health insurance. In: Fifty-eighth World 
Health Assembly, Geneva, (1625 May 2005)
MOHFW (2005). HNPSP Health, Nutrition and 
Population Sector Programme Revised Programme 
Implementation Plan July 2003-June 2010 (p366). Dhaka: 
Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare, Government of  
the People's Republic of  Bangladesh.
White H (2005). Comment on Contributions Regarding the 
Impact of  the Bangladesh Integrated 
Nutrition Project Health Policy and Planning 20(6) 
White H (2007). The Bangladesh Health Swap: Experience 
of  a New Aid Instrument in Practice. Development Policy 
Review 2007; 25 (4): 451-72
White H & and Masset E (2007). “Assessing Interventions 
to Improve Child Nutrition: A Theory-Based Impact 
Evaluation of  the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition 
Project.” Journal of  International Development 19(5). 
23
Bangladesh Health Watch Report 2011

The policy reforms commenced under SWAp, known 
as Health and Population Sector Programme (HPSP) 
necessitated changes in the resource allocation, 
budgeting and health care expenditure pattern of  the 
MOHFW. To achieve equity and efficiency in resource 
distribution, an ESP was designed to allocate 60-65% of  
the total healthcare resources to the primary level 
(upazila and lower level). It was also planned to target 
the poorer districts and allocate more resources 
towards them, while performance-based financing had 
been introduced very recently within MOHFW. 
However, evidence suggests that there exists high gap 
in health conditions between the rich and the poor 
(World Bank 2005), and poor still find it difficult to 
access high quality essential services in Bangladesh 
(Rabbani et al. 2006). Along with limited resources to 
ensure universal health coverage, inequity in resource 
distribution across adminiatrative units and inefficiency 
in resource use are also influencing access of  the poor 
to health services (Rabbani et al., 2006; World Bank 
2005; HEU and MAU 2001). Though a number of  
interventions were initiated under reforms, less 
attention has been paid on the equity and efficiency of  
public spending on health and population services. In 
recent years, the MOHFW and development partners 
are therefore emphasizing the development of  strategic 
options that would provide greater opportunities for 
equitable and efficient allocation and expenditure of  
health care resources (Ensor et al. 2001, MOHFW 2005, 
Rabbani et al. 2006, World Bank 2005). The followup 
programme of  HPSP- the Health, Nutrition and 
Population Sector Programme (HNPSP) now 
considers the proportion of  the Government budget 
devoted to health, and the proportion of  funding to the 
25% poorest districts as the two major indicators to 
assess the performance of  HNPSP (Begum et al. 2007). 
Ch
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INTRODUCTION
rom the late 1980's and throughout the 1990s the 
ministries of  health in many developing countries F
began to review and reform the functioning of  their 
health system as part of  a general economic 
restructuring. The contextual factors of  introducing 
health sector reforms included demographic and 
epidemiological change, changes in politics and political 
regime, ideology and public policy, changes in 
economic and financial policies, process of  social and 
economic change, and influence of  external factor 
(Collins et al. 1999). The deep rooted inefficiencies, 
inequities, unresponsiveness to users, and inability to 
contain costs within publicly funded and provided 
health systems were also responsible to initiate several 
changes within the health system (Mills 1998).  
Although variations can be found between countries, 
the key approaches to the health sector reforms 
involved decentralisation, the public/private mix, 
separation of  the functions of  'purchaser' and 
'provider', cost sharing (health insurance) and cost 
recovery (user fees) (Green et al. 2000, Bossert et al. 
2003). The Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare 
(MOHFW) of  Bangladesh also introduced health 
sector reforms in late 1990's to promote greater equity 
and efficiency in resource use (MOHFW 2002). The 
main elements of  the reforms were Sector Wide 
Approach (SWAp), Essential Service Package (ESP), 
unification of  the Directorates, adminis-trative 
decentralisation, creating static clinics (known as 
Community Clinic) and introducing user fees. Under 
the health sector reforms, the MOHFW aimed to 
achieve sustainable improvements in health, nutrition 
and reproductive health status of  the vulnerable 
groups, including women, children, the elderly and the 
poor (MOHFW 2005). 
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This paper aims to analyse the extent to which the 
MOHFW could achieve the stated objectives of  achie-
veing equity and efficiency in resource use. It also 
intends to explore the additional resources the 
government of  Bangladesh (GOB) must spend to 
achieve universal health coverage in Bangladesh, and 
the feasibility of  accumulating the resources through 
the traditional mechanism of  financing. 
The Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) 
of  Bangladesh is one of  the largest ministries in terms 
of  budgetary allocation. It works as a financial 
intermediary of  the Government of  Bangladesh 
(GOB); it receives funds from the Ministry of  Finance 
(MOF) and the development partners, and allocates 
funds to health facilities at different levels (Fig 1).
Expenditure by level of care
There has been a considerable shift in the trend of  
public health care expenditure by level of  care over the 
last decade. Before the health sector reforms in 
1996/97, the share of  the MOHFW resources going to 
primary and tertiary level care was nearly the same, 38% 
and 37% of  total health care expenditure, respectively, 
while in 1999/2000, the propor-tion of  MOHFW 
expenditure incurred at the upazila and lower level 
health facilities to total MOHFW expenditure increased 
to 62%. However, despite the initial changes in the 
expenditure pattern, the MOHFW could not meet the 
target of  channelling 60-65% health care resources to 
the primary level facilities since 2003/04 (49%), and the 
proportion declined to 52% in 2006/07 (Fig 2). There is 
no evidence that the SWAp itself  had an impact on the 
total level of  funding devoted to ESP services.
SPENDING OF MOHFW
Geographic allocation
Effectiveness of  MOHFW goal of  spatial equity can be 
broadly assessed by disaggregating the MOHFW 
expenditures by rural-urban categories and by the 
income quintile. The findings of  Rabbani et al. (2006) 
suggest that though the two-thirds of  total MOHFW 
allocation goes to rural areas, per capita expen-diture in 
rural areas (Tk. 172) is markedly lower than that in 
urban areas (Tk. 338). Comparing per capita spending 
across districts by poverty status suggests that per capita 
healthcare expenditure through the revenue and 
development budgets of  the MOHFW has been 
highest for the richest districts and lowest for the 
poorest districts, in contrast to the government policy 
to allocate more resources to the poorer areas. This 
suggests that those who are in greater need are actually 
receiving relatively fewer amounts of  resources (Huque 
2009), the case of  'Inverse care law' (Hart 1972). The 
BNHA (2003), for the first time systematically assesses 
spending by geographical division. Not all the 
expenditures can be apportioned to a particular 
division, but ignoring such expenditures, in 2007 the 
overall health expenditure per capita was highest in 
Dhaka division (Tk. 1,337), which was three times 
higher than that in Barisal (Tk. 449 per capita). 
However, it needs to be acknowledged that there have 
been changes in the current spending pattern in favour 
of  poorer areas as compared to early HPSP period with 
spending in the poorest areas growing by 52% as 
compared to 24% in the richest areas. Moreover, over 
the three-year period of  2003/04-2005/06, the per 
capita allocation to the poorest districts has risen by 
around 31% compared to an average of  25% for all 
districts (Huque 2009). 
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Figure 1.
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Figure 2. MOHFW spending by level of  care
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The successive health sector plans of  Bangladesh aim 
to channel resources to the vulnerable groups  women, 
children and the poor. However, the public expenditure 
continues  to  favour  the  rich  relative  to  the poor. 
Health care expenditure of  the MOHFW at different 
levels shows that 27% of  the primary level health care 
allocation is going to the richest quintile and 21% to the 
poorest quintile. At all three levels  primary, secondary 
and tertiary  the poor people receive less healthcare 
resources provided by the public sector than the rich 
people, as opposed to the policy objective as well as 
meeting universal health coverage. The BNHA (2003) 
suggests that the tenth or the richest decile is the largest 
beneficiary group using 15.4% of  National Health 
Expenditure (NHE), while the poorest represented by 
the lowest decile account for around 8.2% of  NHE. 
The richest decile as a group used more than one and 
half  time the healthcare used by the poorest decile.
It is to note that expenditures by the NGO facilities are 
relatively progressive, benefiting the poor more 
compared to the richer deciles, while public provisions 
were the least progressive, benefitting the rich 
compared to the poorest decile. The poor still finds it 
difficult to access essential services at public facilities in 
rural areas, which needs particular attention of  the 
policy makers while moving towards universal health 
coverage.
Efficiency of resource use
Allocating additional resources from centre to local 
levels does not necessarily imply that it will lead to 
improved health outcome, unless resources are used 
efficiently. The widespread waste of  resources because 
of  poor purchasing and distribution systems, 
o v e r s t a f f i n g ,  a n d  s p e n d i n g  r e s o u r c e s  
disproportionately to a few tertiary care hospitals are 
seen as inefficiency of  public sector resource use 
(Withanachchi et al. 2007, Daniels 2000, Mills 1998, 
Sahn and Berneir 1995). 
In Bangladesh, medical and surgical requisites, vaccine 
and medicines, food, computer and accessories are 
being purchased from both the revenue and 
development budgets of  MOHFW. This leads to 
duplication of  efforts in one area and less attention in 
other areas within MOHFW leading to inefficiecy in 
resource use. Moreover, actual final expenditure falls 
short of  approved budget in almost every year with 
huge amount of  unspent scarce resources within 
MOHFW. In 2006/07, 16 percent of  the revised 
MOHFW revenue budget and one fourth of  the 
revised MOHFW development budget remained 
unspent, much higher than that in 2005/06 (Table 1). 
One of  the major reasons of  underspending during the 
HPSP remained unfamiliarity with the new 
procurement methods based on World Bank guidelines 
under 'pool' funding mechanism. These methods had 
delayed much procurement and meant that over the 
first two years of  HPSP, spending was around 12% 
below the planned budget. Family planning supplies 
had largely been untouched and spending on maternal 
care was only 40% of  what was planned in the initial 
HPSP planning documents.  Inappropriate  
disbursement mechanism also delayed progress of  
work leading to unspent resources within MOHFW 
(Huque 2009). This under spending of  health care 
resources drew attention of  the policy makers in recent 
years, and actual spending of  health care resources as a 
proportion of  total MOHFW budget is therefore seen 
as a criteria for measuring efficiency in resource use 
(Begum et al. 2009, HEU and MAU 2001).
We now turn to examine the additional resour-ces the 
government of  Bangladesh (GOB) must spend to 
achieve universal health coverage in Bangladesh. 
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PROJECTED PUBLIC HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE TO ACHIEVE 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE
For universal health coverage, policy makers need to 
carefully project the minimum amount of  resources the 
GOB needs to spend, and the possible ways to generate 
the required amount of  money. 
Barkat (2010) made an attempt to estimate the 
minimum amount of  money the Government of  
Bangladesh (GOB) should spend to provide with PHC. 
He suggests that the annual public health budget should 
be Tk. 234,000 million (US$1= BDT 65) if  the GOB 
wants to comply with the norm of  World Health 
Organization (WHO) to spend US$24 per capita per 
year. Following his estimate, the authors have estimated 
the required budget to achieve the universal health 
coverage (Table 2). 
Currently, the population of  Bangladesh is 158 million 
(UN estimate) and using the WHO suggested norm, 
requires annually a total of  274,173 million Taka to 
provide the 'basichealth services'. The population is 
expected to each 217 million in 2024/25 if  population 
grows at a rate of  2%. This would require public health 
care spending of  Tk. 376,381 million. If  GOB wants to 
allocate 100% of  the required budget, public health 
budget has to grow at a rate of  35% over the period of  
2009/10 and 2014/15, which may not be feasible for 
GOB due to resource constraint. If  public health 
budget complies with 40% norms suggested by WHO, 
the budget should grow at an annual rate of  5.4%, it will 
increase from current level of  Tk. 68,320 million to Tk. 
150,552 million in 2024/25. This shows a huge deficit 
for GOB to provide 'basic health care' as suggested by 
WHO.
If  we assume that GOB will allocate 50% of  the 
required budget, public health budget has to grow at a 
rate of  17.7% over the period of  2009/10 and 2014/15, 
and at a rate of  2% over the period of  2014/15 and 
2024/25. 
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Table 1.  Total health care budgets (development and revenue) and actual expenditure of  MOHFW (in 
Million Taka, current price), 1993/04  2007/08
Year Actual budget Revised budget Actual expenditure Expenditure as % of
revised budget
1993-94 9,540 n/a 10,730 112.5*
1994-95 13,430 n/a 13,740 102.3*
1995-96 15,830 16,270 14,589 89.7
1996-97 16,640 16,649 17,170 103.1
1997-98 19,070 n/a 18,980 99.5*
1998-99 21,236 19,197 18,569 96.7
1999-00 24,417 23,450 20,783 88.6
2000-01 25,585 26,270 20,627 78.5
2001-02 25,861 26,490 23,810 89.9
2002-03 26,011 27,970 23,897 85.4
2003-04 29,220 33,450 27,861 83.3
2004-05 37,320 31,750 28,390 89.4
2005/06 42,400 41,120 37,040 90.1
2006/07 47,850 49,580 39,420 79.5
2007/08 54,700 52,510 n/a n/a
Source: HEU and MAU (2001), Rabbani et al. (2006), Begum et al. (2009)
Expenditure as % of  actual budget
Assumptions of  the projection are:
1. Population growth rate remains constant at 2% over 
the period 
2. Per capita expenditure per year is Tk. 1,728 
3. The total public health expenditure in 2009/10 is Tk 
68,320 million (This is the total budget of  
MOHFW) 
4. Health care budget will grow at an annual rate of  6% 
If  GOB aims to allocate the target expenditure (US$ 24 
per person per year) by 2014/15, then budget has to 
grow at a higher rate of  35% over the period of  
2009/10- 2014/15. Once GOB achieves this target, 
growth rate of  the budget will be proportional to growth 
rate of  population, given the per capita expenditure 
constant. However, if  the GOB attempts to achieve the 
target by 2024/25, the required annual growth rate of  
the budget would have to be 12% (Table 3). 
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Table 2. Public expenditure required for universal health coverage 
Indicators 2009/2010 2014/2015 2019/2020 2024/2025 
A. Population 158,665,000 178,682,560 197,279,985 217,813,044 
B. Total public health expenditure Ideally required for 
universal health coverage (million Taka)  274,173 308,763 340,899 376,381 
C. Estimated health care budget with 6% growth rate 
(million Taka)  68,320 91,427 122,350 163,732 
D. Deficit to achieve universal health coverage (million 
Taka) (B – C) 205,853 217,335 218,549 212,648 
E. Amount of  budget if  GOB provides 50% of  ideally 
required budget (50% of  B) (million Taka) 137,086 154,382 170,450 188,190 
F.  Amount of  budget if  GOB provides 40% of  ideally 
required budget (40% of  B) (million Taka) 109,669 123,505 136,360 150,552 
G. Required budget if  GOB provides 25% of  ideally 
required budget (25% of  B) (million Taka) 68,543 77,190 85,224 94095 
Table 3. Required growth rate of  public health budget 
Indicators Required growth rate of  budget
  2009/2010- 
2014/2015 
2014/2015- 
2019/2020 
2019/2020- 
2024/25 
2009/10-
2024/25 
If  GOB provides 100% of  ideally required budget 35.21% 2% 2% 12.05% 
If  GOB provides 50% of  ideally required budget 17.7% 2% 2% 7% 
If  GOB provides 40% of  ideally required budget 12.57% 2% 2% 5.4% 
If  GOB provides 25% of  ideally required budget 2.5% 2% 2% 2.2% 
Feasibility of  generating resources for universal 
health coverage
In Bangladesh, the major sources of  healthcare funding 
include: household, government, NGOs and 
development partners. Insurance makes up a small 
percent share of  the total source of  financing in 
Bangladesh (BNHA 2003). The above projection 
(Table 2, 3) raises the question of  whether the GOB can 
generate the required amount of  resources to achieve 
universal health coverage. Government health 
expenditures are principally funded through general 
revenue taxation and support from international 
development partners. Government's revenues are 
mobilised through tax and non-tax revenues. In 2008-
09, the total revenue receipt of  GOB was Tk. 692 
billion. It can be said that with such a low tax base of  the 
country, it may not be possible for the government to 
generate sufficient revenue to meet the resources 
required for universal health coverage. The financing 
pattern of  Bangladesh's national health expenditure 
also supports this. Share of  the public sector in the 
overall financing of  the national expenditure, which is 
dominated by MOHFW expenditures, is declining 
(BNHA 2003). Though the Total Health Expenditure 
(THE) shows a steady increase in both per capita and 
1total volume of  expenditures , the share of  govern-
ment proportion in THE is decreasing over time from 
36% in 1997 to 26% in 2007. The MOHFW spent 
0.95% of  GDP in 1996/97, which declined to only 
0.77% of  GDP on health in 2004/05. The share of  
MOHFW expenditure in GDP was 0.84% in 2005/06 
(Fig 3).
The share of  development partners' contribution in 
Annual Development Programme (ADP) is also 
declining over time as evidenced by a lower share of  
Annual Development Programme (41.2%) in 2007 
compared to 50.8% in 1997 for MOHFW. During the 
five years of  HPSP, the proportion of  the develop-
ment partners' contribution to HPSP stood at around 
66%, which has also fallen to 54% during the first three 
years of  HNPSP. This is far from achieving UHC in the 
country from government's end, which in turn, is 
increasing the out-of-pocket expenditures of  
households to meet their health care need over the 
years.
Together with the continued absence of  social 
insurance initiative and a minuscule privateinsurance 
market is compelling the house-holds, particularly the 
rural poor, to bear a large proportion of  national health 
expen-diture through direct or out of  pocket (OOP) 
payments. Household OOP expenditures constitute by 
far the largest component of  the National Health 
Expenditure (NHE), its share was around 69% in 2001 
2(BNHA 2003) . The share of  out-of-pocket 
expenditure in the total health expenditure increased 
from 57% in 1997 to 64% in 2007.
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1. The overall expenditures, measured by THE, exhibit a modest rising trend compared to GDP – from 3% of  GDP in 1996/97 to 3.2% in 2006/07. 
Over the 1998–2007 period, the average annual THE growth rate was 12.7% in nominal terms and 8.1% in real terms. The per capita spending on 
health increased from Tk. 1,085 (US$14.7) in 2006 to Tk. 1,118 (US$16.2) in 2007, while real growth in per person health expenditure between 1998 
and 2007 averaged 6.4% per year (Bangladesh National Health Accounts 2010).
2. The absence of  third party payments through healthcare insurance or social insurance in Bangladesh remains the major reason of  the continued 
dominance of  household OOP expenditure in national health expenditure
 Figure 3. MOHFW expenditure as a proportion of  GDP, 1995/96-2005/06
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INTRODUCTION
n  countries like Bangladesh, where most of  the 
people live under deprivation, out-of-pocket (OOP) I
payment for healthcare leads to limited healthcare 
utilization, catastrophic economic burden and 
consequently poor health condition (Van Doorslaer et 
al. 2006; O'Donnell et al. 2005). In such a situation, 
appropriate measures need to be taken so that all 
citizens can access healthcare at an affordable price 
whenever needed, i.e., can have universal health 
coverage (UHC). 
For ensuring UHC, the health system needs to be 
equipped with all types of  preventive, ambulatory, 
inpatient and rehabilitative care in the healthcare 
spectrum. Among these, inpatient care requires 
qualified labor (specialist physicians, nurses, medical 
techno-logists) and strong capital (hospitals with hi-
tech medical technology including medicine, surgery 
and diagnostic tests) investment. Estimating the 
magnitude of  capital and labor required for providing 
inpatient care services to all citizens in need is 
challenging while data on prevalence of  hospitalization 
due to specific diseases, unmet need for hospitalization 
and the resources required for treating such patients are 
not available. 
The public infrastructure for inpatient care in 
Bangladesh is extended to sub-district level and private 
facilities are also found in a number of  sub-districts. 
However, whether the infrastructure fulfils the 
requirement for achieving uni-versal health coverage is 
yet to be investigated. In the absence of  appropriate 
information on need and supply of  healthcare, some 
indicators can be analyzed for getting an idea about the 
magnitude of  gap between existing inpatient care 
facilities (hospital and health workforce) and the 
facilities required for achieving universal health 
coverage. This chapter will critically review existing 
healthcare facilities, its distribution and utilization as 
well as financing mechanisms, compared to some low 
and middle income countries which are approaching 
towards universal health coverage, using social health 
insurance.
Inpatient care includes both secondary and tertiary 
care. Secondary care is defined as a service provided by 
medical specialists who generally do not have first 
contact with patients. Secondary care is usually 
delivered in static facilities (hospitals or clinics) and 
patients have usually been referred here by their 
primary care provider. Tertiary healthcare is specialized 
consultative care, usually on referral from primary or 
secondary medical care personnel.
In figure 1, it is illustrated that the promotive and 
preventive care can be applied to a broad base of  
population. The primary and outpatient visits are more 
frequent than the inpatient care. Within inpatient care, 
tertiary care is sought by least number of  patients 
compared with secondary care and care in sub-district 
hospitals respectively. Rehabilitive care is normally 
applied in outpatient service.      
Figure 1: Health care in system for meeting an 
universal health coverage
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In this chapter, we limit our discussion with inpatient 
care. For providing care for all citizens in need, a health 
system should have an adequate number of  physical 
facilities (hospitals), enough health workforce, adequate 
and regular supply of  consumables and durables to the 
hospitals as well as awareness among population about 
need for modern healthcare. It implies that both supply 
and demand-sides should be well equipped. A 
management information system (MIS) contai-ning 
both demand and supply side information is essential 
for planning and progressing a health system towards 
universal health coverage.
In Bangladesh, sub-district, district and regional level 
hospitals provide inpatient care. The sub-districts have 
10-50 bed hospitals in almost all Upazila (sub-district) 
Health Complexes and the health ministry posts several 
specialists or specially trained generalists (surgery, 
obstetrics/gynaecology, paediatrics, anaesthesia etc.) in 
their absence. District public hospitals (secondary level) 
provide care in several specialty areas of  diseases. This 
is the level where diseases are diagnosed and the 
hospitals provide services with a view to render out-
patient, in-patient, emergency, laboratory and imaging 
services. It is the secondary level referral facility of  
health services of  Bangladesh. The tertiary level 
hospitals generally attached to the medical college; have 
more sophisticated medical apparatus and well-trained 
specialist physicians, nurses and medical technologists. 
Besides, a number of  specialist hospitals in specific 
disease areas are also available. Since 1980s, 
government has been encouraging private investment 
in healthcare delivery. As a consequence, a large number 
of  private general and specialized hospitals have been 
established, though mainly in the urban areas. Along 
with the public medical colleges, a significant number 
of  private medical colleges have been established in the 
last decades which are producing a good number of  
medical graduates and contributing to improve health 
workforce availability in the country (Directorate 
General of  Health Services, 2010). Both public and 
private initiatives have also been undertaken for 
producing nurses, midwives and paramedics. 
A number of  developing nations have targeted 
universal health coverage by adapting social health 
insurance in their national health agenda. Hsiao and 
Shaw (2007) classified such countries into five stages of  
social health insurance implementation, namely 
designing (Kenya), initiating (Ghana), extending (The 
Philippines), Combination of  Social health insurance 
and managed care (Colombia) and achieving 
(Thailand). Bangladesh lies far behind in this regard and 
out-of-pocket expenditure at point-of-care is the major 
mean of  financing healthcare. Demographic struc-ture 
considering age and residency (urban and rural) have 
shown high implication on having a clue about how to 
plan universal health coverage for a country. Age is a 
significant determinant of  healthcare need and 
utilization (Folland et al. 2007; Roh 2007). It is observed 
that the aged population as well as children in early years 
are more prone to disease incidence and consequently 
to utilization of  hospital care. The working age people 
in a nation finance healthcare not only of  themselves 
but also of  dependent children and elderly as well as 
unemployed and permanently disabled in the society. 
From a sustainable financing point of  view, the age 
dependency ratio and participation in labour force thus 
have significant importance for predicting health-care 
utilization and costs in the absence of  nationally 
representative disease prevalence and disease specific 
unit cost for treating patients in the hospital. The 
question thus arises if  Bangladesh is in an advantaged 
or disadvantaged situation considering demo-graphic 
structure in comparison with UHC approaching 
developing countries at different stages of  
implementation of  social health insurance. 
The population of  Bangladesh is 2.4 times higher than 
Thailand and more than 4 times higher than Kenya. 
Arranging healthcare for all of  its citizens is certainly a 
big challenge. However, when we look at the 
distribution of  population across age groups, it shows 
that the senior citizens (65 years and above) who are 
more prone to inpatient care utilization are less as a 
proportion of  total population in Bangladesh than in 
Philippines, Colombia and Thailand (Table 1). In 
Thailand, senior citizens constitute 7.0% of  total 
population, while the corresponding proportion in 
Bangladesh is 3.8 percent. Though the total population 
is much larger than any of  the UHC approaching 
developing countries, Bangladesh is in relatively more 
advantaged situation since the proportion of  elderly 
people is less. 
Bangladesh is predominantly a rural country and only 
26 percent of  its population lives in urban areas. The 
government policy for healthcare development in 
Bangladesh has been emphasizing private sector 
investment since 1980s. It resulted in high 
concentration of  private inpatient care facilities in 
urban areas where more affluent people reside. It means 
that the rural people are more dependent on public 
hospitals (Bhuiya et al. 2009) and choice of  rural people 
is thus limited. Such a limitation is a big concern since 
the public hospitals have limited number of  beds and 
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poor quality of  care (Andaleeb et al. 2007). Implying the 
observation that geographic nearness to hospital 
increases its utilization, the rural people are in disad-
vantageous condition since the secondary and tertiary 
care are available in district towns or above in 
administrative structure of  Bangladesh (Roh 2007; 
Folland et al. 2007). 
All countries except Kenya (Table 1) have higher 
proportion of  people in urban areas than Bangladesh. 
However, Thailand with its high proportion of  rural 
population (68%) is close to achieving universal health 
coverage. Bangladesh is a high densely populated 
country with 1,229 persons in each square kilometre. 
The Philippines is the closest country to Bangladesh in 
this regard though far below in population density (303 
persons per square kilometre). Colombia has the lowest 
density (41 persons per square kilometre). In 
comparison between Bangladesh and Colombia (or the 
countries with lower population density), one hospital 
can provide services to more people in Bangladesh and 
can be more efficient in resource utilization until the 
hospital get exhausted.
In sum, Bangladesh in relation to the selected UHC 
approaching developing countries has both advantages 
and disadvantages in working towards universal health 
coverage. While some of  the demographic factors may 
help accelerating the process, the other may decelerate. 
In such a condition, the current status of  inpatient 
healthcare supply, utilization and financing need to be 
explored.
Published literature and statistics have been reviewed 
and analyzed for understanding the current status of  
Bangladesh in terms of  inpatient care facilities, health 
workforce, utilization of  inpatient care and the 
financing mechanisms. The current status of  
Bangladesh has been compared with a number of  deve-
loping countries which are at different stages on their 
way to achieve universal health coverage.
Findings from the review and statistics are presented in 
this section, separated into five sub-sections. Existing 
inpatient care facilities and service packages in public, 
private for-profit and private not for-profit are 
presented in the first sub-section, followed by the 
distribution of  these facilities across geographic areas. 
Health workforce, utilization of  inpatient care, 
healthcare financing mechanisms and management 
information system are described in the next sub-
sections. 
FINDINGS
The main objective of  this study is to map the existing 
inpatient care facilities of  Bangladesh and identify the 
gaps for planning inpatient care for achieving universal 
health coverage. The following specific objectives, 
therefore, needs to be addressed: 
i) To explore the current level of  healthcare supply in 
terms of  inpatient care facilities and health 
workforce, supply chain of  consumables and 
durables in hospitals and the distribution of  
inpatient care facilities across geographic regions.  
ii) To explore the current level of  inpatient care 
utilization and its differential across geographic 
regions, gender and socio-economic groups as well 
as quality of  care.
iii) To explore the healthcare financing mechanism for 
in-patient care. 
iv) To explore the status of  management information 
system.
v) To compare the current status of  inpatient care 
facilities, utilization and financing mechanism with 
UHC approaching developing countries. 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of  Bangladesh in relation with universal health coverage (UHC) 
approaching developing countries using social health insurance (SHI) 
  SHI stage1 GDP per 
capita (Inter-
national $)1 
Population2 
(in thousands) 
Population (%) across age 
(years) groups2 
Urban popu-
lation2,3 
Popu-lation 
density2,4 
0-14 15-64 65+ 
Bangladesh Not adapted 1,233 160,000 32.0 64.1 3.8 26 1,229 
Kenya Designing 1,432 38,765 42.8 54.6 2.7     21 68 
Ghana Initiation 1,351 23,351 38.7 57.7 3.6 48 103 
Philippines Extension  3,244 90,348 34.3 61.6 4.1 63 303 
Colombia SHI+managed care 8,117 45,012 29.6 65.1 5.4 74 41 
Thailand Achieving UHC 7,469 67,386 22.0 70.6 7.44 32 132 
 
Source: 1) Hsiao and Shaw 2007, 2) United Nations 2010, 3) Percentage of  total population,4) Per square kilometre. 
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Inpatient care facilities
The Healthcare system in Bangladesh provides 
inpatient care services through sub-district, district 
level public hospitals, medical college and specialized 
hospitals, private for-profit and not for profit hospitals. 
District hospital is considered as secondary level 
referral facility and the medical college and specialized 
hospitals as the tertiary facilities. While information on 
public facilities is available from government sources, 
no reliable data is found for private ones. A complete 
picture, therefore, cannot be provided. An effort is 
made below for presenting the existing facilities in 
public, private for-profit and private not for-profit 
sectors. 
Public facilities
A total of  536 public hospitals with 37,387 beds provide 
inpatient care services in Bangladesh. There are 413 
Upazila (sub-district) Health Complexes which have 
limited inpatient services (Table 2).  District hospitals 
are usually termed secondary hospitals since unlike the 
medical college hos-pitals these have fewer specialty 
cares. Apart from these, there are different types of  
special care centres such as, infectious disease hospitals, 
tuberculosis hospitals, and leprosy hospitals which fall 
under secondary care health facilities. The medical 
college hospitals are located in the regional level 
covering several districts, and provide specialty care in a 
wide range of  disciplines. These hospitals are called 
tertiary hospitals. Tertiary hospitals include even 
national level super specialty hospitals or centres which 
provide high end medical care services, specialized in 
only one particular area of  healthcare. 
Over the last few decades, Bangladesh has experienced 
a rapid development in secondary and tertiary care 
network all over the country (Table 2). Of  64 districts, 
59 have a hospital with secondary health care. However, 
these hospitals have limited specialist, diagnostic and 
laboratory services. In addition, there are nine general 
hospitals with 100-250 bed capacity. The types and 
number of  public hospitals, number of  beds and 
service packages are presented in the table below.
Varieties of  inpatient care services are available in 
public hospitals. In its three tier-system (sub-district, 
district and region), a good network of  hospitals has 
been established in Bangladesh.
Table 2. Inpatient facilities in public sector and service package 
Inpatient hospital No of  
hospitals 
No of  beds Service package 
Sub-district level    
Sub-district hospitals 413 14,557 Comprehensive emergency obstetric care services 
(EOC), gynaecology, anaesthesia, nursing and basic 
laboratory facilities.  
Secondary level    
District hospital 59 7,650 Medicine, surgery, orthopaedics, Eye, ENT 
General hospital 9 1,250 Medicine, surgery, orthopaedics, Eye, ENT 
Tertiary level    
Medical college hospitals 17 10,005 Medicine, surgery, orthopaedics, Eye, ENT,  Eye and 
ENT, ARI, Reproductive care etc.  
Infectious disease hospital  5 180 Treatment of  Infectious diseases 
Specialized hospital 2 500 Selected services 
Chest disease/TB hospitals 12 546 Chest disease 
Leprosy hospital 3 130 Leprosy 
Specialized centres 3 150 Selected services 
Specialized hospital affiliated with post-
graduate training institute  
7 2,114 Selected services 
Other hospital 6 305   
Total 536 37,387   
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It needs to mention here that while basic health care 
service is supposed to be free in public hospitals, 
patients end up bearing the costs of  medicine and 
laboratory tests, as well as some additional unseen costs 
(Andaleeb et al. 2007). It was also observed in public 
hospital that the ambulance, though available, was not 
in use for the hospital (Sarowar et al. 2010). It implies 
that there is a gap between principle and practice in the 
public facilities.
Private for-profit
The government of  Bangladesh has been encouraging 
private investment in health sector since early 1980s. 
Government policy has reiterated and reaffirmed the 
need for the private sector to share the provision of  
health care with the public sector "with a view to 
achieving the spirit of  participation and owner-ship in 
health development" (GOB 1998: 463). The private 
health care facility constitutes an important component 
of  the national health care system of  Bangladesh, 
providing services to people with better affordability to 
pay. Private sector offers both modern and alternative 
(homeopathic, ayurvedic) care. Private facilities are 
naturally developed in urban areas where affluent 
sections of  the population reside. 
In the early 1980s there were only 150 private clinics and 
hospitals in Bangladesh (Chowdhury and Osmani 
2010), which increased to 2,501 registered hospitals and 
clinics (Directorate General of  Health Services 2010). 
These facilities contain a total number of  42,237 beds in 
the registered private hospitals and clinics (Table 3). 
Moreover, 5,122 registered diagnostic centres are 
currently available. Apart from these, there are a large 
amount of  private clinics in different districts and cities 
that are not registered.
Private for profit hospitals naturally intend to maximize 
profit and such hospitals targets middle- to high-
income segments of  the society. Some of  these 
hospitals have varying numbers of  free beds (included 
in bed number mentioned above). 
Table 3. Selected private for profit hospitals, number of  beds, cabins, departments and operation 
theatres  
Name of  private hospitals Sanctioned 
bed 
Free bed Department Ward Cabin Operation 
Theatre 
Ad-din Medical College Hospital 500 290 23 15 98 7 
Apollo Hospital, Dhaka 304 0 31 15 49 8 
Aysha Memorial Specialized Hospital (P.Ltd)  50 0 6 24 40 3 
Delta Medical College Hospital,  250 15 3 200 50 2 
East West Medical College Hospital, Dhaka 400 80 14 14 29 6 
Fashion Eye Hospital 20 5 1 5 5 2 
Islami Bank Hospital 160 0 9 8 76 5 
Jalalabad Ragib Rebeya Hospital, Sylhet 890 9 14 18 120 10 
Lions Eye Institute & Hospital 84 10 6 6 10 4 
Meditech General Hospital 10 0 10 2 6 1 
Metropolitan Medical Centre Ltd. 70 0 8 40 30 5 
Monowara Hospital 74 4 6 26 48 3 
North Bengal Medical College Hospital 250 25 10 0 0 0 
Pan Pacific Hospital  62 0 10 20 42 3 
Rushmono General Hospital 200 5 12 76 75 4 
Samarita Hospital Ltd. 200 5 12 76 75 4 
Shahid Mansur Ali Medical College Hospital 500 200 19 13 20 6 
Uttara Adhunik Medical College Hospital 500 0 12 12 0 11 
Z.H. Sikder Women's Medical College Hospital 100 0 0 2 17 2 
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Private not for-profit (NGOs)
Private not for-profit (NGOs) facilities normally 
provide outpatient services in Bangladesh. A handful 
number of  NGOs has successfully established 
secondary and tertiary inpatient healthcare services. 
Some NGOs have established their own hospitals, 
aiming to provide free or subsidized healthcare for the 
poor. A number of  these hospitals offer some kind of  
health insurance. Such insurance generally covers 
consultations and a minimum level of  treatment. Thirty 
four NGOs are providing secondary healthcare that are 
operating mainly on charity basis. 
The numbers of  inpatient care beds vary largely across 
NGO driven hospitals, operated nationally and 
internationally. Among the national NGO hospitals 
Gonoshasthay Kendro (GK), AK Khan Healthcare 
Trust, Dhaka Community Hospital, BIRDEM hospital 
etc. are wellknown ones. The number of  hospital beds 
and cabins vary largely across these hospitals. For 
instance, GK Dhaka hospital has a capacity of  about 
410 beds and 46 cabins. AK Khan Healthcare trust is 
operating a 50 bed hospital for women and children in 
Chittagong. Wide range of  services are provided by 
these hospitals, for instance, in the speciality areas of  
burns, endocrinology, cardiology, surgery, and 
obstetrics/gynaecology, diabetes, Surgery, ERCP and 
CT Scan. 
Example of  international NGOs, which provide 
secondary and tertiary healthcare are ICDDR,B, LAMB 
Hospital. ICDDR,B has two hospitals in Dhaka and 
one in Matlab. These hospitals, with a total of  370 beds 
are providing service mainly for diarrheoal and cholera 
diseases and also in obstetric/ gynaecology and 
paediatrics. Lamb Hospital in Parbatipur, Dinajpur 
provides inpatient service through departments of  
obstetrics/ gynaecology, paediatrics, surgery and 
medicine with 115 beds.    
Distribution of  inpatient care facilities
Bangladesh is divided into six administrative divisions 
(excluding Rangpur division which has been recently 
separated from Rajshahi). The distribution of  the 
facilities across divisions is presented in Table 4 below 
in relation to the distribution of  population. 
In the upper panel of  the table, absolute number of  
hospitals in each division is presented. Inpatient 
hospitals are distributed in an equitable manner across 
divisions considering the distribution of  population as 
shown in lower panel in Table 4. Services available in 
sub-district and district hospitals are generally uniform 
in all areas. The medical college hospitals also possess a 
similar manner across the country. However, if  the 
hospitals with specific specialties are established 
considering the need of  people in the region (division) 
cannot be clearly justified without disease prevalence 
data of  that region.
Table 4. Distribution of  secondary and tertiary public hospitals under DGHS between divisions, year 2010  
Types Barisal Chittagong Dhaka Khulna Rajshahi Sylhet Total  
Sub-district hospitals 33 85 103 50 111 31 413 
Secondary & tertiary 8 17 40 16 26 10 117 
Medical College 1 2 8 1 4 1 17 
Infectious Disease 0 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Chest Hospitals 1 2 1 2 4 2 12 
Total  43 107 153 70 146 45 564 
Percentile distribution of  
hospitals 
7.6% 19.0% 27.1% 12.4% 25.9% 8.0% 100.0% 
Percentile distribution of  
population 
6.6% 19.5% 31.4% 11.8% 24.3% 6.4% 100.0% 
Source: Directorate General of  Health Services, 2010 and Bangladesh Bureau of  Statistics 2009. 
readily found which could have been used for planning 
the allocation of  beds across district hospitals. In 
absence of  such data, the population size of  the 
catchment areas (districts) can be compared with 
Available data from district hospitals shows that the 
number of  beds per hospital ranges between 100 and 
250. The information on morbidity in the districts 
(including even those who do not visit hospital) is not 
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1number of  beds allocated . Though no significant 
relationship is observed between number of  beds and 
population size, we found that population size is higher 
in the districts where higher number of  beds is 
allocated. 
Comparison in international context (WHO, 2011b) 
shows that hospital beds per 1,000 populations in 
Bangladesh are 0.400 which is less than half  of  Ghana 
(0.9 per 1,000 populations). Kenya is at the same 
economic level as Bangladesh, but has 35 percent 
higher number of  hospital beds. To reach the level of  
Thailand, which is close to achieve universal health 
coverage, we need to increase the number of  hospital 
beds by 5.5 times in Bangladesh. 
Effective management of  supply chain of  consumables 
and durables is important as it affects the access of  
medical goods to the patients. The public procurement 
rules are applied for purchasing goods for public 
hospitals. Central Medical Stores Depot (CMSD) is 
responsible for purchasing medical goods for public 
hospitals in Bangladesh. CMSD can purchase both 
from local and international market. The requisitions 
for any purchases are raised by the local hospitals which 
need to be approved by the office of  Directorate 
General of  Health Services and the Ministry of  Health. 
The supply chain is strongly centralized and follows the 
public procurement rules of  Bangladesh. However, the 
local hospitals can purchase goods up to a certain 
maximum amount. 
External sources, like development agencies supply 
certain goods (like, vaccines) using their own 
procurement rules. In the private sector, the hospitals 
follow their own procurement strategy in the private 
competitive market.   
Health Workforce
Unlike many service sectors, inpatient healthcare 
demands highly qualified labour force (health 
workforce) including physicians, dentists, nurses, 
midwives and medical technologists. Inadequacy of  
health workforce has been observed in Bangladesh and 
considered to be a strong limiting factor of  population 
health (Joint Learning Initiative 2004). 
Bangladesh government has sanctioned 20,234 
positions for physicians of  which 11,300 are currently 
filled up, which means a total vacancy of  44.2%. In total 
13,483 nurses are currently working in the public health 
facilities, while the total number of  positions 
sanctioned are 17,183. The Distribution of  vacant 
positions of  different levels of  nurses shows that 
around 96 percent positions of  senior nurse are vacant. 
Corresponding vacancies for junior (class II) and aide 
nurse (class III) are 67.6 and 19.5 percent respectively. It 
means that vacant position is higher among the nurses 
with higher qualification. Table 5 presents information 
on sanctioned and vacant positions in public hospitals 
of  different types of  medical personnel.
Statistics on private sector appointment of  medical 
staff  is not available. However, the physicians in public 
sector often provide services in private hospitals. The 
gap between what the government has assessed 
(sanctioned) as requirement for providing healthcare 
services and the positions vacant clearly shows that 
Bangladesh has yet to go a long way. It is not even clear 
if  the sanctioned positions are sufficient to provide 
healthcare services to all citizens for meeting universal 
health coverage. The highest vacancy in medical staffs is 
observed in Barisal (64.9%), followed by Khulna 
(58.2%), Rajshahi (55.3%), Sylhet (54.7%), Chittagong 
(50.7%) and Dhaka (25.4%).
There are currently 20 public medical colleges in 
Bangladesh of  which 17 have the capacity to produce 
2,509 physicians and the rest can produce 210 dentists. 
A total of  1,250 places for nursing education are 
available in public institutions. Furthermore, places for 
educating 650 medical assistants are available in public 
institutions. From the public medical colleges 10,990 
physicians have been graduated between 2004 and 2009 
of  which 49.2 percent is female. 
The scope for medical education has been extending 
beyond public medical institutions since the beginning 
of  1990s. A sum of  44 private medical colleges can 
educate 3,335 physicians. Twelve dental colleges have 
the capacity to educate 770 dentists. A sum of  530 
nurses, 140 midwives and 1,855 medical assistants can 
be graduated by private institutions. However, statistics 
on number of  physicians actually graduated from 
private institutions is not available.
1. The districts with 100-150 bed hospital have an average population of  1,624,479 (1,063,208) and that of  with 200-250 bed is 2,204,051 (SD= 709,959). 
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Bangladesh has an overwhelming bias towards urban 
areas in the distribution of  qualified healthcare 
providers (BHW 2007). Unregulated providers, 
pharmacies, para-profession and trained community 
health workers have a complementary role. But such 
providers cannot be utilized for providing inpatient 
care services in the hospitals. However, among all 
providers for each 1,000 population, 0.77 percent is 
constituted by physicians, nurses and dentists. It needs 
to be noticed that Bangladesh with 0.300 physicians per 
1,000 populations is in the same level as Thailand (0.305 
physicians per 1,000 populations). Bangladesh even has 
higher number of  physi-cians than Kenya and Ghana 
per 1,000 popula-tions. Dentistry personnel in 
Bangladesh are low (0.02 per 1,000 populations). The 
highest number is found in Colombia (0.78), followed 
by the Philippines (0.56), Thailand (0.07) and Kenya 
(0.04). Only Ghana has lower number (0.01) than 
Bangladesh. Among these six countries, Bangladesh has 
lowest number of  nurses and midwives per 1,000 
populations (0.28). The highest number is observed in 
the Philippines (6.00). The closest country to 
Table 5. Health Workforce in public facilities in Bangladesh, 2010  
Types of  medical care and staff Sanctioned Filled up Vacant 
Male Female Both Number Percentage
Allopathic Medicine 
Physicians 20,234 8921 2,379 11,300 8,934 44.2 
Nurses      
Class – I (senior) 161 6 155 96.3 
Class – II (Junior) 463 150 313 67.6 
Class – III (Aide) 16,559 13,327 3,232 19.5 
Medical technologists 6,150 4,658 1,492 24.3 
Medical assistants 5,411 3,694 1,717 31.7 
Domiciliary staff 26,416 23,285 3,131 11.9 
Non-medical 466 168 50 218 248 53.2 
Alternative medicine 
Unani  66 20 46 69.7 
Ayurvedic  66 22 44 66.7 
Homeopathic 66 16 50 75.8 
   Compounders  64 48 16 25.0 
Herbal garden assistants 467 425 42 9.0 
Source: Directorate General of  Health Services, 2010 
 
Table 6. Comparison of  health workforce in Bangladesh with universal health coverage (UHC) 
approaching developing countries using social health insurance (SHI) 
Country SHI stage Physicians per 1,000 
population 
Nurses and midwives per 
1,000 population 
Dentistry personnel per 
1,000 population 
 
Bangladesh Not adapted 0.300 0.28 0.02  
Kenya Designing 0.139 1.18 0.04  
Ghana Initiation 0.090 1.05 0.01  
Philippines Extension 1.150 6.00 0.56  
Colombia SHI+MC1) 1.430 0.55 0.78  
Thailand Achieving UHC 0.305 1.52 0.07  
Note: 1) Managed care 
Source: World Health Organization 2011b  
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Bangladesh in this regard is Colombia which has 0.55 
nurses and midwives per 1,000 popu-lations.
Utilization of  inpatient care across geographic 
areas, gender and socioeconomic groups
Data from Bangladesh government shows that the 
mean bed-occupancy rate in sub-district hospitals is 
77.2%. The highest occupancy rate is observed in 
Khulna division, followed by Dhaka, Barisal, Rajshahi, 
Chittagong and Sylhet respectively. However, hospitals 
with 100 percent or higher bed occupancy are very few 
in Upazila (sub-district) Health Complexes. In the table 
7, percentage of  hospitals with 100 percent or higher 
bed occupancy rate in Sub-district Health Complex and 
district hospitals are presented. Only 18.3% of  all 
hospitals are occupied by 100% or higher rate. The 
district hospitals are more occupied than the sub-
district hospitals.  In the divisional level share share of  
such hospitals (100% or higher occupancy) ranges 
between 5.9 percent (Sylhet) and 26.7 percent (Khulna).  
Gender-based disparity is observed in inpatient care 
utilization in district hospitals according to Directorate 
General of  Health Services (2010). Among the total 
patients who admitted to district hospitals in 2009, 60 
percent were female. This pattern is not uniform in all 
districts. For instance, in Barguna district, 74 percent 
admitted patients were male, and it was only 36 percent 
in Kishorgonj.  
A total picture of  inpatient care utilization across 
socioeconomic groups in Bangladesh is not currently 
available.  An impression about this can observed in a 
study on inequity in maternal health care service 
utilization in a rural area (Matlab) in Bangladesh, which 
shows that 4.8 percent of  all mothers in poorest 
socioeconomic quintile receive care at ICDDR,B 
(international NGO) Matlab hospital (Anwar et al. 
2005). The corresponding percentages in public and 
private facilities are 1.0 and 0.4 respectively. It increases 
with higher socioeconomic positions in all three types 
of  facilities. Such utilization is 3.7, 5.0 and 12.0 times 
higher in the least poor socioeconomic quintile in 
comparison with poorest one at ICDDR,B, public and 
private hospitals respectively. It is thus observed that 
hospital care utilization across socioeconomic groups 
varies largely in all types of  hospitals and it is largest in 
private facilities.
Table 7. Distribution of  utilization (bed occupancy) of  public hospitals at sub-district and district level in 
Bangladesh, 2010 
Division Sub-district hospitals District hospitals Share of  hospitals with 
100% or higher bed 
occupancy in all 
hospitals 
Total number With 100% or 
higher bed 
occupancy 
Total 
number 
With 100% or 
higher bed 
occupancy 
Barisal 33 4 5 1 13.20% 
Chittagong 85 5 12 8 13.40% 
Dhaka 103 13 14 6 16.20% 
Khulna  50 9 10 7 26.70% 
Rajshahi 111 21 13 10 25.00% 
Sylhet 31 0 3 2 5.90% 
Total  413 52 57 34 18.30% 
Source: Directorate General of  Health Services, 2010  
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Quality of  hospital care is a concern of  any healthcare 
system. While several indicators are used for quality 
assessment in different countries, we observed in a 
study in Bangladesh that nine areas of  quality indicators 
(Doctors' service orientation, Nurses' service 
orientation, Tangibles (hospital), Tangibles (staff), 
Access, Treatment cost, Baksheesh, Process features 
and Patient satisfaction) have been used (Andaleeb et al. 
2007). The indicator “Access” captures to some extent 
the coverage of  inpatient care, while asking about if  it 
was difficult to get a bed/cabin. However, it can be 
improved by taking the information on what 
proportion of  the patients who sought inpatient care 
had to be denied services due to any reasons, like, 
scarcity of  beds, physicians etc. 
Financing healthcare
The healthcare financing of  Bangladesh is strongly 
dominated by private out-of-pocket payments. The 
government expenditure is only 35.7% of  total 
expenditure. The total health expenditure of  
Bangladesh in 2008 is 191,486 million taka or 2,775 
million US dollars. It constitutes 3.5 percent of  GDP. 
Current per capita health expenditure is 47 US$, which 
increased by 176.5% since 1995 (World Health 
Organization 2011a). However, health expenditure as a 
percentage of  GDP varied between a small range i.e. 2.7 
and 3.7 percent during the same period. 
The financing of  public hospitals comes from revenue 
and development budget. While the revenue budget is 
the source of  revenue collected through taxes, the 
development budget is from Health, Nutrition and 
Population Sector Program (HNPSP 2003-2011). The 
public hospitals receive funds from the government on 
the basis of  number of  beds and staffs allocated to the 
hospital.
Pre-payment mechanism for financing health care is 
less used one. Few hospitals like Gono Shasthya 
Hospital and Dhaka Community Hospital sells health 
card at a very low price against which the card holders 
get services at a low cost. The services that are provided 
against the card are highly subsidized. Dhaka 
Community Hospital has an industrial health insurance. 
Under this insurance, the firms can make contract for 
getting primary care, health check-up etc. for their 
employees against a premium. For inpatient care, the 
employees can only be referred to the hospital. 
National Health Accounts show that Bangladesh has 
lower health expenditure as a percentage of  GDP or as 
per capita expenditure than any UHC approaching 
developing countries. The private source of  
expenditure in Bangladesh (64.3%) is next highest. 
Colombia has little higher (67.1%) private expenditure 
than Bangladesh. However, pre-payment mechanism 
dominates the private health expenditure of  Colombia 
through private insurance (51.3%).
Pre-payment mechanism, like social security fund in 
Bangladesh is not adapted yet; while in Colombia and 
Ghana 70 percent and 37.4 percent of  general 
government expenditure are constituted by social 
security fund. Further-more, another pre-payment 
mechanism i.e. private health insurance does not have 
any share in private health expenditure in Bangladesh. 
About nine percent of  Kenyan private health 
expenditure is covered by this mechanism. The highest 
contribution of  this mechanism is observed in 
Colombia (51.3 percent).
Management Information System
For planning universal health coverage information 
about health and healthcare is essential. In recent years, 
the Management Information System of  the 
Directorate General of  Health made tremendous 
progress. The activities of  MIS-Health related to health 
information system include collection of  data from 
various health sources and cleaning, analysing , 
summarizing the data to generate and distribute reports 
through routine administrative report, web site, year 
book, health bulletin, newsletter, etc. The existing data 
flow system covers all public health facilities from sub-
district to national level. Additionally, data from lower 
level (union health centres, community clinics etc.), 
than sub-district levels are gathered through paper-
based system for including electronically in sub-district 
database system. The databases include health facility 
information, health facility utilization, morbidity profile 
of  indoor patients, mortality profile, emergency obs-
tetric care profile, statistics of  integrated management 
of  childhood illness, health work force, logistic 
information system, population information. A pilot 
project on Geographic Information System (GIS) has 
shown success in introducing in health sector and 
scaling up of  the GIS has been undertaken.
44
Inpatient Healthcare in Bangladesh: Current Status and Future Prospects towards Achieving Universal Health Coverage
DISCUSSION
Findings of  this investigation have addressed four 
broad areas, i.e. capital, labour, utilization and financing. 
Capital and labour which are the factors of  healthcare 
production are reflected on hospitals and health 
workforce respectively.  
There are 0.300 physicians, 0.280 nurses and midwives 
and 0.020 dentistry personnel in Bangladesh. In the 
public hospitals, we observe large vacancies in health 
workforce. Moreover, the number of  hospital beds is 
very poor. It implies that Bangladesh does not have a 
good combination of  inputs (capital and labour) for 
producing inpatient healthcare in an efficient way. It is 
observed in most of  the countries, which successfully 
provide healthcare to all citizens that a larger 
proportion of  nurses and midwives are available in the 
health workforce in comparison with the number of  
physicians. For instance, Thailand has five times higher 
nurses and midwives than physicians (WHO, 2011b). 
Data from industrialized welfare states like Canada, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and France 
show that the number of  physicians is 3 to 5 times 
higher than nurses and midwives. All these indicate that 
the number of  hospital beds as well as health workforce 
should be increased sharply and a good mix of  inputs 
i.e. hospitals, hospital beds, physicians, nurses and 
midwives should be maintained for using the resources 
efficiently. 
Along with efficiency, a fair distribution of  beds across 
geographic regions considering the population size and 
need for inpatient care is essential for reaching universal 
health coverage.
It is observed that the distribution of  public hospitals is 
equitable, considering the population size, across 
regions within the country. Since the data on disease 
prevalence is missing, we cannot make estimation that 
reflects equity in distribution of  hospital beds 
considering need for inpatient care. On the contrary, 
the private hospitals are skewed to urban areas. The 
number of  beds should therefore be increased using 
public facilities (existing and new establishment) and 
simultaneously incentives should be created for private 
sector so that private investment can be attracted to 
rural areas. Not for profit (non-governmental 
organizations, consumer society etc.) sector can have a 
strong role in this respect. 
Bangladesh has 0.400 hospital beds per 1,000 
populations. Under-utilization of  hospital bed (only 
18.3 percent of  hospitals are utilized fully or more) 
indicates that supply may not guarantee equitable or 
efficient utilization of  services. Inequity in utilization 
of  maternal care in hospitals is explained by lack of  
education among mothers in Bangladesh (Anwar et al. 
2005), which means that the demand side plays a strong 
role for under-utilization of  inpatient care and fostering 
inequity. 
A question can be raised in this context regarding how 
many beds and medical staff  (like, physicians, nurses, 
dentists) should be arranged per 1,000 population in 
Bangladesh for providing healthcare service for all 
patients who require inpatient care. Estimation is yet to 
be made. However, scientific literature suggests that 
health care need indicators (for assessing need for 
hospital care) can be developed based on Census 
information and odds ratios derived from logistic 
regression analyses of  the relationships between 
hospital utilization, health status, socio-demographic 
characteristics and area indicators of  supply (Benzeval 
and Judge 1994). As indicated earlier Bangladesh needs 
5.5 times higher hospitals bed to reach the level of  
Thailand. However, the country characteristics 
regarding need for hospital care may vary largely due to 
their disease pattern. It implies that the need for 
hospital beds per 1,000 populations can vary between 
countries. A rigorous analysis thus is required for 
estimating the need for hospital beds for meeting 
universal coverage. It is equally relevant for assessing 
the need for health staffs. In addition, Bangladesh lacks 
survey on the consumable (like, drugs) and durable 
goods (x-ray machine, ultra sonogram, ambulance etc.) 
utilized in hospitals.  Surveys in public hospitals had 
been undertaken in some areas, like health workforce 
earlier. Such surveys are unavailable in private sector, 
presumably due to practical constraints, like 
inaccessibility to required information.
There is opportunity to improve the quality of  services 
in public hospitals in Bangladesh referring the 
weaknesses identified by Andaleeb et al. (2007). We have 
observed that the hospital supply chain is highly 
centralized, which can result in inadequate scope for 
meeting the need of  consumable and durable goods in 
the hospital. For instance, the unavailability of  drugs in 
public hospitals is highly prevalent. A number of  
countries (like, Thailand, Ghana), which have adapted 
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universal health coverage, have simultaneously 
developed an accreditation method for hospitals to be 
contracted for service delivery to the citizens. Such 
action is important in Bangladesh for improving the 
quality of  inpatient care while considering universal 
health coverage to be implemented. It needs to 
emphasize here that the private hospitals also should go 
through such accreditation process for ensuring quality 
service. 
Progress in Management Information System (MIS) of  
the Directorate General of  Health will be useful for 
planning universal health coverage. Additional 
databases in MIS will be required when social health 
insurance will be introduced in the health system. For 
instance, database of  insurance clients (like, 
information in biometric smart card in RSBY in India) 
is essential component for such an effort. Bangladesh 
health system can take advantage of  the knowledge 
acquired by the Joint Learning Network consists of  
countries (Kenya, Ghana, Thailand, The Philippines 
etc.) which working for achieving universal health 
coverage.     
The total healthcare expenditure in Bangladesh is borne 
by government (35.7% of  total) and private persons 
(64.3% of  total). The govern-ment allocates resources 
from revenue and development budget to the public 
hospitals. Most of  the services in public sector are 
financed through revenue collected by the government. 
The revenue base in Bangladesh is small, which is a 
strong barrier to accumulate enough healthcare funds. 
Moreover, the allocation of  revenue to health sector is 
subject to negotiation with other sectors like, education, 
national defense, agriculture etc. At the same time, the 
allocation of  health fund to public hospitals is based on 
number of  beds and staffs of  the hospitals. It means 
that the government does not consider disease burden 
for allocating budget to hospitals, while the resources 
for treating patients with different diseases can vary 
largely. The system is thus suffering from vertical 
inequity since the resource is allocated for patients with 
different diseases similarly. A vast number of  countries, 
including Thailand, South Korea, Iran and many 
industrialized ones, are currently using Diagnosis 
Related Group (DRG) which considers disease-specific 
cost for inpatient care for allocating public funds 
(collected through revenue or insurance premium) to 
the hospitals (Jackson et al. 1993; Ghaffari et al. 2009). 
Using this allocation procedure based on types and 
severity of  disease, costs involved for treatment are 
considered. In this way both vertical and horizontal 
equity in resource allocation can be ensured.    
Out-of-pocket payment (OOPP) mechanism is 
dominating the health financing system of  Bangladesh, 
where a high proportion of  people are living under 
deprivation. This payment mechanism puts a huge 
number of  people in a vulnerable socioeconomic 
situation. Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) observed in a study 
on Asian countries that the people of  Bangladesh faces 
catastrophic economic healthcare burden due to out-
of-pocket payments. Bangladesh, therefore, should 
concentrate on a financing system, where people can 
avail healthcare at an affordable price while seeking 
healthcare. 
It is observed that pre-payment either through taxes 
(often not earmarked for health and subject to 
negotiation with other sectors) or/and insurance (social 
or private) occurs in different degrees in any UHC 
approaching developing countries, while this 
mechanism is weakly existent in Bangladesh.  
Industrialized countries show that pre-payment 
mechanism is the most dominating one.  In Canada and 
UK, government expenditure is 69.8% and 82.8% 
respectively. Government health expenditure in the 
USA is lower (46.5%), but major portion of  private 
expenditure is funded by private health insurance 
(63.8%). Pre-payment can be made in different ways 
such as taxes, social health insurance contribution, 
private health insurance, community-based health 
insurance etc. (Mossialos et al. 2002).  
Bangladesh is a country with small base for taxes. This 
base is widening very slowly and we cannot expect a big 
expansion of  the tax base in a few years. The country is 
suffering from price hike for sometimes. Any expansion 
of  indirect tax (value-added tax, fuel tax etc) may not be 
appropriate in such a condition, which may put more 
people into economic deprivation. Moreover, the 
revenue collected as either direct or indirect taxes is 
subject to negotiation with other governmental sectors, 
like education, national defense, agriculture etc. for 
allocation in health sector. Pre-payment system is 
weakly existent in Bangladesh for recovering the cost of  
healthcare. In such a condition, Bangladesh should 
explore the possibilities of  introducing pre-payment 
system, like social or community-based health 
insurance by testing on people in different 
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socioeconomic segments. The public and private 
formal sector employees can be targeted as a first step. 
It can gradually be extended to informal sector workers, 
which constitutes 88 percent of  total labour force of  
Bangladesh (Maligalig et al. 2008). These people can be 
covered for healthcare by sharing health risk across 
themselves. The ultra poor, students, disabled and 
elderly, who lack ability to pay the premium, should be 
included in the system by using cross-subsidization.
In recent years, a number of  developing countries have 
adapted social health insurance mechanism for meeting 
universal health coverage. It is observed that while 
some countries are attempting to offer comprehen-sive 
care (like, Thailand, Ghana), some other are going to 
offer in-patient care only (like, the Philippines, India-
RSBY). A number of  arguments for and against such 
arrangement can be provided. Catastrophic economic 
burden due to health hazard is often connected to in-
patient care. By offering inpatient care such burden can 
be reduced for vulnerable people. On the contrary, it is 
unclear how the gate-keeping will work for reducing 
inappropriate consumption of  care. Primary or out-
patient care which can prevent further deterioration of  
disease condition cannot be tackled by incorporating 
only inpatient care in social health insurance system. It 
can further argued that through primary or out-patient 
care the social insurance clients will be more frequently 
in contact with social health insurance system, which 
can be useful for building trust of  citizens to the 
insurance system.       
Finally, Bangladesh should take a careful step forward 
by gathering experience from both types of  countries 
which have achieved universal health coverage and 
which have not. For instance, the United States, being 
one of  the richest countries, has not covered health-
care for all citizens, though it has the highest per capita 
health expenditure. It is two times higher in the USA 
(7,536 US$) than in Canada (4,095 US$) and UK 
(3,248), while later two countries have achieved 
universal health coverage. Private health insurance (a 
pre-payment mechanism) is dominating the US 
healthcare financing system. It is argued by Noble 
laureate Paul Krugman that involvement of  private 
insurance raises the healthcare expenditure in the USA 
(Krugman 2007). Any countries that are planning 
implementation of  UHC should critically analyze the 
experience of  healthcare financing from other 
countries.
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Ensuring universal health coverage for 160 million 
people of  Bangladesh is a challenging task. However, 
the age-dependency ratio shows that lower proportion 
of  people at young and old age are dependent on 
working age people compared to the UHC approaching 
developing countries. Scarcity of  hospitals and medical 
personnel are observed. A fair distribution of  public 
hospitals across geographic regions (divisions) is 
observed. But the rural people who constitute 74 
percent of  total population live far away from the 
existing public hospitals. Moreover, private hospitals 
are concentrated in the urban areas. We have also 
observed unjustified mix of  physicians, nurses and 
midwives in Bangladesh. Generally, under-utilization of  
public hospitals has been observed in different public 
hospitals. The quality of  services in such hospitals is 
poor.  
To allocate the revenue (healthcare fund) in an efficient 
way is important so that maximum number of  patients 
can be treated with given fund considering the need for 
care. Currently, number of  hospital beds and the 
number of  employees are considered for budget 
allocation in public hospitals. Private sectors are highly 
dependent on out-of-pocket payments, which is a 
reason of  barrier to healthcare access and of  
catastrophic economic burden. The international 
comparison shows that the current status of  inpatient 
care in Bangladesh has both advantages and 
disadvantages towards universal health coverage. 
Considering these observations in inpatient healthcare 
system in Bangladesh, the following recommendations 
can be made: 
1. More hospitals and medical personnel as well as its 
good combination are required for providing 
services to all citizens. 
2. Empirical scientific investigation on assessing need 
for hospital beds, health workforce, medical 
equipment, drugs and diagnostic services should be 
carried out.
3. The possibility for creating incentives for private 
investment in rural areas needs to be investigated so 
that the distribution of  hospitals in urban and rural 
areas can ensure physical access to hospital based 
healthcare.
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4. The reasons for under- and over-utilization of  
hospital beds should be investigated and equity in 
utilization across geographic areas, gender and 
socioeconomic groups should be ensured.
5. For an efficient resource allocation in the public 
hospitals as well as reimbursement to the private 
ones, it is important to estimate the disease-specific 
treatment cost and case-mix of  patients in different 
hospitals.
In sum, both supply and demand sides need to be 
critically studied and the possibilities for financing 
healthcare through pre-payment mechanism and an 
efficient and equitable resource allocation model 
should be developed so that need-based universal 
health coverage can be established in Bangladesh.
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and payment beyond a certain limit is made in full by the 
consumer or some other third-party payer (Ensor 
2004). CCT has been criticised on the ground that the 
schemes may not lead to increased access to services 
since cash is transferred to recipients after the desired 
behaviour has occurred, and they often face high 
operational and transactional costs. Another demand 
side approach provides vouchers for free or sold to 
eligible participants, allowing them to access specific 
health services from selected providers. It is argued 
that, if  designed and implemented well, voucher 
programmes can overcome access barriers as vouchers 
are provided in advance of  service utilization that CCTs 
may not address (Ensor 2004). Vouchers can be used to 
accurately target priority groups and increase demand 
by subsidising services. Vouchers have the potential to 
increase consumers' choice of  providers and improve 
quality of  care through enhancing competition among 
providers for voucher clients (Bhatia et al. 2006, Ensor 
2004). 
It is to note that the benefits of  DSF accrue in practice 
depend not only on subsidies provided to the target 
group but also on a number of  supply-side factors, such 
as, the appropriate number of  providers and facilities in 
place to meet the increased demand created by the 
scheme. The enhanced demand for services arising 
from the implementation of  DSF must comply with 
expansion in staff, physical capacity, and accompanying 
increases in the supply chain within the health system. 
Specific physical improvements to accommodate the 
increased utilisation of  facilities include the need to 
improve cleanliness, hold more beds for pregnant 
women, and establish easy-to-reach toilet facilities for 
women in labour (Koehlmoos et al. 2008). The benefits 
of  DSF therefore depend on the current functioning of  
health sector institutions within a specific country, the 
extent to which they are able to change with and 
without external catalyst, on the nature of  the 
healthcare market and the extent to which facilities can 
compete to improve quality of  services (Ensor and 
Cooper 2004, Ensor 2004).
INTRODUCTION
n Bangladesh, primary health care services, including 
the maternal and child programmes have been I
pursued mainly through supply side interventions many 
of  which failed to achieve the expected objectives of  
reaching the poor. Non-availability of  drugs and 
commodities, discrimination against poor, imposition 
of  unofficial fees, lack of  trained providers, weak 
referral mechanism, unfavourable opening hours and 
interdepartmental difficulties contribute to low use of  
public facilities in Bangladesh (Ahmed and Khan 2011, 
HEU 2010). Providers available in the system are also 
inequitably distributed between urban and rural areas, 
with rural facilities experiencing vacancies, which 
adversely affect use of  services at public facilities (HEU 
2010a, MOF 2005).
Weaknesses on the supply side interventions have led to 
some interest in demand side financing (DSF) as a way 
to improve the targeting of  specific groups and as an 
instrument for promoting provider efficiency in many 
developing countries including Bangladesh (Ensor 
2004). Demand side funding through the provision of  
vouchers or coupons that individuals can exchange for 
services with government and non-government 
providers are being piloted in several countries as 
potential methods for overcoming some demand side 
barriers. 
Demand side financing involves channelling a part of  
government subsidy for health services directly to 
households allowing them to purchase health services 
themselves or through an agency (Bhatia et al. 2006). 
This approach aims to raise the overall consumption of  
a specific service; to improve the targeting of  benefits at 
identified vulnerable groups and to improve the quality 
of  service provided to members of  these groups.
One form of  demand side financing is condi-tional 
cash transfer (CCT), which provides grants to 
consumers based on personal or household 
characteristics while the value of  the voucher is limited 
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There is, however, little evidence on whether DSF 
mechanisms are more effective than supply side 
subsidies while it is also questioned whether the 
mechanism is sustainable with the greater transaction 
costs of  the approach. The purpose of  this paper is to 
review some of  the potential reasons for using a 
demand side approach, and to examine whether 
demand side financing can contribute in achieving 
universal health coverage in Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh situation
By the efforts of  the government combined with the 
contribution of  non-government organizations 
(NGO) Bangladesh has achieved considerable progress 
in the health indicators over the last decade through 
expanding the coverage of  essential services to the 
disadvantaged people. Despite these achievements 
several challenges still remain unmet. Though the 
United Nations' Millennium Development Goal 5 
(MDG 5) calls for reducing Bangladesh's MMR to 143 
deaths per 100,000 live births by the year 2015, 70% of  
the pregnant women have no access to emergency 
obstetric care (EmOC) (BDHS 2007). Skilled 
attendants assist only 26.5% of  births; while around 2.4 
million births take place at home annually in 
Bangladesh (Streatfield and Arifeen 2010), mostly in 
unsafe and unhygienic conditions. Only 4.3% of  
women use a medically trained provider to attend 
deliveries at home which poses risk of  maternal death 
(Streatfield and Arifeen 2010). While access to family 
planning is increasing, access to three other pillars of  
safe mother-hood namely, antenatal care, clean and safe 
delivery, and essential obstetric care remain largely 
unfulfilled. It is, therefore, a great challenge to meet 
MDG 5 with the current level of  low use of  skilled birth 
attendants and EmOC. 
In Bangladesh, demand side barriers for low use of  
public facilities for maternal care include cultural and 
social belief  system, distance of  the facility from home, 
lack of  information on sources of  care, lack of  
awareness on the value of  maternal health services, and 
high access costs (e.g. direct and indirect costs) (Ensor 
and Cooper 2004). One of  the most important barriers 
to access maternal care is high cost of  services which 
needs to be paid for out-of-pocket. Consumer medical 
expenditures for ANC (for a package of  four visits, 
including drugs, supplies, and diagnostic/laboratory 
tests) and normal delivery in public facilities vary from 
854 Taka at the primary level to 1854 Taka at the tertiary 
level (HEU 2010b). Moreover, costs of  services not 
only include the facility cost but also include unofficial 
fees, transportation cost and opportunity cost. 
Evidence suggests that non-medical out-of-pocket 
expenditures incurred by patients for outpatient 
maternal services (ANC and postpartum care) ranges 
from 32 to 68 Taka per visit to the facility, which are 
mainly incurred for transportation to and from the 
facility. For inpatient maternal services, total non-
medical expenditures are in the range of  1,654 to 2,059 
Taka, which involves travel and food costs for the 
patient and attendants (HEU, 2010b). Most of  these 
demand side costs are financed by user charges either at 
the time of  treatment through loans, often at high 
interest rate, or by selling productive assets. 
Conventional funding mechanisms generally fail to 
address the demand side costs faced by women in 
accessing care during pregnancy. These costs may 
influence delays in the decision to seek care and reach a 
facility impacting significantly on use of  services 
(Ensor and Ronoh 2005). Killewo et al. (2006) also 
confirmed that lack of  money for transport is an 
important reason for delay in seeking care in rural 
Bangladesh. A demand side financing scheme for 
maternal and neonatal health is expected to reduce 
financial barriers to access and, therefore, to improve 
use of  the services by the poorer sections of  the 
population (Ahmed and Khan 2011). 
The Ministry of  Health and Family Welfare (MOHFW) 
of  Bangladesh is piloting a maternal health voucher 
programme in 44 upazilas (sub-districts) around the 
country as part of  its Health, Nutrition and Population 
Sector Programme (HNPSP) as a test case for demand 
side financing. The objective of  the programme is to 
increase the use of  qualified birth attendants and ease 
the financial costs of  delivery. The programme also 
intends to include private and NGO facilities as 
potential providers of  maternal care to stimulate 
competition among providers to improve quality of  
care. It is expected that the DSF would contribute to 
Bangladesh's efforts to reach Millennium Development 
Goal 5 and achieve a 75% reduction in maternal 
mortality by 2015 (HEU 2010).
In Bangladesh, there are experiences with at least three 
other voucher programmes for maternal health 
services, although all are small in scale. One programme 
implemented by the International Centre for 
Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) 
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is the Community Health Project in Chakaria upazila of  
Cox's Bazaar district, while another voucher scheme 
called 'Demand-based Reproductive Health 
Commodity Project', was jointly piloted by RTM 
International, ICDDR,B, and the Population Council. 
Marie Stopes Clinic Society is implementing a voucher 
scheme, alongside other interventions, in three districts: 
Shariatpur, Bhola, and Barisal (HEU 2010). Under 
these voucher programmes, women received antenatal 
care (ANC), post-natal care (PNC) and delivery services 
free of  cost at designated facilities. Demand-based 
Reproductive Health Commodity Project and Marie 
Stopes Clinic Society provided transportation voucher 
to facilitate access to services, however, women did not 
receive any other cash incentives besides the voucher 
under any of  these projects. All these small scale 
voucher programmes, with financial assistance from 
development partners, had been successful in 
increasing use of  ANC, PNC and delivery care (HEU 
2010; Rahman et al. 2009). 
This paper is based on review of  relevant published 
documents. Peer reviewed journal articles and research 
reports were selected for reviewing. These mainly 
focused on three broad themes i) operational issues in 
the management of  DSF ii) the impact of  DSF on the 
use of  services and management process, and iii) 
sustainability of  DSF initiatives to achieve universal 
health coverage.
A number of  relevant personnel were also interviewed 
who had been involved in implementation and 
evaluation of  maternal health voucher scheme in 
Bangladesh. A guideline was used for interviewing the 
respondents, and evolved around the following key 
questions: i) Who are the major stakeholders involved 
in implementing the voucher programme? ii) Do the 
organizations have appropriate number of  health 
personnel and support staff ? ii) Whether voucher 
programme has increased service utilization as 
expected, and if  yes, what measures the organizations 
had adopted to meet increased demand for services? iv) 
Does the organization have mechanism to closely 
monitor/follow-up the implementation of  different 
activities of  voucher programme? What indicators are 
used to monitor programme activities? v) Has the 
programme brought about competition among 
providers? vi) What are the cost implications of  the 
METHODS
voucher programme? vii) What are the major barriers in 
implementing the DSF in Bangladesh and how the 
obstacles can be reduced? viii) Is DSF a solution to 
achieve universal health coverage? Thematic approach 
has been used to analyze the information.
The findings are summarized in three broad thematic 
areas. It mainly focuses on the experiences of  the 
maternal health voucher programme initiated by the 
MOHFW, Bangladesh. 
Operational issues in the management of  
voucher programme
The pilot DSF scheme implemented by MOHFW was 
formally launched in 2004, though actual distribution 
of  vouchers and provision of  services were delayed due 
to delayed release of  funds. The start of  the voucher 
programme varied among upazilas - between August 
2006 and June 2007 (Koehlmoos et al. 2008, HEU 
2008). 
The MOHFW used two different types of  targeting 
mechanisms for voucher programme in Bangladesh. 
Some upazilas offered universal coverage, and others 
used means-testing to target the poor. Among the initial 
33 upazilas 9 had universal coverage with all the 
pregnant women receiving the vouchers. In the 
remaining 24 upazilas, targeting was based on economic 
status of  the beneficiaries. In these upazilas, eligibility 
was restricted to extremely poor women who owned 
less than 6,534 sft. of  land, whose household earning 
was less than US$38.50 per month, who lacked 
ownership of  other productive assets and who was first 
or second time pregnant (HEU 2010). 
The vouchers entitled the pregnant women to access 
free ANC, delivery care, emergency referral, and post-
partum care services. Women could obtain these 
services from selected facilities and providers. In the 
case of  referral for complications, pregnant women 
accessed services at specific hospitals with a referral 
certificate. Cash stipends for transportation (Tk. 500 
for routine or emergency transport to referral facility), 
Tk. 2,000 cash incentive to mothers for the purchase of  
nutritious food and medicines, and incentives in-kind 
(A gift box worth Tk. 500) for delivering with a qualified 
health provider had also been provided to consumers 
(Koehlmoos et al. 2008). 
FINDINGS
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Upazila DSF (UzDSF) Committees and Union DSF 
(UnDSF) Committees were formed followed by 
orientation of  all members of  the committees (HEU 
2008). The senior staff  nurses and family welfare 
visitors (FWV) were oriented as service providers. The 
duration of  the orientation of  voucher distributors and 
service providers varied from one to four days 
(Koehlmoos et al. 2008). 
Family welfare assistants (FWA) and health assistants 
(HA) were responsible for identi-fication and 
registration of  pregnant women and distribution of  
vouchers. District designated bodies were responsible 
for selecting and accrediting eligible public, private and 
NGO providers in the pilot upazilas with the capacity to 
provide basic and/or comprehen-sive EmOC, 
including management of  normal and problem 
pregnancies, surgical obstetrics, anaesthesia, and blood 
transfusion. An UzDSF committee was responsible for 
monitoring and supervision of  activities of  the 
maternal health voucher scheme. This committee 
allocated vouchers to UnDSF committees for distri-
bution among the target beneficiaries. The UzDSF 
committee reported to the national DSF committee 
(HEU 2008, HEU 2010).
The programme provided incentives to health care 
providers for identifying eligible women and providing 
maternal health services. Besides doctors and nurses at 
the public facilities, the support staff  (aya, ward boy and 
cleaners) were also entitled to financial incentives 
(HEU 2008). Accredited private service providers 
could reimburse the voucher at designated financial 
institutions, while public facilities used part of  voucher 
revenue to pay incentives to staff. Healthcare facilities 
were reimbursed for providing voucher-covered 
services at fixed rates. Fifty percent of  the 
reimbursement amount had been deposited into the 
upazila 'seed fund account', while the remaining 50% 
was distributed as an incentive to the government 
service providers who provided those services. 
The World Health Organization (WHO), with co-
funding from the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), provided technical assistance to 
the DSF programme, such as, administrative and 
monitoring support. The DSF organizers, who were 
posted to each DSF upazila, played a key role at the local 
level in coordinating Upazila Health Complex (UHC) 
management to run the DSF programme. They were 
supervised by a national DSF coordinator, based in the 
national DSF cell in Dhaka.
Voucher programme had been criticised on several 
grounds. It was reported that the eligibility criteria were 
not being followed strictly in a few areas rather 
nepotism worked in the distribution of  vouchers (HEU 
2010a, HEU 2008). One respondent confirmed that 
local leaders often influenced the distribution of  
vouchers. Moreover, inadequate validation of  
information provided by the women led to adverse 
selection. Women often did not disclose the actual 
number of  children and received vouchers during their 
third child birth. It is evident that a number of  voucher 
recipients had three or more children  contrary to the 
exclusion criterion set out in the guidelines (HEU 
2008).
The HA and FWA followed different practices for 
distributing vouchers across the upazilas. In some 
upazilas, they distributed vouchers mostly at household 
level. However, in some instances, the FWA took 
passive role in the distribution of  vouchers and 
registration, while the HAs accomplished the 
distribution of  vouchers and registration task through 
the outreach immunization site (Koehlmoos et al. 2008, 
HEU 2008). 
It is evident that the scheme, during its imple-
mentation, faced problem of  delay in disbursement of  
funds from central to local levels. This, in turn, delayed 
reimbursement to the providers and paying incentives 
to consumers. This created frustration among the 
consumers and providers, which adversely affected 
voucher-supported service activities (Koehlmoos et al. 
2008). Moreover, the Government of  Bangladesh's 
standard financial regulation that unused monies are 
returned to the Treasury at the end of  the fiscal year 
created an additional, serious disruption to voucher 
programme operations (HEU 2010).
Though the voucher programme aimed to provide 
subsidy to only poor pregnant women in 24 districts at 
the initial stage of  implementing the programme, the 
local level mistakenly provided voucher to all pregnant 
women irrespective of  their socioeconomic status. This 
also resulted in temporary suspension of  voucher 
distribution for a few months due to shortage of  
voucher books (Ahmed and Khan 2011).
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Effects of  voucher programme on service 
utilisation and management process
Evidence suggests that the implementation of  the 
voucher programme increased awareness of  the poor 
women on the importance of  accessing maternal health 
services, and increased demand for ANC, delivery care 
and PNC from qualified providers (HEU 2010, Ahmed 
and Khan 2011, HEU 2008). The health complex saw 
increased demand for services especially from the poor 
people. HEU (2010) found that the DSF programme 
was significantly associated with higher rates of  delivery 
with qualified providers and with higher rates of  
1institutional deliveries  (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Delivery care for births taking place in 
the 6 months preceding the survey
Source: Adapted from HEU (2010)
The likelihood of  delivering with a qualified provider 
was more than twice as high in intervention areas as in 
the control upazilas. The effect was strongest for means-
tested upazilas (70% of  births), as compared to 
universal (58%) and control upazilas (27%). A much 
greater proportion of  complicated deliveries were 
attended by qualified providers in intervention than in 
control areas. The effect was strongest for the universal 
upazilas (44% of  births), as compared to the means-
tested (30%) and control upazilas (19%). However, the 
number of  those undergoing Caesarean section (c-
section) remained low (HEU 2010, HEU 2008). 
HEU (2010) also suggest that 9% women in the control 
upazilas gave birth in private sector facilities, which tend 
to charge higher fees, compared to women in universal 
(5%) and means-tested areas (2%). Similar proportions 
of  women delivered in public sector facilities in both 
universal (32%) and means-tested upazilas (28%), while 
only 9% of  women in control areas gave birth in public 
facilities (Table 1).
Table 1. Location of  most recent delivery, by 
intervention type (%)
Delivery Control Universal Mean
location tested
N=1104 N= 552 N=552
Home 80.9 56.1 69.8
Public sector 9.0 31.6 28.0
NGO 0.3 7.0 0.0
Private sector 9.3 5.3 2.1
Other 0.6 0.1 0.1
Total 100.0 100 100.0
Source: HEU 2010
However, Koehlmoos et al. (2008) suggest that the DSF 
programme was adversely affecting the family planning 
programme of  MOHFW. Being attracted by the 
financial benefit, the field workers were more engaged 
in DSF activities, which resulted in reduction of  routine 
home visits and satellite clinics (SC), thereby affecting 
the family planning performance. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the cash incentive would encourage poor 
women to become pregnant, which is contradictory to 
the family planning objectives of  the GoB (Ahmed and 
Khan 2011). Since the programme began, the poor and 
low income people had been showing more interest in 
conception than in contraception as better incentives in 
cash and kind were offered for delivering a children 
rather than contraception (Koehlmoos et al. 2008). 
It is also apparent that the increased use of  services 
resulted in considerable increase in workload of  health 
personnel and administrative officers in public facilities. 
However, there was no increase in supply of  service 
providers or support staff  to cope up with this 
situation. Moreover, the public facilities lacked 
appropriate skill mix. The respondents stated that due 
to inappropriate skill mix, some services such as EmOC 
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1. The evaluation measured demand-side impact of  the voucher programme based on a household survey in 16 DSF (universal and mean-tested) upazilas 
and 16 matched control upazilas, covering 2208 women who delivered between February 1, 2009 and July 31, 2009.
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could not be provided in UHCs. They could not even 
perform some laboratory tests because of  scarcity of  
supplies (Koehlmoos et al. 2008). Due to inadequate 
supplies and limited human resources, particularly 
gynaecologists and anaesthesiologists (HEU 2008), the 
UHCs were often compelled to refer clients to district 
hospital. This increased the transportation cost of  
clients, which were not being covered by the voucher 
programme. Travelling long distance also worked as a 
disincentive to use of  the services. Furthermore, the 
Upazila Health and Family Planning Officer and the 
Resident Medical Officer experienced increased 
administrative role, which led to inefficient manage-
ment and supervision as well as possible conflict of  
interest (HEU 2008).
As mentioned earlier, the vouchers entitle the pregnant 
women to cash incentive of  Tk. 2,000. However, a 
number of  respondents reported that women actually 
received only part of  the cash incentives in several areas 
due to corruption. One respondent said, 'Women do not 
receive the full amount of  Tk. 2,000 cash incentive in several 
instances. They often receive maximum of  Tk. 800.' HEU 
(2008) reported that many beneficiaries complained 
about either not receiving or delays in receiving cash 
benefits after child delivery. It further emerged that the 
beneficiaries were not well informed of  the voucher 
scheme benefits. As a consequence they developed 
unrealistic expectations regarding financial benefits 
resulting to dissatisfaction  especially when their 
expectations were not met. 
The service providers received extra payments for 
direct provision of  services, which was directly 
proportional to the number of  clients seen. However, 
the administrative personnel did not receive any 
incentive despite their indirect contribution to the 
implementation of  the scheme (Koehlmoos et al. 2008). 
Ahmed and Khan (2011) suggest that neither the 
providers nor the administrative personnel were 
satisfied with the incentive structure. Service providers 
considered the amount of  incentive quite low for the 
additional workload, which resulted from the increased 
use of  maternal healthcare in facilities. Another 
concern remained whether the scheme provided 
perverse incentives for surgical services as the 
designated institutional providers received Tk. 6,000 
for performing C-section delivery. It was evident that 
9% of  women in the control group had a C-section at 
their last birth, which is comparable to the national 
average of  8% (HEU 2010). A slightly higher 
proportion of  women in the universal group (13%) 
received C-sections while there was no difference 
between control and means-tested groups (8%). 
Though the evaluations of  the voucher programme 
demonstrated that the C-section rates remained low by 
all providers (HEU 2008, HEU 2010), it needs to be 
closely monitored. 
The voucher programme aimed to increase 
competition among healthcare providers through 
including both public and private providers; however, 
very few non-public facilities are participating in the 
voucher programme run by the MOHFW. Since there 
was no accredited private health facility or NGO clinic 
in the upazila, patients had no choice other than to seek 
care from public facilities. Therefore, the objective of  
improving the quality of  services or respon-siveness of  
the system to clients through increased competition 
remained unmet. 
Sustainability of  the programme
The voucher programme involves huge transaction 
cost for providing services. It is expensive to provide 
incentives both to the providers and consumers, and to 
administer the scheme. The average cost per voucher 
distributed (based upon the direct costs of  the DSF 
programme) is estimated to be US$ 41. In addition to 
program administrative costs, this cost includes 
incentives to pregnant women as well as to providers 
and facilities (HEU 2010). According to the national 
financial incentive structures (Table 2), the cost per 
voucher distributed ranges from 3,800 Taka to 11,300 
Taka depending on the level of  complications 
(Koehlmoos et al. 2008).  
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Table 2. Structures of  financial incentives
Entitlement of  beneficiaries Taka
3 ANC check-ups (@ Tk. 100/visit) 300
Transport cost for having institutional delivery 100
Safe delivery (institutional/SBA at home) 2,000
1 PNC check-up 100
Gift box (baby soap, big towel, baby attire, 500
and Horlicks) 
Entitlement of  voucher distributors/
service providers 
Registration per pregnant woman 10
2 haemoglobin tests before delivery (@ Tk. 35/test) 70
2 urine tests before delivery 
(@ Tk. 35/test) 70
3 ANC check-ups (@ Tk. 50/visit) 150
1 PNC check-up 100
Conduct of  safe delivery 300
Other associated expendable costs 
Medicine cost 100
Cost subsidy for ambulance if  referred from 500
UzHC to a designated service provider in the
case of  complications
Forceps delivery/vacuum 1,000
extraction/placenta removal by
hand/dilatation & curettage (d&c)/eclampsia
Caesarian section 6,000
Source: Koehlmoos et al. (2008)
The voucher programme in Bangladesh is currently 
being implemented through donor support. The WHO 
provides administrative and monitoring support to the 
DSF programme. The MOHFW implements DSF 
voucher programme through pooled funds co-financed 
by the World Bank, United Kingdom, the European 
Community, Germany, Sweden, Canada, Netherlands, 
and the United Nations Population Fund. If  the donor 
support is withdrawn, it would be virtually impossible 
to run the programme by internal resources. Moreover, 
as already stated earlier, with the existing capacity of  
public facilities, it is not feasible to meet the additional 
demand unless private providers are also involved in the 
process of  service delivery mechanism through 
voucher.
In Bangladesh, DSF has been adopted as a means of  
subsidizing women of  low income group to reduce 
their out-of-pocket expenses at point of  delivery, and 
DISCUSSION
thereby encourage them to seek maternal healthcare. 
The DSF scheme is designed to protect households 
from catastrophic expenditure associated with 
relatively high cost interventions like EmOC. It allo-
cates a restricted cash grant to the poor preg-nant 
women. Though consumer satisfaction is higher with 
unrestricted transfers, the voucher programme restricts 
both what the consumer buys with the transfer and 
what services the providers are eligible to supply. It is 
expected that the DSF would empower women to make 
decisions on buying services based on their need and 
perceived quality of  service. It is argued that the 
voucher programme would contribute in enhancing 
quality of  maternal health services through provider 
incentive and increased competition among providers. 
Initial evidence shows that the DSF mechanism has 
been successful in increasing the use of  maternal health 
services in Bangladesh (HEU 2010, HEU 2008). This 
increased use has been achieved through the provision 
of  incentives to both the consumers and the providers. 
Along with the provision of  free services for poor 
women, SBAs were compensated directly based on 
voucher used, which helped create effective demand for 
services. Further investigation needs to be done to 
explore the disaggregated effects of  these two types of  
incentives on the use of  maternal health services. 
Limitations
The programme has some limitations. It has been 
criticized for the potential perverse incentive of  having 
additional children, especially in rural areas. The 
universal coverage under the DSF scheme in some 
upazilas extended the benefit to the non-poor, which 
appeared to promote an interest of  an increase in 
pregnancies at all levels of  society (Koehlmoos et al. 
2008). Moreover, as the cash benefit for cases of  
sterilization is lower than that of  the DSF scheme for an 
institutional delivery, this may create a perverse 
incentive in favour of  producing more pregnancies. 
Due to the financial benefit, the field workers were 
more engaged in DSF activities, which adversely 
affected the family planning performance. 
Though the programme is designed to provide subsidy 
for maternal healthcare for up to two children, lack of  
reliable data and inadequate monitoring system leads to 
adverse selection of  beneficiaries. Moreover, due to 
absence of  a local committee to conduct home visits for 
determining eligibility, women from non-poor income 
groups also received voucher in a few cases. Unethical 
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exercise of  political power and nepotism influenced the 
distribution of  voucher, as stated by respondents. 
Concerns have also been raised regarding the potential 
increase in C-sections due to supplier induced demand. 
HEU (2010) reported that 13% women in the universal 
group received C-sections, which was slightly higher 
than the national average rate (8%). However, it was 
unclear what accounted for the higher C-section rates in 
universal but not in means-tested areas (8%). It needs to 
be acknowledged that some increase in C-section rates 
is expected and desired as a result of  the DSF 
programme in order to address unmet need for 
medically indicated surgical deliveries (e.g., in the case 
of  obstructed labor or fatal distress), however, the 
disparity in incentive payments to physicians 
conducting C-sections (Tk. 3,000 vs. Tk. 150 for 
normal deliveries to physician) might put women at risk 
of  unnecessary C-sections (or encourage facilities to 
report some normal deliveries as C-sections to obtain 
the incentive) (HEU 2010). 
Shift of  an organization from a predominantly supply 
side financing towards one based heavily on DSF will 
require a fundamentally different skill. Moreover, 
increased work load due to increased number of  clients 
and the incentive payments may raise human resource 
management issues within the facilities. To introduce 
DSF, building a staff  base with relevant competencies is 
required, and be backed up for institutionalizing the 
process. Under the 'Demand-Based Reproductive 
Health Commodity Project' 21 days hands on training 
was provided to the FWVs to perform normal delivery 
at the UHFWCs, while three days training for the 
service providers and field workers were arranged to 
disseminate information on the importance of  
maternal healthcare issues and the process of  using 
vouchers (Rahman et al. 2009). However, there is limited 
evidence of  providing compre-hensive training to the 
healthcare providers and administrative staff  before 
implementing the voucher programme initiated by 
MOHFW. 
Moreover, providing services requires appropriate 
input mix, which is often lacking in lower administrative 
levels, and requiring referral of  clients to 
upazila/district level. In rural areas, a large proportion 
of  posts remain vacant for long time. Though the 
voucher programme has increased service utilization, 
no attempt has been taken so far to fill in the vacant 
posts in the 44 upazilas to accommodate additional 
workload of  providers. Though the SBAs are satisfied 
with the incentive scheme, this additional workload and 
delayed payment of  incentives has created frustration 
among managers and healthcare providers. It also 
appears that there is lack of  communication between 
the central and local level managers in providing the 
voucher scheme. The vision, mission and 
implementtation plan of  voucher programme were not 
communicated properly from the central to the lower 
administrative levels. Delay in paying incentive to the 
consumers and partial payment created frustration 
among consumers, and mistrust towards administrators 
of  the scheme.
Universal maternal coverage
Despite these challenges faced in implementing the 
maternal health voucher scheme in Bangladesh, it may 
be considered as an important step in removing 
demand side barriers to maternal health services. It 
raises the question whether DSF can be used as a 
mechanism to achieve universal health coverage in 
Bangladesh. A number of  factors need to be considered 
like what services should be covered and who should be 
subsidized under the scheme? Policy makers also need 
to critically assess the added costs of  the programme 
compared to the additional benefits and sustainability 
of  the programme. Benefits include increased access to 
services by vulnerable groups and the potential 
improvement in quality. The costs include the creation 
of  an organization for assessing and allocating 
vouchers, accrediting facilities and paying providers 
(Ensor 2004). 
Evidence suggests that the best use for vouchers are for 
predictable services that are relatively simple to 
package. This suggests that groups and conditions 
should be chosen that are reasonably predictable such 
as pregnant women, basic care for newborns, high risk 
groups for sexually transmitted infections (STI), 
sufferers of  priority diseases that take some time to 
treat such as malaria and tuberculosis, and sufferers of  
chronic illnesses and disabilities. Thus, schemes could 
focus primarily on fixed packages of  key services aimed 
at easily identifiable groups. Vouchers could be given 
directly to those suffering from illnesses based on 
standardized packages of  care. It is argued that in the 
case where there is no externality from non-treatment 
as in the case of  maternal health or chronic non-
communicable diseases, they might be targeted at low 
income groups.
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Only public facilities are providing services through 
voucher programme in Bangladesh. To scale up the 
current maternal health voucher programme or to 
include additional services in the package such as basic 
care of  newborns and STIs would require enhanced 
capacity of  public facilities and to involve private sector 
in service provision. Increased competition among the 
providers needs to be ensured to widen the choice of  
providers for consumers and to improve quality of  care. 
The monopoly of  public facilities in providing DSF 
scheme poses a threat of  reducing the benefits of  
introducing the financing system.
It appears that the voucher programme involves 
marked amount of  transaction cost. These costs can be 
substantial where they include costs of  voucher 
production, contracting providers and monitoring their 
performance, distributing vouchers, reimbursing 
providers, providing incentives to consumers, and 
establishing systems to avoid perverse incentives and 
abuse of  the voucher scheme (Bhatia et al. 2006). The 
additional benefits gained may not exceed the 
transaction cost of  voucher programme for a number 
of  services. Policymakers therefore need to assess the 
potential benefit of  a voucher scheme, the cost of  
service provision, and the sources of  funding before 
initiating any voucher programme with universal 
coverage.
DSF have been successful in raising the use of  specific 
and easily identifiable services amongst poor pregnant 
women in Bangladesh. Despite initial success, it is 
crucial to address the following issues for 
implementation of  the voucher programme for 
universal coverage:
•Due consideration must be given to the potential 
occurrence of  perverse effect of  voucher, and 
inadequate capacity of  public facilities to provide 
additional services. The voucher programme must 
be designed and implemented in such a way that it 
does not generate any perverse incentive to 
providers or consumers. Behavioural Change 
Communicat ion,  s tr ict  monitor ing and 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
supervision, and periodic evaluation of  the 
programme need to be ensured to reduce perverse 
incentive, if  there is any. Capacity in administering 
the financing schemes and also accrediting 
providers needs to be developed. Capacity building 
both at the central and local levels through basic and 
refresher training is needed. It is also crucial to fill 
up the vacant posts in public facilities, create 
additional posts if  required (such as anaesthetics) 
and recruit appropriate number of  personnel to 
provide services effectively.
•The vision, mission, planning and budgeting of  the 
organization needs to incorporate a commitment to 
achieve the stated objectives of  voucher 
programme in order to transmit an explicit and 
unambiguous message to all staff  and external 
stakeholders about the value base and principles of  
the organization regarding DSF. The central level 
needs to communicate the vision properly to the 
lower administrative levels, and to other 
stakeholders including beneficiaries. 
•In order to reduce corruption in targeting the poor 
within public services, monitoring and supervision, 
and developing data base are crucial. Involving 
community in the process may contribute in 
ensuring transparency in selecting beneficiaries. 
Database needs to be developed incorporating 
information on demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics of  the local population for better 
targeting of  the poor. 
•DSF should strengthen the private market for 
service provision. Measures need to be taken to 
involve private providers (profit and not-for-profit) 
in the service delivery mechanism through voucher.
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INTRODUCTION
ealth care financing issues remain a key agenda in Hglobal health policy. The most recent World 
Health Report puts greater emphasis on the country's 
health financing mechanisms in order to ensure 
universal coverage (WHO 2010a). Rising health care 
costs and the large share of  out of  pocket expenses 
appear as among major hurdles for the poor to break 
out of  poverty. Consequently, poverty reduction 
strategies within the purview of  the millennium 
development goals (MDG) necessitate a review and 
possible reforms of  health care finance so as to arrest 
the growing impoverishment on account of  health 
shocks. 
While primary health care services in Bangladesh, as in 
most developing countries, are meant to be free, the 
poor appear unable to access public sector facilities, 
except possibly for child and maternity care. As a result, 
they end up paying directly for most health services 
from the private and informal sector. The 
disproportionate reliance on out-of-pocket payments 
(OPP) represents a most regressive way of  financing 
health care expenditures. Consequently, despite 
significant progress in health indicators, significant 
inequities in the access to health care still exist in 
Bangladesh. Many believe that health finance reforms 
by incorporating a risk sharing plan such as micro health 
insurance (MHI) hold the promise of  providing 
meaningful financial protection to mitigate the poverty 
consequences of  ill health. However, it is uncertain if  
the latter strategy can be a pathway toward achieving 
universal health coverage (UHC). Indeed, one of  major 
objectives of  the paper is precisely to examine the latter 
hypothesis.
The main health financing mechanism consists of  tax-
financed government funding, private health insurance 
(both mandatory as well as voluntary insurance) and 
OPP. In addition to spending by households and the 
Government, other financing agents include NGOs 
and international development partners. Some 400 
NGOs are engaged in the health care provision in 
Bangladesh, most of  which work in rural areas offering 
primary health care services and health education. 
These NGO activities partly compensate for the large 
gaps created by the inadequacy of  public health 
programmes.
The objective of  this paper is to provide an assessment 
of  health care financing programmes being offered by 
some of  the prominent NGOs and other dedicated 
health providers in the country. We also elaborate on 
the viability of  these models for possibly targeting 
UHC via this route. In particular we focus on evolving 
MHI programmes being offered by the above 
mentioned NGOs. For the purpose of  this paper, pre-
purchase of  a member card for a fee in exchange for 
specific health services (either free or on a co-payment 
basis) may be described as an 'insurance' modality. 
Hence our selection of  NGOs is restricted to all those 
involved in offering such an insurance programme. 
With these remarks servings as an 'introduction', the 
rest of  the paper proceeds as follows. In the next 
section we provide a brief  'micro' overview of  the 
health financing situation prevalent in the country, 
which is based on a recent 4,000-strong household 
survey carried out by the Microinsurance Research Unit 
(MRU) at InM. Selected MHI programmes are 
reviewed in the following section as to their scope, 
client acceptability and financial sustainability. Then we 
discuss the major challenges faced by these 
programmes as well as pathways to possible scaling-up 
so as to contribute to the attainment of  UHC. Some 
concluding remarks are put forward in the final section. 
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COST OF HEALTH SHOCKS, 
VULNERABILITY AND THE MEANS OF 
FINANCE
That health shocks can be catastrophic for individuals, 
which can also trap the vulnerable households 
indefinitely into poverty cycles, is a matter of  great 
concern from a public policy perspective (Dercon and 
Hoddinott 2005; Jalan and Ravallion 1999). In most 
datasets, demographic shocks appear to contribute 
significantly to variability in full income (defined to be the 
sum of  crop profits and wage income earned by adult 
males over the year). In the ICRISAT sample gathered 
annually over a ten-year period (1975-84), about 40% 
of  the families reported loss of  working days due to 
illness in a given year. Loss of  savings or capital 
combined with the inadequacy of  social security 
schemes in developing countries, the poor are often 
forced into deeper poverty (and the low-income non-
poor into poverty) by their limited ability to cope. 
How widespread are health shocks in Bangladesh? In a 2009 
survey carried out by the Microinsurance Research Unit 
(MRU) at InM, 3,941 households (hhs) (comprising of  
19,424 individuals) reported 1,457 having missed work 
over the preceding 12 months due to illness. Of  this 
group, 462 cases involved loss of  up to 5 working days, 
while 219 remained absent for more than 31 days. 
Altogether 1,186 illness episodes can be classified as 
'health shocks' over 2 years, where a shock is defined to 
involve a certain threshold in terms of  either 
expenditure or duration of  illness. 
About 88 percent (3,459 out of  3,941) households 
reported at least one episode of  illness over the 
preceding 12 months. While more than half  (55%) of  
them had more than one episode of  illness, about 35% 
had 2 episodes and remaining 20% had 3 or more. 
Translated to the level of  persons in the sample, the 
above figures reveal that 33 percent of  the individuals 
had self-reported morbidity and 98 percent of  them 
utilized some kind of  healthcare over the 12-month 
period in question. However, only 40 percent sought 
healthcare from formal providers. The poor and the 
children are the most deprived section of  the 
population in terms of  utilization of  formal healthcare. 
The poorest quintile had significantly higher utilization 
of  informal care (and lower utilization of  formal care) 
than richer quintiles (fourth and fifth).
OPP per affected household during the preceding 12 
months (i.e., over 2008-9 fiscal year) amounted to 
roughly USD 59 which was about 6% of  the total 
household (and about 9 % of  food) consumption over 
1the year . Drugs were seen as the principal component 
of  OPP, accounting for about 60 percent of  direct OPP 
(about USD 31.50), a figure that was even higher (nearly 
70 percent) for the poorest quintile. How do these 
primary survey figures tally with aggregate national 
statistics? Broadly consistent would be a fair 
assessment. The government spending at a meagre 1% 
of  GDP on healthcare in recent years implies a 
disproportionate reliance on private out-of-pocket 
spending of  86% of  private health expenditures. Total 
health expenditure (THE) is still rather low at about 
3.4% of  GDP (WHO 2010b).
Turning to the incidence of  catastrophic health 
expenditure (defined presently to exceed 10% of  gross 
monthly outlay), the MRU data reveals that about 15 
percent of  the affected households incurred such level 
of  healthcare expenditures. Utilization of  both public 
and private care leads to substantially higher incidence 
of  catastrophic expenses compared to NGO care. 
Lamentably however, national statistics reveal that 
NGO spending on health (including the share borne by 
international donors) is of  minor quantitative 
significance in dollars and cents, between 6 to 10% of  
THE (MOHFW 2010). Even then the relatively small 
sum may yield major benefit if  strategically spent in 
targeted directions (e.g., in ante and neo-natal care).
It is notable that catastrophic expenditures happen to 
be somewhat regressive in the sense that such 
expenditures appear to fall disproportionately on the 
poorer quintiles, where about 17.4% percent of  
households in the poorest quintile fall into this category, 
th 2vis-à-vis about 13.9% in the 4  quintile . Figure 1 
illustrates this well. 
1. All survey based expenditure figures cited in this document represent summer 2009 figures and utilize the prevailing exchange rate of  BDT 69/USD.
2. Focusing on 90-day records reveals a much greater incidence of  catastrophic expenses (about 27%) as a share of  household expenditure, where the 
burden on the poorest quintile was dramatically high (about 37%). While annualization is a standard means of  restating such data, the immediacy of  the 
issue gets muffled in the process. 
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Means of  coping with health shocks:  The MRU data reveals 
that the largest group (about 30%) attempted to meet 
the expenses from regular income, which is incidentally 
consistent with the scope of  offering additional labour 
by the affected household in the market as reported 
3elsewhere (Kochar 1995) . Another 21% used their 
savings, while about 28% incurred additional debt from 
different sources. About 9% of  the sample households, 
which is far from negligible, however, sold and/or 
mortgaged permanent assets (e.g., land, live-stock, etc) 
as a coping mechanism (Ahsan et al., 2011). Thus, in the 
majority of  cases (58%), the victims' choice of  coping 
strategy exposes them to further vulnerability, which is 
in principle preventable by well designed 
microinsurance products.
Most MFI-NGO activities in the health field are 
primarily of  awareness building and educational in 
scope, which indeed constitute the first line of  attack in 
the war on improving health and hygiene in a society. 
While it would be of  importance to take a 
comprehensive look at all such activities and embark on 
an evaluation of  the same, this is clearly not feasible in a 
short chapter focussed on MHI. Instead below we 
review several rather well-known health financing 
programmes initiated by NGO-MFIs. Even though 
many such programmes are labelled 'insurance', 
typically these do not embody a great deal of  risk 
MAJOR NGO-LED 'MICRO HEALTH 
INSURANCE' PROGRAMMES
shifting. A key feature of  an insurance mechanism is the 
shifting of  the underlying risk from the party in a 
relatively weak state to weather the risk on her own (e.g., 
the care seeker) to those who are more capable of  doing 
so (e.g., a risk-pool like a commercial insurer or a mutual 
association of  cooperatives). It is implicit in this 
arrangement that while bulk of  the risk will be shifted in 
the process, a small share (typically 25% or less) is to be 
borne by the insured entity in order to minimize the 
chances of  moral hazard (Arrow 1976). A strict 
adherence to this quantitative rule of  risk shifting, 
which in the first place is not of  the 'cast-in-stone' 
variety, would imply that none of  the programmes that 
we have in mind here qualifies as 'insurance'. Instead, 
we propose a weaker definition in the present context; 
pre-purchase of  a membership card for a fee in exchange for the 
promise of  some services (either free or on a co-payment basis) may 
be described as an 'insurance' programme. 
While discarding the quantitative restriction cited 
above, it ought to be emphasized that the degree of  risk 
shifting accomplished in an insurance type arrangement 
remains a key criterion of  its effectiveness in preventing 
vulnerability to poverty. As Arrow (1976) had 
remarked, if  the co-insurance exceeds 25%, the 
insurance principle, namely risk shifting, is lost. The 
point is that even 25% of  a large bill may be so 
burdensome as to push the household below the 
poverty line or deeper into poverty. 
Even when some specialized insurance companies, 
health sector NGOs and MFIs are involved in the 
provision of  microinsurance services (often in 
collaboration with each other), these are mostly of  
credit or some version of  credit-cum-life variety. The 
health insurance market for the poor in Bangladesh is 
served exclusively by NGO/MFIs. Many of  these 
entities claim to have been offering a variety of  MHI 
products since the late 1970s, but registered insurers are 
yet to jump into the fray. Given that many of  these 
programmes were introduced about a decade or longer 
ago, most were rightfully seen as important innovations 
in the context. Hence a time has come to take stock of  
the situation in the light of  current developments and 
thinking on the issue. 
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3. This observation is consistent with the characterization of  rural labour market as suffering from the 'surplus labour' condition, namely that a sudden 
absence of  working members may not necessarily lead to a fall in household production (Sen 1966).  
Figure 1. Incidence of  catastrophic health
expenditure (over 12 months)
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Among the NGO initiatives, health financing 
mechanism varies from one organization to another. 
Normally, outreach services are provided for free. Some 
organizations charge nominal amounts. Many NGOs 
have developed specific, customized interventions to 
address the needs of  the ultra-poor and other 
disadvantaged groups. The health programmes of  
different NGOs consist of  preventive, curative, 
rehabilitative and promo-tional health services, where a 
greater emphasis is given on improving maternal, neo-
natal and child health along with fighting 
communicable diseases and common health problems. 
Some organizations focus on other important public 
health issues such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, 
vision care and sanitation. 
NGOs mainly use community-based approaches with 
trained community health workers (CHWs) to 
implement their programmes. Micro health insurance 
(MHI) is primarily provided by NGOs, which also 
provide health services and microcredit. MHI covers 
basic and preventive health services including immuni-
zation, family planning, consultation, and normal 
deliveries. Discounts are also provided on medicine and 
pathology tests, where available. MHI of  most NGOs 
specifically target women, micro credit members, and in 
many cases the poor and ultra-poor house-holds in the 
working area. In case of  larger organizations having 
their own health service centres or hospitals, over and 
above basic services noted above, the card holders are 
able to receive more specialized services such as 
ultrasound and to avail surgeries (e.g., cataract, C-
section and similar) either at their own premises or at 
referral clinics/hospitals. However two important 
features of  most programmes are (a) the high 
copayment (typically 50% or more) for services such as 
drugs, pathology, ultrasound tests and surgeries, and, 
(b) the lack of  a formal referral system. Both these 
issues are discussed further in the next section on 
'challenges'. Hence often the very low sticker price of  a 
'card' (say BDT 20) can be very misleading. Some 
programmes, as we shall see below, however, do offer 
extremely low-cost products to the ultra-poor (e.g., 
Gonoshashthya Kendra). 
With these remarks, let us now briefly run through the 
MHI programmes operated by some of  the major 
national-level NGO-MFIs and those that happen to be 
major initiatives of  smaller/regional NGOs. However 
due to lack of  publicly available information, we are 
4unable to include all worthy programmes . Those 
included are Ad-din, BRAC, Dhaka Community 
Hospital (DCH), Gonoshashthya Kendra (GsK), 
Grameen Kalyan (GrK) and Sajida Foundation 
(SAJIDA). 
(a) Ad-din: Established in 1985, Ad-din works with 
health, education, social and financial matters, targeting 
mainly underprivileged people, particularly women and 
children. Its working areas include Khulna and Barisal 
divisions and Dhaka city. It is reported to be offering 
quality hospital and community based health services 
through 23 office clinics, 26 paramedics, 390 traditional 
birth attendants and it runs 368 satellite clinics every 
month. It is unclear if  they have any qualified doctors 
and surgeons on its employment or if  they are actually 
engaged as consultants, who would otherwise be 
gainfully employed elsewhere. Like many health-
focussed NGOs, Ad-din's health workers routinely visit 
client houses distributing contraceptives, oral re-
hydration therapy, vitamin-A capsules and providing 
health education. They also run sessions on 
reproductive health with adolescent females. The 
hospital network focussed on maternal and child health 
care includes nutritional rehabilitation units in Dhaka 
and Jessore. Compared to other local private hospitals, 
charges for hospital services are believed very nominal, 
and include a number of  free services as well.
The Health Insurance scheme was launched in 2004 for 
the members of  the microcredit programme. The 
cardholders receive 10% discount for purchasing 
medicine from Ad-din and avail all other services at half  
price. The ultra poor are offered these services free of  
cost. In 2009, 14,520 received free health services under 
the insurance scheme, which included 452 operations at 
a cost of  BDT 1.4 million. Moreover, 6,229 members 
of  the microcredit scheme received health services 
under the insurance plan. This included 3,305 
5outpatient services, and 2,924 inpatient services . It 
4. The information cited below resulted from both direct discussions with the providers as well as from what is publicly available in various publications 
and on the web, and as such they are not uniformly up to date. See Ahsan and Tax (2010) for more details.
5. The Ad-din claims, facts and figures are based on information accessed on its website (www.ad-din.org) and from its annual reports, Ad-din (2007) and 
Ad-din (2009).
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would seem that the number of  ultra poor members 
exceed the regular insurance cardholders, though the 
latter appear to utilize inpatient services more 
extensively. Lacking adequate information, it is difficult 
to evaluate the financial model underlying the health 
activities, and therefore, be able to say more about the 
financial viability of  the scheme. 
(b) BRAC Bangladesh: While BRAC has a large 
health programme targeted at the rural poor (through 
its Essential Health Care programme reportedly 
covering 16-17 million households), it has only a minor 
health insurance presence. Though BRAC began its 
first insurance initiative in Sulla in 1977, it had to be 
soon closed down due to the difficulty in reaching the 
target population. A pilot MHI was eventually 
introduced in 2001 in two rural locations in the 
Narsingdi and Dinajpur districts, with financial and 
technical support from ILO. After the termination of  
ILO funding in 2005, the programme in Dinajpur was 
discontinued. The programme in Narsingdi continued 
up until April 2007, after which it was also discontinued. 
However, in February 2008, the programme in 
Narsingdi was restarted with BRAC's own fund.
The premium for the general package (which lists 695 
of  1,210 covered households) is either BDT 150 or 250, 
differentiated as to the membership status of  the 
member in what BRAC calls 'voluntary organizations' 
(VO, e.g., BRAC/other NGOs) and those not 
belonging to any VO, presumably a proxy for poor vs. 
6non-poor . As with other programmes cited here, most 
services are offered on a discount basis; for the general 
package, the discounts are 10% on drugs, 50% on 
consultations, pathology tests and normal chid delivery 
at its own facilities. There is also a provision of  a limited 
cash payment (up to BDT 1,000 per year per family) to 
be made available to the insured upon referral to 
external providers.
There is a second programme, 'prepaid pregnancy 
related care package', where the premium is 100 or 150, 
7respectively, again differentiated as above . The latter 
has a membership of  514 families. The BRAC MHI 
programme engages 2 doctors, 6 nurses, one lab 
technician and 3 administrative staff  members. 
Between Feb 2008 and April 2009, the programme as a 
whole accounted for 2,865 episodes of  treatments. 
However the programme appears unexciting to the area 
residents and they are unenthusiastic about signing up 
or to renew the packages; the renewal rate as of  April 
2009 stood at a mere 25%. Perhaps due to the poor 
scale, the operational cost recovery, at 39%, is well 
below the break-even level. Tables 1-3 briefly 
summarise the detailed features of  BRAC and those of  
most of  the programmes reviewed in this chapter. 
Going forward, it would seem that, perhaps being 
ambivalent about the programme design, BRAC has 
been less than serious in scaling up its MHI programme 
over the past decade. Nor has it done much about 
developing a business model for its financial solvency. 
The programme has been 'on again/off  again', partly 
depending on the availability of  donor grants. Given 
the important health sector role it has played over the 
past decades, it would seem that a viable model could 
have been developed where it could leverage/upgrade 
its considerable experience and 'already-in-place' 
dedicated resources (in terms of  both trained personnel 
and existing health infrastructure) to bargain for a 
prominent role in MHI implementation. It would thus 
seem logical to conclude that to date BRAC has given 
greater priority to its role in advancing the cause of  
UHC outside of  the insurance mode. 
(c) Dhaka Community Hospital (DCH): Currently, 
DCH works through 30 primary health care centres 
outside Dhaka (10 are owned by DCH, and the rest are 
by other participating NGOs), employing on average 10 
8persons in each centre . In addition, DCH has its own 
250-bed modern hospital in Dhaka, which also acts as 
the referral centre. DCH has been implementing the 
health card type insurance scheme for some time. Their 
schemes are as follows: School Health Programme, 
Industrial Health Insurance Programme, Family Health 
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6. Here, the ultra-poor qualify for the 'Equity Package', but there is only one household in that category. These members do not pay any premium 
whatsoever, and also receive 80% discount on drugs and pathology. 
7. The pregnancy package entitles the holder cash benefits which are multiples of  the premium cost; for example, these range between 2 to 5 times the 
premium for pre- and post-delivery complications and newborn illness. For normal delivery they can receive up to 3 to 4 times the annual premium. But 
the cash benefit for referrals are half  of  the figures for the 'general' package.  
8. Most of  the information about DCH described in the paragraphs to follow is taken from its site www.dchtrust.org/ health_program.htm.
Insurance Programme and Rural Health Insurance 
Programme. Though these schemes are called 'health 
insurance programmes', they function differently 
compared to regular health insurance programmes. For 
instance, there are no fixed premiums. However each 
plan involves the acquisition of  a 'health card' for a fee, 
as explained below. The core funding comes from the 
DCH Trust (which runs the medical college), Oxfam 
and the participating partner organizations.   
Under the Family Health Insurance programme, for 
example, each family gets 'Family Health Card' against 
yearly payment of  Tk. 20 (on average, and this amount 
is set by the community keeping in mind the 100% cost 
recovery objective). Family members receive: inpatient 
and outpatient services (managed and financed by the 
local community), referrals, 10 per cent commission on 
overall expenditure in case of  additional services, 4 
home visits per month by health workers for basic 
services and health education, and emergency services. 
The Rural Health Insurance Programme is similar to the 
family health coverage and is offered in collaboration 
with partner rural health organizations, operating in a 
large number of  districts (in excess of  20). Over and 
above primary health services, both invasive preventive 
and curative procedures are made available to the 
cardholders. Typically in each rural heath centre doctors 
are available 8 hours a day and paramedic service can be 
accessed 24 hours a day. DCH serves 100,000 people 
under this programme, presumably via some 20,000 
cardholder households. This programme is financed 
with support from Oxfam and DCH subsidies.
The industrial programme, one of  the oldest of  the 
DCH programmes, works in close collaboration with 
industrial units that are covered by the programme. 
These units let their staff  trained as medical assistants, 
and factory personnel actually manage the pharmacy 
set up by DCH on location. DCH doctors provide care 
services to the cardholders once a week at the factory 
premises. Cardholders also receive yearly thorough 
medical check-up and referral service at DCH. 
Presently 24 factories are covered and on average 350 
workers/employees are being served every week. The 
current cost recovery for this programme is reported to 
be 100 percent
The school health has been implemented in 
collaboration with NGO schools, mostly in and around 
Dhaka city. Each child is provided with a 'Health Card' 
(Tk. 20 on average, borne usually by the NGO school or 
DCH). DCH doctors visit the schools once a week and 
provide care services to the students. Currently a total 
of  13 schools (on average 80 children in each) are 
covered. The focus here is on general paediatric care, 
but targeted areas include vision, hearing (ENT), 
dental, immunization etc. Funding of  this programme 
is mainly through DCH subsidies and fixed amounts of  
token money collected from the NGO school 
authorities. Estimated cost recovery for this 
programme is less than 30 per cent.
Unlike the other schemes discussed here, DCH health 
card schemes are community-based programmes. The 
community decides the health card fee (premium 
amount) and fees for other services as well with the goal 
of  cost recovery in mind. The primary discount scheme 
appears to be 10% off  the usual rates, beyond the range 
of  free services (e.g., awareness and advisories, check 
ups, limited home visits etc). The primary attention is 
claimed to be not cost recovery, but to offer quality 
health care services at low costs. The low-cost claim 
must be due to both the equality and variety of  free 
services as well as procedures of  payment in 
instalments etc. Otherwise the 10% discount seems to 
be the lowest of  what the other programmes offer. The 
reason the industrial programme is self-financing is 
primarily due to the fact that most services are in effect 
being imposed (beyond the training phase) on the 
factory itself  (via the training of  its staff  as 'health 
assistants' and the running of  the pharmacy by staff  
who are already in the company's payroll). And the 10% 
subsidy for services accessed at DCH is not much of  
concern from this point of  view. In non-industrial 
packages, these 'free' services are given directly by DCH 
and its partner organizations, which is costly to the 
provider. Overall, however, the community-based 
DCH mode is very interesting and may hold the 
promise of  significant expansion especially if  means 
can be found to distribute the large burden of  the 'free 
services', a common feature of  its core programmes, to 
a greater number of  social actors and not just to charity.
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(d) Gonoshasthaya Kendra (GsK): Launched in 
1975, GsK's micro health insurance programme has 
9been among the earliest anywhere . The programme's 
goal is to provide sustainable health care services. 
Insured persons or families pay for a health insurance 
subscription according to their socio-economic status 
but everyone gets the essential and comparable health 
care in GsK facilities. Different risk groups are also 
differentiated in premium setting (e.g., smokers vs. non-
smokers). The GsK premium scheme is progressive so 
that the destitute, poor and ultra-poor pay little for 
consultations, medicines and referral services. 
Presently GsK offers its programme through 4 
hospitals (Dhaka, Savar, Sreepur and Kashinathpur) 
and 39 rural health centres (RHCs) covering 648 
villages from 47 unions comprising 14 districts. A fifth 
hospital has recently been established in the 
Gaibandha-Kurigram area (about 30-bed as of  June 
2011). At present, GsK employs 58 doctors and 280 
paramedics altogether to serve this network of  health 
facilities. One senior paramedic remains in charge of  
each RHC. Various types of  medical care are provided 
in these centres including minor surgeries. However 
only doctors working as consultants on a rotational 
basis provide regular surgeries. 
Presently the number of  families covered by GsK 
health insurance is about 169,000, which would 
translate to about a million people, which would by far 
be the largest programme in the country.  The 
cardholders are mostly categorised as 'poor' (67%, i.e., 
about 113,230 households), 25% in middle class, while 
2,64 % are ultra-poor, and 0.42% belong to the poorest 
cadre, 'destitutes'. The remaining 4.5% are declared 
10'rich'. It accommodated 232,265 patient visits in 2008 . 
The general premium and co-payment structure 
appears to be at the low end of  what is seen throughout 
South Asia.
GsK therefore has already played a vital part in allowing 
the poor to access critical health care needs in remote 
locations, and is thus playing a significant role in the 
cause of  UHC. However, lack of  publicly available 
financial data makes it hard to evaluate its scalability or 
its capacity to operate in a self-financed manner. For 
example, eligible drugs are given free to the 'very poor', 
who also pay mere BDT 5 as consultation fee for each 
visit, but it is uncertain to what extent these subsidies 
are squared off  against other surplus generating 
insurance and non-insurance services. Among non-
health premium sources of  funds, evidently the two 
urban hospitals generate positive cash flows, as does the 
medical college in Savar. Besides, its own 
pharmaceutical company is presumably another source 
of  cash, and then there are the donors. However it 
would be useful to analyze the issues in clearer terms 
and explore the relative efficacy of  the alternative 
modes of  sustainability open to GsK. 
(e) Grameen Kalyan (GrK): GrK introduced its 
version of  MHI in 1996 and at its peak covered several 
hundred thousand individuals. MHI is central among 
GrK's activities serving the dual purpose of  ensuring 
the participation of  the target group as well as acting as 
a source of  revenue for the programme. GrK attempts 
to cross-subsidize its members by having higher pricing 
structure for non-Grameen Bank cardholders and non-
cardholders.
Earlier, the premium was rather low at BDT 100 for 
Grameen Bank (GB) members and BDT for 150 non-
GB members. Since 2009, the premium has however 
been doubled to BDT 200 and 300, respectively, for GB 
members and non-members per year. Once a 
cardholder, however, all benefits are identical between 
both sets of  members. The fee entitles the household 
11(up to six persons) to access all eligible services . 
Insurance coverage (for all members) includes free 
annual check-up for the family, immunization against 
common diseases and home visits for educational, 
counselling and health awareness campaign. Doctor's 
consultation fee is BDT 10 per visit and basic annual 
pathology tests cost BDT 25. Standard discounts apply 
to drugs (25% for basic, 10% for other) and normal 
pathology (30-50%). The scheme also allows 
hospitalization expenses of  50% of  costs at external 
clinics (but limited to BDT 3,000 per year), and that too 
just for the cardholder. Some researchers have claimed 
however that the hospitalization benefits have not 
69
Bangladesh Health Watch Report 2011
9. While Gonoshasthya Kendra (GsK) and Grameen Kalyan (GrK) both claim the identical acronym (GK) in their own documentation, to avoid 
confusion, we have chosen to abbreviate the two terms differently
10. However, the actual breakdown of  the number of  patient visits into different categories of  membership is not available.
11. Additional family members pay only BDT 35 to join in. Just recently (2011) GrK has started to allow the cardholder to pay the premium in two 
instalments than one, as was the practice till then. At the same time, basic free check was extended to all members of  the household, not just the head.
being exercised on a routine basis, neither for GrK nor 
for BRAC MHI programmes (Radermacher and Dror 
2006). 
Membership has fallen off  significantly in recent years 
due to a variety of  reasons. Beyond the premium hike, 
difficulty in retaining doctors in rural locations is 
proving to be a major challenge and is prominently 
among factors causing the decline in subscription. 
From some 21 doctors in 2009, it now has to do with 
only 15 for all 53 of  its Health Centres spread over 16 
districts in Bangladesh. GrK, much like other program-
mes reviewed here, plays both the roles of  insurer and 
of  direct service provider. See Tables 1-3 for additional 
details. 
While the programme clearly is in some turbulence as 
staff  morale is low in the absence of  doctors and falling 
renewal rates. Thus it would need some major paradigm 
shift in order to break out of  the impasse it has been 
facing of  late. The decline in the operational cost 
recovery from 83% in 2008 to about 55% in 2010 is 
worrying to say the least, though GrK is not alone in 
that sort of  range. However, it does have a hefty capital 
fund (built up from the income earned on an interest-
free loan of  USD 42.5 million from GB back in 1996, 
duly returned to the parent organization in 2002), and 
the interest income out of  this is more than sufficient to 
meet all operational costs. While the latter is not a viable 
strategy, GrK can well shoulder the lean period should 
it be able to reengineer itself. The Grameen brand, 
despite the recent backlash, is an enviable commodity, 
and the pool of  millions of  loyal trusting clients, could 
provide a win-win backdrop should it choose to 
experiment with new products and delivery modalities  
(say, in collaboration with a rural network of  external 
service providers).
(f) Sajida Foundation (SAJIDA): Originally started as 
a private family-run charity, by 1993 SAJIDA evolved 
into a formal institution offering micro-credit to poor 
urban women. It became involved in the health field in 
1999 in response to demand from its microfinance 
members. Currently it has two micro health insurance 
programmes: HELP (covering health, education, 
life/loan, legal and man-made disaster) which is 
SAJIDA's priority programme and mandatory for its 
micro-finance members. This is a comprehensive 
package inclusive of  health, education, life/loan, legal 
and disaster coverage. The second one, SAJIDA Health 
Programme (HEALTH), which is open to all and used 
as a marketing strategy to promote SAJIDA's two 
urban-based hospitals in Keraniganj (100-bed) and 
Narayanganj (70-bed). The second hospital in N'ganj 
12opened in 2010 . Both HELP and HEALTH 
programmes run independently. As of  May 2011, a total 
of  153 people were working in the programme of  
whom 60% staff  is female with 21 specialist doctors, 28 
medical officers, 3 sonologists, 3 pathologists, 43 para-
medics and a field team of  service promoters and 
supervisors.
The HEALTH programme is targeted at the non-poor 
who live in the catchment area of  the hospitals, and 
have to pay BDT 150 per person in order to be eligible for 
coverage. Once a cardholder, they also receive the 
discounted price as HELP members, but no cash claims 
unlike HELP (see below).  Only those purchasing 
coverage are eligible, there being no family membership 
here. The benefits are only available at the two hospitals 
as there is no referral system. The membership happens 
to be on a growth trajectory; from 389 members in 
2007-8, it rose to 681 in 2008-9. 
In its flagship HELP programme, launched in 2006, the 
newest of  the set analyzed here, SAJIDA has about 
94,311 eligible families as members as of  2011. Per 
family annual premium is BDT 250 (for up to 5 
members, BDT 50 per additional member), which is to 
be paid at the time the loan is disbursed. A number of  
services (e.g., inoculation against major diseases, annual 
check-up for head of  the family, normal child deliveries) 
are offered on a gratis basis to the insured members. 
They also stand to gain 30% discount on diagnostic (i.e., 
laboratory tests) services and 10% on medicines and x-
ray. The diagnostic discounts are available only if  
members can access the two hospitals. In addition, 
panel doctors are available for free consultation at each 
of  the 62-microfinance branches at specific times 
during the week (about 3 times per week).
This is a two-tier plan; first the insured residing in the 
catchment area of  the hospitals benefit from 
discounted rates for all services made available at the 
two full-fledged hospitals it runs. Various surgeries are 
offered in packages (inclusive of  medication) ranging 
between BDT 3,000 to 14,000 (as of  2011), which are 
typically 20% lower than comparable facilities in similar 
12. A third hospital in Chittagong is due for completion in 2012; though the old 'satellite clinics' have been closed down to achieve operational efficiency.
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locations. The HELP clients pay on average about 30% 
13less than the posted price cited above . At the second 
tier, all insured members receive a further cash credit, 
ranging between BDT 500 to 3,000, against most 
treatment categories once it is established that they have 
received hospital treatment. For example, the cash 
claim for Caesarean surgery is BDT 2,000. The cash 
'claim' is offered to all insured regardless of  where the 
treatment is accessed from. Note that a majority of  the 
SAJIDA's HELP beneficiaries do not live in the 
catchment area of  the two hospitals cited above, and 
thus they have to contact outside clinics for these 
14services .  
In 2010 it settled 5,043 episodes of  health claims 
incurring an expense of  about BDT 9 million. The 
settlement process is fairly efficient. For example, 67% 
of  the health claims by HELP members in 2009 were all 
completed within one month, though there exists room 
for progress in this area.
One unsatisfactory aspect of  the HELP programme is 
that the benefits received by the insured vary depending 
on their location, while each paying an identical 
premium. In particular, those not able to access services 
of  the Sajida hospitals, have to find treatment facilities 
on their own and pay the market prices in force there, 
and are only entitled to the cash claim cited above. In 
other words, they do not benefit from the quality care 
of  SAJIDA's hospitals at a discount as some members 
do. However the co-payment rate for surgical care as 
well as diagnostics remain considerable from the risk 
shifting perspective, though not out of  line vis-à-vis the 
comparator group here. 
On the plus side, the programme seems to be on a 
sound financial footing, as evident from excellent cost 
recovery figures for both the HELP (102%) and 
HEALTH (about 85%) programmes. The two hospitals 
are self-financing once the set up costs have been 
incurred. The surplus covers the shortfall in the 
HEALTH programme. The member fees essentially 
cover the cost of  the various discounts and cash back 
programmes, while the hospital charges allow an 
operating margin on the plus side. In terms of  capital 
funds, it may be noted that SAJIDA received a 
corporate grant of  51 % of  the Pfizer Bangladesh Ltd 
(now called Renata Pharmaceuticals) from the parent 
company in New York, and the annual dividend from 
these shares amount to about BDT 60 million annually. 
Given this backdrop, SAJIDA would appear poised for 
an even greater role as an important partner in the quest 
for UHC in Bangladesh. The recent collaboration with 
'Click Diagnostics' of  US is another jump up the ladder, 
which would allow the mobile technology to be put to 
greater use so that SAJIDA medical staff  located in 
rural areas may regularly consult the hospital for 
diagnostics and issuance of  prescriptions. The 
technology being developed by 'Click' is expected to be 
piloted later in 2011. The final obstacle would appear to 
be what ails all programmes we know of, namely the 
client apathy toward the insurance concept. Give the 
compulsory nature of  the HELP programme, current 
borrowers have to buy it by default, but it would seem 
that members, once they no longer active borrowers, 
opt out. The number of  cardholders is actually less that 
the number of  microfinance members (94K vs. 107K). 
If  made into a voluntary scheme, SAJIDA staff  suspect 
that membership would fall off  dramatically. 
The Health programme being voluntary in nature, 
exhibits renewal rate that are rather low, below 50%, 
echoing the similar proclivities. Once the need seem to 
disappear, the members feel reluctant to buy the 
protection. Is significant reliance on OPP the real 
concern? One must then address design changes such 
that once sick, there would be little or no OPP once the 
package has been bought. Another knowledge gap 
seems to be 'value for money' perception of  HELP 
clients who live close by the hospital and those who do 
not, since the effective delivery of  services are very 
different. Whether the degree of  client indifference is 
identical in both sets of  locations is not known, which 
can only be discerned by careful experimentation by 
means of  scientific surveys. In the meantime, 
alternative modalities of  delivering MHI must go on till 
these become synchronized with the tastes, preferences 
and ability to pay on the part of  the poor. 
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13. For example, in 2009, the hospital rate for a caesarian section (without medication) was BDT 7,500; cardholder had to paid only 5,000. The 'high street' 
price for this surgery may have a sticker price of  10,000.
14. The hospitals also market a distinct 'insurance' product to the non-poor public (i.e., the HEALTH program), as well as treating the general public 
outside of  the insurance mode.   
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Table 1. MHI premium and benefits 
 
Organization 
 
Insurance 
Product 
Name 
Premium Rate (BDT) Discounts  
Member Non- 
Member 
Consul-
tations 
Medicine Pathology  Hospitalization (Referral 
Benefits) (BDT)  
BRAC  General Package 150 250 50% 10% 50%  500-1000  
Prepaid 
Pregnancy 
100 150 Included Free Iron Tablets  n/a  200-500  
Equity Package 0 0 Free 80% 80%  500-1000  
Gonoshasthya 
Kendra 
(Rural/Urban)  
Destitute 5/15 2/Free Free/77%  n/a  n/a  
Ultra Poor 6/20 3/Free Free/33%  n/a  n/a  
Poor 10/40 5/Free 75%/25%  n/a  n/a  
Middle Class 50/70-200 10/15-25 MRP/20%-MRP  n/a  n/a  
Rich 80/400 12/30 MRP  n/a  n/a  
Grameen Kalyan Micro Health 
Insurance 200 300 60% 10% 30-50%  50%, max 3K  
Dhaka 
Community 
Hospital (DCH) 
Family Health 
Insurance 
Programme 
20 
BDT 5 10% discount on general services
Rural Health 
Insurance 
Programme
20 
School Health 
Programme n/a 
Industrial Health 
Insurance 
Programme
n/a 
SAJIDA 
Foundation  
Health Card Old: 600/family 
New: 150 per person 
Free 10% 30%  
No referrals  since 2009, but 
discounted inpatient services  
HELP * 250 n/a Free 10% 30%  Discounted inpatient services, 
PLUS cash rebates 
Note:  HELP Programme includes: Loan & Life Insurance, Health Insurance, Disaster Insurance, Education  
Scholarships & Legal Support) 
 Sources: http://www.brac.net, http://www.dchtrust.org , http://www.gkbd.org ,           www.grameen.com, 
http://www.sajidafoundation.org.  
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Table 2. MHI membership and sources of  finance 
Organization 
(Date) 
Insurance 
Product Name 
Number of  
Households 
Insured 
Number of  
Patients 
Treated 
Annually 
Total 
Premium 
Collected 
(BDT) 
Operational Cost 
Recovery  
(%)  
Source of  Funding  
BRAC 
(April 2009)   
General Package  695 
2, 865 140, 620 39  
External Support from ILO, 
BRAC’s own fund, Member 
Contributions  Prepaid Pregnancy  514
 
Equity Package  1 
Gonoshasthya 
Kendra 
(June 2011) 
Destitute  
710 
4,460 
113,230 
42,250 
760 
169,000 
232,265 1,260,346 73  
Member Contributions,  non-
state subsidies, donations and 
cross subsidization from other 
development programmes  
Ultra Poor  
Poor  
Middle Class  
Rich  
Total  
Grameen Kalyan 
(June 2011) 
Micro Health 
Insurance  37,776 (2008) 
23,794 (2009) 
13,066 (2010) 
323, 495 
(2008) 
247,328( 2009) 
214,847 (2010)
5,590,725 
(2008) 
1,852,609 
(2010)
83 (2008)  
55 (2010)  
Grameen Bank Endowment 
Fund, Donor Funds, Member 
Contributions  
Dhaka 
Community 
Hospital (DCH) 
Family Health 
Insurance 
Programme 
100,000 persons 
Not available Not available  100%  
DCH subsidy, Partner NGO 
subsidy, Donor support  
Rural Health 
Insurance 
Programme 
School Health 
Programme 13 schools 
Industrial 
Health 
Insurance 
Programme 
24 factories 
SAJIDA 
Foundation  
HEALTH 
Programme  
681 5,382 (first 5 
months in 
2011) 
 
408, 800 
(2008-9) 
85%  Dividend earnings from Renata 
Ltd, Cross Subsidization from 
MF Activities, Member 
Contributions  
HELP  
94,311 
(May 2011) 
9,510 (first 5 
months in 
2011) 
23, 577,750 
(2010-11) 
102%  
Sources: http://www.brac.net , http://www.dchtrust.org , http://www.gkbd.org , www.grameen.com, http://www.sajidafoundation.org .  
on the modalities for co-payments and deductibles. 
Below we review how these and related bottlenecks may 
be addressed in designing feasible micro health 
insurance products especially in the context of  the 
valuable experience that the currently offered MHI 
programmes has to offer. 
Beyond the buyer-seller information gap, more ground 
level concerns over programme feasibility, equity, 
efficiency, sustainability and conformity with the legal 
statutes of  the land also need to be addressed. Below we 
attempt to identify and summarize the key challenges 
and shortcomings of  the initiatives reviewed in the 
preceding section. 
(i) Insurance vs. subsidized care and OPP: The 
limited extent of  risk-shifting in most programmes 
cited above implies that even after having paid for a 
card, the insured members still has to rely on significant 
  
CHALLENGES FACING MHI 
PROGRAMMES
While moral hazard and adverse selection, due to the 
mismatch of  information at the disposal of  the buyer 
and seller, are the standard obstacles to the viability of  
an insurance market in general, in a developing country 
context, these also take on additional nuances. Moral 
hazard gets exacerbated due to difficulties of  
verification and the inadequacy of  the formal legal 
framework (Ray, 1998). Further, preponderance of  
agricultural and self-employment activities among the 
poor are often pointed out as roadblocks to 
implementing good adverse selection strategies. 
Designing an appropriate health insurance scheme for a 
particular group of  people is a complicated task even in 
the best of  circumstances. The above cited issues would 
have significant bearings on questions as to the type of  
health risks to be covered, the extent of  coverage, and 
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Table 3. MHI coverage location(s) under each programme 
Organization 
 Working Areas
 Health Facilities Number of  Staff Services Offered
 
BRAC  
Madhabdi, Narsingdi 1 upgraded center 12 
Health Education, Pharmacy, Primary &  Secondary 
Health, Diagnostic and Pathological testing, ANC, PNC, 
Caesarean Delivery, Normal Delivery, Minor Surgical, 
Menstrual Regulation, Post Surgical Care, Immunizations, 
Family Planning, Nutrition.  
Gonoshasthya 
Kendra 
Savar, Sherpur, Gazipur, 
Manikgong, Serajgonj, 
Chapai, Nawabgonj, 
Feni, Pabna, Cox’s Bazar, 
Bhola, Dhaka, 
Gaibandha & Kurigram 
5 Hospitals 
39 Static Clinics 
400 
Preventive Care & Health Education, Out-patient Care, 
Hospital Treatment, Midwife Services, Medicines, 
Referrals.  
Grameen 
Kalyan 
Tangail, Manikgonj, 
Munchigonj,  Savar; 
Narayangonj, Keraniganj, 
Mymensingh, Comilla, 
Chandpur, Rajshahi, 
Gazipur, Pabna, Bogra, 
Shirajgonj. 
53 Health Centres 
(16 districts) 
[15 MBBS Doctors: 
2010] 
433 (2009) 
398 (2010) 
Primary  and Preventive Care, Diagnostic Services, ANC, 
PNC, Satellite Camps, Normal Delivery, Minor surgeries, 
Eye Disease & Diabetes & Geriatric Management, 
Cataract Surgery, Mobile Health Programme,  Community 
Cardiology & Nephrology & Dentistry, Out-patient Care, 
School & Adolescent Health Programmes, 
Immunizations, Hospital Treatment, Medicines, 
Consultations, Referrals.  
Dhaka 
Community 
Hospital 
(DCH) 
Dhaka, Rajshahi, Pabna, 
Munshiganj, Patuakhali, 
Sylhet 30 Primary Health 
Centers [10 owned 
by DCH] 
 
A 250-bed modern 
hospital in Dhaka 
Not available 
Primary and preventive care, inpatient, outpatient, 
referral, emergency, consultation and other general 
services 
Sources: http://www.brac.net , http://www.dchtrust.org , http://www.gkbd.org , www.grameen.com, http://www.sajidafoundation.org .  
out-of-pocket expenses for any diagnostic tests, 
medication and, where available, surgeries. These cost 
have to be put up in advance of  the treatment, and thus 
may pose a major obstacle to most of  the poor. While 
co-insurance is generally a desirable feature of  any 
insurance arrangement primarily to ward off  moral 
hazard, the bulk of  the risk ought to be borne by the risk 
carrier, and not the insured. Moreover, for catastrophic 
events (e.g., major surgeries), the co-insurance can 
easily be set to zero. Given the low probability of  such 
events, the expected costs of  this additional clause 
would be small, and hence actuarially manageable in a 
good-sized programme. Hence any MHI programme 
must endeavour to contain large co-payment 
requirements especially for diagnostics and inpatient 
care. 
(ii) Quality and extent of  care: Both GsK and Sajida 
Foundation provide a wide variety of  treatment in full-
fledged hospitals, though mostly located in urban and 
semi-urban locations. GrK (53 HCs) and BRAC (just 
one centre), by contrast, operate rural clinics with a 
rather limited range of  services. While urban locations 
make up for operational surplus on the hospital side of  
the ledger due to the demand for non-insurance 
services, access by the 'insured' poor is only feasible for 
those in close proximity, thus diluting the benefit of  the 
coverage from their perspective. In a similar vein, at 
GrK, surgeries are limited to cataract and caesarean 
section, which are again available in limited locations. 
Both BRAC and GrK find it hard to retain doctors in 
rural locations; in 2010 there were only 15 doctors 
available for a network of  53 GrK centres. 
A major challenge in providing meaningful health 
policies in rural Bangladesh thus appears to be the 
shortage of  qualified personnel and infrastructure. 
Overall system costs cannot be lowered unless an 
adequate range of  treatment procedures is made 
available locally. Thus, one would require a network of  
hospitals for each coverage area. As noted above, 
upazilas with good infrastructure and a strong local 
economy would be an ideal place to locate the network 
hospitals, which in turn ought to be linked to better-
equipped district hospitals by a seamless referral 
system. Plausibly, once insurance is under-way, the 
demand for healthcare would lead to appropriate 
supply response from the private sector. The 
programme design and placement issues are therefore 
vital to creating value for client and thus the eventual 
acceptability of  the programme. 
(iii) Cash-in-advance Constraint & Credit 
Linkage: The necessity of  payment in cash up front in 
meeting various fees and co-payments in each of  these 
programmes is a substantial drawback for a rural 
programme even with the advent of  microcredit. Since 
most are engaged in the informal sector, the flow of  
cash in the household is typically irregular. This is a real 
conundrum; while a credit link would appear necessary 
to overcome the liquidity issue, this creates the risk of  
greater indebtedness (even though for a good cause). 
On the other hand, regulatory guidelines as to the 
bundling of  credit and insurance have to be attended to. 
And, above all, the client must not feel that the 
insurance costs are a necessary evil to access the much-
needed credit (as is often claimed to be the case). The 
latter remark calls for a much greater role of  the 
insured's participation in the process of  programme 
design as would be de jure requirement in a 'community-
based' programme placement (see Ahsan and Mahmud 
2011; Chapter 8 in this volume). Below we briefly state 
the case for a health line of  credit to pay for the co-
payment.
(iv) External referral and absence of  network 
hospitals: In none of  these cases reviewed above there 
is any functioning referral system; Sajida, for example, 
stopped this option in 2009. Where it exists on paper 
(e.g., for GrK and BRAC), the procedures are not user-
friendly (e.g., cash up front, very limited coverage: max 
BDT 500-1000 in BRAC and 3K for GrK). As 
Radermacher and Dror (2006) noted, less than 1% have 
ever been referred by these organizations to external 
facilities. Moreover, there has been no dedicated 
external provider, let alone a network of  empanelled 
hospitals. The issues here are complex, but a poor-
friendly resolution would require both the 
establishment of  dedicated providers, hands-on 
guidance in getting patients admitted/treated, and deal 
with the cash requirement bottleneck.   
(v) Awareness and Demand: Over and above the 
inherent quality of  the insurance product in all its 
dimensions, it seems that rural poor do not fully grasp 
the value of  an advance payment for 'the right to buy 
protection against a future contingency'. Resource 
constraints, it has been pointed out, generally suggest a 
high discount rate and hence the urge to take care of  the 
current while the future waits. Given that in 
community-based programmes being piloted 
elsewhere with apparent success do typically embody an 
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advance payment of  premium, it seems this constraint 
can and has been overcome, at least in many contexts. 
One must then try harder to grapple with the difficulties 
and find user-friendly means of  resolving the matter in 
that mode (i.e., community-based). 
In order to ease the burden of  OPP, one can try 
alternative means of  'post-pay' devices within or 
outside of  the community model? One example would 
be the health line of  credit idea cited above; once sick 
the 'insured' would call in the co-payment necessary to 
receive treatment in real time mediated through an MFI. 
Here the insurer need not be the MFI; only mutual 
agreement would suffice, i.e., MFI members may buy 
coverage from a third party, where the MFI merely 
advances a new 'health' credit to its members at the 
request of  the insurer. However, such post-payment 
means is to facilitate the co-payment part only. 
Adequate risk shifting cannot be accomplished without 
the pre-payment portion.    
At another level, it is often believed that awareness may 
develop through experience with the product/service; 
however the frequently encountered low renewal rates 
noted above implies that this is not happening. This 
suggests some uneasiness with the product 
quality/features; pricing, design, delivery modality may 
all be relevant issues.  
On the design issue, note that for a health insurance 
product to be of  value to the poor, it must have the 
scope of  minimizing vulnerability to poverty. None of  
the programmes reviewed above would appear to fit 
this goal mainly on account of  the high co-insurance 
and the limited range of  service availability. It is seen 
that out of  1,703 episodes of  illnesses requiring 
treatment reported by GrK members over the 
preceding 12 months of  the survey, 165  (i.e., below 
10%) sought GrK care as first choice; instead 38% went 
to village quacks (Ahsan, Hamid and Barua 2011).
Further, the MRU sample cited above finds that in spite 
of  25% of  surveyed households (precisely 979) being 
covered by GrK health plan, none reported having used 
this window when confronted with 'health shocks'. This 
presumably reflects the fact that since 'shocks' are 
understood here as aggravated events of  illness (in 
terms of  the 'cost of  treatment' or 'severity of  illness'), 
the local GrK facility's capacity was known to the 
member as not up to par. Consequently, the provider's 
services remained largely under-utilized.
(vi) Inadequate risk-pooling and high costs: Unless 
the pool of  insured is large enough, effective risk 
pooling cannot be accomplished rendering the 
programme cost-inefficient. Larger programmes also 
allow the insurer to engage quality professionals, which 
in the long run lead to costefficiency. As Morduch and 
Karlan (2009) pointed out, BASIX, an Indian MFI, 
managed to build a large pool of  insured allowing it to 
contract highquality doctors. A common feature of  the 
Bangladesh programmes reviewed above is that 
membership in MHI is mostly voluntary (except, e.g., 
the HELP programme of  SAJIDA), which adds to the 
cost of  intermediation in that the service has to be 
marketed on a continuing basis. This also opens up the 
scope of  adverse selection, although due to inadequate 
data, this claim cannot be readily established. An 
alternative would be to seek branch-level membership 
of  NGOs who collectively decide on participation en 
masse. A similar process is currently being practised by 
the community-based health insurance (CBHI) model 
being promoted by the Microinsurance Academy 
(MIA) in Delhi. 
(vii) Delivery Modality & Reinsurance: All the 
programmes reviewed above are examples of  the 
'provider' models of  delivery, where the service 
provider and the insurer are one and the same entity, 
which leads to many conflicts in cost containment, 
range and adequacy of  care as well as in reaching an 
adequate riskpool. While these issues have been 
discussed at length elsewhere in this volume (Ch 8), let 
us merely note the missing role of  formal insurers (even 
in the cooperative/mutual mode). Unless insurers are 
carrying the risk it would be hard to entice international 
reinsurers without which covariate events may not be 
accounted for. The latter deficiency can jeopardize an 
otherwise efficient and popular programme. 
(viii) Financial Viability and Scalability: As Table 2 
shows, none of  the programmes reviewed above 
manage to cover even the operational costs. It is too 
hasty to claim that the premium and co-payment rate 
structures are inadequate for an actuarially sound plan. 
The scale issue along with the programme design may 
well be the primary causes of  concern here. SAJIDA's 
HELP programme appears to perform better in 
financial terms than others, but this is possibly due to 
the larger pool made possible by the conditionality 
imposed on receiving credit.  
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Though many of  these programmes have played a role 
of  value in rural communities, the overall conclusion 
for the programmes reviewed here gives an indication 
that none of  these are ideal candidates for possible 
replication or for possible scalability to the national 
level. The shortcomings include the high co-payment 
structure, the cash-dependent elements and coercion, 
which are not ideal features of  a programme designed 
for the benefit for the poor. The range of  services and 
quality of  hospitals are generally inadequate in terms of  
offering a meaningful degree of  care to the majority of  
MHI clients. Moreover, the delivery modality is flawed 
in cost containment, among other. Finally, these are not 
solvent financially even at an operational level without 
subsidies. Hence reform and experimentation must be 
the order of  the day.
Globally there is a growing consensus for prepaid 
health care financing such that government tax revenue 
or dedicated health levies can be utilized to pay for 
health insurance. Given the uncertainty as to the 
feasibility of  such a mechanism in the present 
Bangladesh context, micro health insurance may be 
expected to play an important role in the quest for UHC 
over the intermediate future. Although, there are 
promising community-based initiatives such as Health 
Card Schemes and Micro Health Insurances (MHI), 
these schemes however remain limited in scope and 
design. Currently, a tiny proportion of  the total 
population is insured under various such schemes. In 
order to address the void in a bold manner, alternative 
versions of  MHI programmes need to be scaled up to 
reach masses of  the poor. Experiences in other low- 
and middle-income countries encourage one to double 
up the efforts to seek innovative approaches to 
achieving universal health coverage through the 
microinsurance mode. Some of  these ideas have been 
explored in the preceding sections of  the paper.
Micro health insurance schemes provided by the NGOs 
offer valuable experience on which it is necessary to 
build upon. One major knowledge gap is caused by the 
fact that some of  the larger programmes (e.g., GsK) are 
yet to release programme details (especially financial 
data) of  sufficient quality to allow an informed analysis. 
But, to be scaled up to the national/regional level, only 
financially viable models need be focussed on.
CONCLUSIONS
A second drawback is that like the health sector of  
Bangladesh, MHIs seem to be primarily focused on 
preventive care. Thus greater emphasis should be 
placed on curative care as well. So far few programmes 
are able to offer proper quality inpatient services 
(beyond maternity) to most of  its rural members.  
Acceptability of  MHI schemes is an essential pre-
requisite for programme success. So far attempts to 
create enthusiasm for MHI have not materialized in any 
of  the programmes that target self-financing. Studies 
show that the poor are often reluctant to give up 
resources unless a health problem arises. An important 
task would be to discern the reasons behind the 
ambivalence of  the potential insured toward embracing 
the value of  risk sharing and thus be prepared to buy 
into the scheme.
Another deficiency relates to the insufficient 
experimentation with the mode of  delivery. As noted 
above and elaborated upon elsewhere, the provider 
mode of  MHI delivery, the dominant approach thus far, 
has its drawbacks (Ch 8). Given that the NGO-MFIs 
operating at the grassroots level in Bangladesh enjoy 
trust and acceptance of  people, they can be used as 
effective partners in efficiently implementing the goal 
of  achieving universal coverage through the insurance 
modality. 
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INTRODUCTION
overing the healthcare expenditure for the Cpopulation has garnered much attention in the 
recent times and countries in all income strata with 
diverse historical backgrounds are striving for just and 
equitable healthcare financing using different 
approaches (WHO 2010b). Financial hardship 
emanating from large healthcare cost is common across 
the world and such hardship can be burdensome even 
in the most developed countries where a proper health 
system based on universal coverage is yet to take place 
(Reid 2009). However, finding the right mix of  different 
sources of  funding modes for a specific country require 
detailed understanding of  its institutional structure 
including understanding of  socio-economic status of  
the clients in the market for such insurance products,  
and interaction with the actual suppliers and providers 
of  healthcare services (e.g. physicians and drug 
industry). 
It is worth noting that only a handful of  countries have 
truly provided an extensive coverage for healthcare cost 
through a third-party payment mechanism. The 
countries that have universal coverage are primarily 
high income countries with a strong institutional set-up 
1in place for contract enforcement .  It is important to 
understand overall market for such insurance products 
and the business atmosphere. The impediments within 
the latter may inhibit the development of  private third-
party payers who would cover the unforeseen spending 
at the onset of  major healthcare expenditure.
Insurance in general is a contingency claim for 
revelation of  a state of  the world. Insurance against 
health shocks are desirable because (a) there are general 
uncertainties when such health shock will occur and 
who will face such shock, and (b) also about the severity 
of  such shock. The required expenditure to mitigate the 
impact of  such shock may not be known ex ante. The 
society needs products that reflect the contingency 
claims against idiosyncratic shocks related to adverse 
health outcomes (Arrow 1963). Risk pooling for a 
relevant population then must be very important. The 
average price of  that product (premium for health 
insurance) will reflect the systemic health risk of  the 
population and competitive market can confirm that 
the insurance providers do not accrue above normal 
margin of  profit. It is also important to realize that the 
provision of  a universal public health insurance 
financed through tax (income or otherwise) may be 
limited because of  limited scope for levying tax due to 
presence of  a large informal labour and goods market 
(Sekhri and Savedoff, 2004, Pauly et al. 2009). Thus, a 
voluntary private insurance system can provide the 
much needed buffer against unexpected and substantial 
drain on household's financial resources. 
In this paper, we define the private insurers as entities 
that directly pool financial resources in the form of  
premium from the private parties to pay the health care 
providers and as such not part of  the the entities that 
provide the health care service (e.g. subscription base 
hospital managed care). We also preclude risk-pooling 
entities that are commercial and primarily profit 
motivated. These agents are commonly characterized 
by being voluntary and commercial as opposed to being 
mandatory, publicly financed and managed insurance 
(see Sekhri and Savedoff, 2004). Typical of  many less-
developed countries, Bangladesh has a private health 
insurance market which is in a very nascent stage. 
Globally, private health insurers play a minor role in 
1. Few developing countries have been successful in providing mass coverage for healthcare expenditure for population. Thailand in recent time has introduced 
universal health coverage. Cuba would be another exception which has established reasonable health cost coverage for its population. Strong political will 
played an important role for development of  government-based healthcare cost coverage. 
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overall healthcare financing where government 
sponsored financing remained the most prominent 
source. This is especially true for the developing 
countries where out-of-pocket payments for health 
services continue to be the major source. However, it is 
not uncommon for many such developing countries to 
experience increasing share of  GDP allocated for 
receiving healthcare services. Bangladesh is not atypical 
of  this trend, and thus provides a possibility of  private 
health insurance market to play a larger role in overall 
healthcare financing.
This chapter will attempt to present some of  the 
important facts regarding private health insurers' roles 
as third-party payers globally and specially in 
Bangladesh. The official data suggests that private 
health insurers continue to play limited roles in overall 
health care financing. This paper identifies lower 
willingness to pay for health care need (as evident from 
still low fraction of  national income devoted to health 
care), high cost of  contract enforcement and large 
informal sector employment as possible constraints for 
private health insurers to contribute more in health care 
financing and lower the out-of-pocket payments. A 
number of  insurance companies (traditionally involved 
in more conventional life and property insurance 
products) have started to delve into the health insurance 
market. However, both the industry and policymakers 
should exploit the possibility of  private health insurers 
to contribute more into overall health care financing.
National Health Accounts (NHA) data from WHO is 
often the most systematic and comprehensive source 
of  information on the resources used to finance the 
healthcare expenditure at the national level which are 
also comparable across countries (Poullier et al. 2002). 
We used this data for our analysis (WHO 2010a). We 
merged the health accounts data with a number of  
country-specific aggregate markers for willingness to 
pay for healthcare, cost of  doing business, and 
prevalence of  informal sector which we expect to be 
jointly associated with the level of  healthcare 
expenditure provided by the private insurers. WHO 
National Health Accounts data also provided us with 
GDP series and population figures. The ratio between 
total healthcare expenditure and total GDP provided us 
with an indicator for country-specific willingness to pay 
DATA
for health. For consistent and comparable estimates for 
informal economy in different countries we relied on 
Schneider et al. (2010). Thus, our definition of  informal 
economy is basically synonymous with 'shadow' 
economy which may result from effort to avoid 
government tax burden and/or not being able to be 
accounted for by the official statistical queries which go 
into measuring the official GDP (Schneider et al. 2010). 
We collected the cost of  doing business data from the 
World Bank that maintain the most comprehensive 
database on different aspect of  cost of  business around 
the world for a number of  countries (World Bank 
2011). We focused mainly on the cost of  contract 
enforcement which we assumed to be vital for a viable 
private health insurance market. 
It is very difficult to gather business data on number of  
clients or beneficiaries for a specific insurance 
company. Insurance companies are usually very 
protective about such information and any guess on the 
overall size of  the market at best will be just an 
improper extrapolation. Rather than focusing on such 
aspects of  the market, this paper will focus on products 
offered by the insurance companies. For such 
information we relied mostly on publicly available 
information on products and schemes offered by the 
insurance companies. Such information is available 
from different company websites. The paper also 
addressed a specific case study focusing on an 
employer's experience with the health insurance 
scheme it subscribed to.
We relied mostly on simple statistical analysis based on 
univariate and multivariate methods. We first estimated 
the fraction of  total healthcare expenditure financed 
through different modes such as government funding, 
out-of-pocket payments, and private health insurance 
among others. We first did it at the global scale and then 
stratified the analysis by countries at different levels of  
development (as defined by the World Bank). The 
fraction of  total healthcare paid through different 
sources provide us with some guidance to the relative 
role of  private health insurance might have played in 
overall healthcare financing. We continued to explore 
the association of  few selected variables (namely health 
care expenditure as percent of  national income, 
fraction of  labour force employed in the informal 
METHODS
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sector and cost of  business especially cost of  
enforcement) we identified in the introduction that may 
determine the level of  private health insurance 
industries' contribution in the overall health-care 
financing. 
To draw a picture of  the private health insurance market 
in Bangladesh we mostly relied on secondary data from 
websites and used mostly on qualitative analysis. We 
included a case study highlighting some experiences of  
a small non-profit research institute with a group health 
plan. However, one should note that this would 
essentially be an incomplete picture of  the current state 
of  affairs of  the private health insurers in Bangladesh 
and would probably need a much more comprehensive 
study in future.
In 2008, a total of  $5,794 billion was spent on 
healthcare with an average of  about $864 per person of  
which, government provided $3,503 billion 
constituting about 62% of  total spending on healthcare 
services (Table 1 and Figure 1). Both out-of-pocket 
payments and private health insurers played equal roles 
paying for the rest of  the healthcare expenditure. In 
2008, globally $1,034 billion was paid out-of-pocket in 
healthcare, averaging at about $523 per person. Private 
health insurance companies provided another $1,014 
billion. Both these sources provided about 18% of  the 
total healthcare expenditure in 2008. Non-profit 
sectors (e.g. charities) and external sources (e.g. foreign 
donations and grants) played a minor role in overall 
healthcare financing globally (Figure 1 and Annex Table 
1). Thus, across all countries, estimates suggested that 
private health insurers provided much less than the 
government in overall healthcare expenditure while 
they were almost at par with private out-of-pocket 
healthcare payment.
It was also important to note that different sources of  
financing played varied roles in terms of  level of  
contribution depending on the level of  development of  
the country. The government played a much bigger role 
compared to the global average in the more developed 
countries (see Figure 2 and also Annex Table 2). An 
average high income OECD country spent about 
$4,753 per capita on healthcare (of  which government's 
RESULTS
contribution is $2,959 per capita). On the other hand, 
high income non-OECD countries spent much less on 
healthcare per capita domestically ($959, see Annex 
Table 2), the governments in these countries paid even a 
larger share (69%, see Figure 2) for healthcare. 
However, it was important to note that private health 
insurers contributed very unevenly as they contributed 
about 19% and 5% of  total healthcare expenditure in 
high income OECD and non-OECD countries 
respectively. Private health insurers continued to play a 
significant role among the upper-middle income 
countries as 12% of  total healthcare spending is 
financed by the private health insurers. Governments 
continued to bear the major share (55%) of  total 
healthcare spending in the upper middle income 
countries.
Table 1. Summary statistics for selected variables
Number of Mean
countries
Health expenditure as % 138 6.5
of  GDP
Cost as % of  claim 133 33.1
Informal economy as % 125 32.5
of  GDP
Source: Health expenditure and GDP data is from WHO (2010). 
Data on cost of  contract enforcement as percent of  claim 
received are from The World Bank (2010) and data on informal 
economy is from Schneider et al. (2010).
Figure 1. Distribution of  health expenditure by 
sources of  financing
Source: WHO National Health Accounting Data. (Table 1)
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Figure 2. Distribution of  health expenditure by 
sources of  financing for different income groups 
of  countries
Source: WHO National Health Accounting Data. (Annex Table 1)
The healthcare recipients' contribution to healthcare 
spending through out-of-pocket payments became 
larger and larger as we moved from high income 
countries to low income countries. Only among lower 
middle income and lower income countries out-of-
pocket payments became the major source of  
healthcare financing (around 50%). The private health 
insurers provided a very small share of  total healthcare 
expenditure (<4% in both lower middle and lower 
income countries). Governments provided about 44% 
and 40% of  total healthcare spending in these two sets 
of  countries respectively.
It remained to be seen what factors might be associated 
with the apparent variations in the level of  private 
healthcare expenditure (per capita) across different 
countries. Countries were fundamentally different both 
institutionally and technologically (broadly 
incorporateing preference heterogeneity as well). As 
put forth in the introduction, we focused on three 
aspects of  the healthcare expenditure financed from 
private health insurers. The summary statistics for these 
2three factors (lower willing-ness to pay for health , 
business cost of  running a health insurance firm, and 
prevalence of  informal economy) are presented in 
Table 3. There were also considerable variations in the 
values of  these variables across countries and we 
associated these variations with per capita healthcare 
expenditure financed through private health insurers.
As one would expect we can see a positive association 
between fractions of  total country expenditure on 
healthcare and per capita healthcare spending financed 
3by private health insurance (Figure 3) . This suggested 
that countries with a higher level of  spending probably 
offered a larger market for private health insurers. Since 
health insurance (like any other insurance) presupposed 
being able to pool risk over a large population through 
pre-payments, a larger market was certainly conducive 
to a “thicker” private health insurance industry.
Figure 3. Healthcare expenditure (% of  GDP) and 
per capita healthcare expenditure financed by 
private health insurance
Source: Per capita health financing from private health insurance figures are 
from WHO National Health Accounts (see WHO, 2010a). The same data set 
also included GDP figures. All data are for 2008 (except for Zimbabwe for 
which 2007 information was used).
2. We have already addressed the level of  income and its association with the per capita expenditure through private health insurers. Here we delve further 
by focusing at aggregate healthcare expenditure as a percent of  gross domestic product as a surrogate marker for willingness to pay for healthcare.
3. If  we compare two countries where one spent ten percentage points more on healthcare as a fraction of  its GDP, then we should expect the per capita 
contribution from private health insurers to rise 37.5%.
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Another important fact was that the low income countries 
usually had larger informal sectors. In general the private 
health insurance providers were comfortable to reach 
the clients through the formal sector participants (for 
example, through employer based group insurance 
schemes rather than offering individual policies). Thus, 
one should expect that the overall level of  informal 
sector was negatively associated with lower penetration 
of  private health insurers and we also saw this in the 
data (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Prevalence of  informal sector and per 
capita healthcare expenditure financed by private 
health insurance
Source: Per capita health financing from private health insurance figures are 
from WHO National Health Accounts (WHO 2010a). Information for 
Informal sector data are from Schneider et al. (2010).
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One should also note that cost of  doing business was higher 
in the low income countries which also had lower 
penetration in the healthcare financing by the private 
health insurers. We focused more specifically at cost of  
contract enforcement. The service of  insurance parti-
cularly involves enforcement of  a more com-plicated 
contract typically based on contingency claims. As such 
a higher cost of  enforcement of  such contacts could 
certainly act as a deterrent for a viable private health 
insurance market. We found this relationship in data as 
cost of  business (measured by cost as a percent of  
claim) was negatively associated with the level of  per 
capita healthcare spending financed through private 
health insurance (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Cost of  business and per capita 
healthcare expenditure financed by private health 
insurance
Source: Cost of  business was defined as cost of  settlement of  a contract as 
percent of  total claim for a country (World Bank 2011). Per capita health 
financing from private health insurance figures were from WHO National 
Health Accounts (WHO 2010a).
EXPERIENCE OF BANGLADESH
According to constitutional provision, Bangladesh is 
committed to provide healthcare services to all her 
citizen. Since independence different measures have 
been taken to provide access to primary healthcare 
services en masse. The instrumental role of  health to 
ensure the human development of  the population has 
received its due recognition. However, healthcare 
financing and role of  private health insurance perhaps 
have not received enough attention. This is probably 
because private health insurances have continued to be 
a minor contributor in the overall healthcare 
expenditure (according to available aggregate health 
account statistics; WHO 2010).
The most important trend in healthcare expenditure in 
Bangladesh is that a larger share of  overall GDP has 
been allocated for healthcare in the recent times (Figure 
6). While at the end of  1990s 2.7%  of  the GDP was 
spent on healthcare, it was 3.5% at the end of  2010s. 
This modest increase hides the fact in absolute amount 
health expnditure has increased from $1.2 billion to 
about $2.8 billion over the same time registering an 
increment of  more than two-fold or an annual growth 
rate of  about 9.3% over the same period. In per capita 
terms, the total healthcare expenditure has also 
increased from about $8.7 to $17.4 over the same 
period. 
In the backdrop of  this increasing emphasis on health 
and associated expenditure, one should expect private 
health insurance market should also grow over time. 
But according to available aggregate healthcare 
expenditure statistics, private health insurance market 
remained negligible and recent efforts by the private 
health insurers still maintained the industry at a very 
nascent stage. For example, Figure 7 suggests that 
between 2001 and 2008 the total healthcare financing 
(in nominal terms) annually increased by about 11% 
and rose from $263 million to about $550 million. 
Controlling for inflation for the same period actually 
leaves the growth curve of  financing through private 
health insurance essentially flat. Thus, one can infer that 
our earlier implications of  limited role of  private health 
insurance industry in the overall coverage of  healthcare 
spending remained largely valid for Bangladesh.
Figure 6. Trend in healthcare expenditure as % of  
GDP in Bangladesh
Source: National Health Accounts (WHO 2010)
At the same time, the nascent private health insurance 
industries have exhibited growth over the last couple of  
years. The existing insurance companies, traditionally 
offering life and accident insurance policies, are quickly 
entering and creating a private health insurance market. 
Currently, there are about 44 firms listed as insurance 
companies mainly focusing on general, life and accident 
insurances. There is no central repository of  data on the 
entire inventory of  health insurance products. Of  the 
28 insurance companies for which product information 
was available, 14 companies offered some forms of  
health insurance products. There are different modes 
of  delivery of  these products. The dominant mode 
appeared to be group health plan the insurance 
companies offer to the employers. So, the large 
employers (in both private and public sector) act as the 
main clientele for the insurance companies. In addition 
to the group plans, insurance companies also offer indi-
vidual policies (while giving group ones additional 
discount on premiums) and mediclaim policies for people 
travelling abroad (as required by the visiting country). 
For the last case local insurance companies some times 
work as an agent of  more visible international insurance 
companies.
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Figure 7. Annual healthcare financing through 
private health insurance in Bangladesh
Source: National Health Accounts (WHO 2010). The series has been 
inflation adjusted using GDP deflator with 2008 as base year.
In addition to the features described above the health 
insurance products  a lso show interest ing 
characteristics. For example, the policies reviewed for 
the purpose of  the present work suggested that 
insuring for hospitalization is the main component of  
health insurance schemes. Most insurance companies 
offer multiple products depending on the size of  
coverage. One interesting aspect of  the industry is that 
the products are surprisingly homogeneous (see Annex 
Table 3 and the case study). Annual coverage usually 
reaches up to only Tk. 150,000 ($2,100) even for the 
most generous policies (among the health insurance 
companies studied, Green Delta Life Insurance Ltd. only 
had coverage up to Tk. 75,000 or about $1,100). 
Beside usual group and individual health insurance 
schemes, private health insurance companies also offer 
insurance coverage for the travellers (many countries 
require the travellers to have some form of  health 
coverage). There are few cases where the insurance 
companies also offer dread disease coverage. In these 
cases the insured individuals can claim coverage against 
some fatal diseases and old age complicacy (Annex 
Table 3). Many of  these hospital coverage and health 
insurance are supplemental to some other insurance 
schemes (life or otherwise) and offered as “rider” (i.e. 
additional benefits, possibly optional, over and above 
the basic coverage in a term life insurance policies, for 
example) in a package. 
The private health insurance market or industry in the 
developing countries is generally very thin and most 
people are usually self-insured through own income or 
DISCUSSION
rely on social network to some extent (while 
government or public spending cover health care need 
that is mostly primary in nature or has some public 
health aspect). However, in almost all countries 
commercial private insurance works side-by-side with 
other types of  financing agents. 
For example, the USA has large private health insurance 
industry that work through employers' subscription 
within a regime where there are large public entitlement 
programs such as Medicare (for senior citizens, 
federally funded), Medicaid (for earning challenged 
households), SCHIP (for children in needy families) 
and veteran health support programs. The last of  the 
three programs are run through individual states with 
federal contribution. There are also not-for-profit 
programs such as Kaiser Permanante which also has a 
large membership albeit having geographic 
concentration in the west coast. 
Germany uses a model where private insurers play an 
important role. Germany introduced world's first 
universal coverage and uses a multi-payer system where 
private insurance through numerous sickness funds and 
private insurance companies play important roles in 
covering healthcare spending. Private insurers also play 
important roles in the Netherlands and Switzerland and 
also supplement specialized care in some countries 
(such as dental and cosmetic surgeries in Canada and 
the UK). In the developing countries the private health 
insurance market is yet to become a major contributor 
in overall health care financing because of  the problem 
of  contract enforcement (high transaction cost) and 
low willingness to pay emanating from more 
sophisticated knowledge of  the product (one has to pay 
upfront but only gets paid when there is some adverse 
health outcome).
In this context Colombian experience is probably 
worth mentioning. It achieved a very high rate of  
coverage from 24% of  the population covered to more 
than 80% coverage through a comprehensive overhaul 
of  the financing system in 1993 (known as Law 100). 
People are covered through contributory regime (for 
people earning over certain level) and subsidized regime 
(for people in need chosen based on pre-determined 
proxy means testing). Both these regimes are funded 
through mandatory payroll tax contributions. However, 
the insured person can choose from a pool of  insurers, 
private or public, who compete for memberships. It is 
an interesting experiment where both the premiums 
and benefits are fixed by the government. The only 
margin where the insurers can compete is through 
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assuring the quality of  health care service for which 
they contract with network of  health service providers. 
While the system is perhaps still dominated by supply-
side financing (paid to the provider through insurers, 
private or otherwise, as of  2009; see Giedion and Uribe 
2009), it has achieved a high level of  coverage within a 
short period of  time. At the time of  the policy uptake 
(i.e. in 1993), Colombia belonged to the upper-middle 
income group, however, it offers an experiment where 
private insurers played an important role in extending 
the coverage against health care cost (reforms aimed at 
minimizing government role while introducing social 
insurance based on regulated competition among 
private parties and also separating provision of  
insurance from the actual service delivery; see Trujillo, 
Portillo and Vernon 2005). 
None of  our findings on the asserted association 
between different country specific parameters and per 
capita healthcare spending covered by private health 
insurance should be interpreted as treatment effects 
and low ability for the private health insurers in the 
developing countries to cover for healthcare spending 
are probably jointly determined and driven by 
unobserved factors. So, positive association of  private 
health insurers' contribution with higher fraction of  
GDP spent on healthcare services and fraction of  
labour force employed in the formal sector of  the 
economy will suggest private health insurers will try to 
choose clients who have sufficiently high willingness to 
spend on healthcare (% of  income on health) and 
people who are easy to find (who are employed in the 
formal sector). However, given the limited formal 
market such insurers will remain quite small in the near 
future.
It is widely believed that dominace of  commercial 
private insurers may lead to unequal access, denied 
participation because of  (e.g.) pre-existing conditions 
leading to large uninsured population and rent seeking 
based on situations known as “cream-skimming”. At 
the same time, there are large out-of-pocket payments 
for health care cost especially in the developing 
countries. So a managed competition among the private 
insurers with commercial motive can offer better access 
and lead to more equity. Moreover, in some countries 
(such as Switzerland), social insurance schemes has 
evolved from voluntary (and guild-based) private 
insurance practices. Government can also issue 
mandates that require coverage of  an entire group like 
government employees or formal sector labor force. 
Nigeria introduced such requirements recently with an 
aim to cover its entire citizen in future. HMO type 
delivery model with cost capitation and in-house 
provision of  care has also emerged in coutries like 
Nigeria and many other sub-saharan countries (see IFC 
2009). Lessons learnt from these experiments provided 
a better guideline for future policy debate.
Like most other developing countries people in 
Bangladesh finance their health expenditure largely 
through out-of-pocket expenditure. People's 
willingness to pay such a substantial amount on health 
needs warrant for existence of  a viable health insurance 
market in Bangladesh albeit so far exhibiting a very 
limited outreach of  such product through a competitive 
market mechanism. Insurance can provide households 
to cope up with large health expenditure without 
drawing from household wealth thus reducing the 
financial vulnerability (Pauly et al. 2006).
Experience with employer-based group health plan – case study
The main purpose of  this case study is to document experience of  an employer that provides coverage for its regular 
employees. It is not very common for employers to subscribe to group insurance offered in most insurance companies. As 
such one cannot claim that it is a common situation. 
In this case study, we focused on an employer-based insurance scheme which covers the employees of  a research and training 
institute with employee size of  40. The organization is insured by Delta Life Insurance company. The employer pays Tk. 
4,100 for each employee under 60 years of  age and Tk. 10,750 for people over that. The policy covers against incidences that 
require the insured person to remain at a hospital. The coverage is quite comprehensive and includes insurance against most 
regular diseases for which such hospitalization may be required. The exclusions include some special healthcare 'need' (e.g. 
pregnancy).
The paper work is not very onerous. However, not a single claim was filed under this policy. The coverage itself  seems limited 
as maximum Tk. 1.5 lac is covered per hospitalization. The claim should be filed through the employer. According to the 
human resource policy there is a provision that the employer may decide to provide supplementary support for the employee 
at the incidence of  hospitalization which is much higher than the actual coverage (Tk. 5 lac).
88
Status and Prospect of For-Profit Private Health Insurance in Bangladesh
CONCLUSION
In Bangladesh, the for-profit private health 
insurance market is yet to take off. At present, it is 
most likely serving a very small niche through 
group plans for employers. However, as our case 
study seems to suggest that the propensity of  
taking benefit of  health service coverage through 
pre-payment is still low. The experience of  
Bangladesh actually fits the theoretical prediction 
that developing countries are probably less likely to 
benefit from for-profit private health insurance 
market. It is not because there is no gain from trade 
in this market per se rather lack of  coverage through 
private health insurance because of  different 
constraints (both supply side and demand side) is 
impeding the growth of  the sector.
This situation suggests that voluntary private healthcare 
insurance can provide a much needed coverage against 
unforeseen, idiosyncratic and possibly large healthcare 
cost (Pauly et al. 2006). However, a lower willingness to 
pay for such services may remain an important 
impediment towards the growth of  private health 
4insurance in developing countries .
It is also important to realize that the insurance, 
especially health-related ones, is a complicated 
contractual agreement and enforcement of  these 
contracts are also important. With high transaction 
costs associated with enforcement of  such contracts, 
the potential growth of  private health insurance 
industry may be compromised in less developed 
countries such as Bangladesh. One of  the major goals 
of  health insurance is to pool the risk over a larger 
population. This is a necessary condition which makes 
the average health cost burden predictable and is shared 
by a group so that the average cost (from the point of  
view of  the private insurer) is insurable. However, the 
vast population of  the developing countries operates in 
the informal sector which is difficult for the private 
insurers to bring them under insurance coverage. 
Thus, settlement of  dispute and claims has to be 
smooth and efficient without which it will be difficult to 
lure clients into the sector and be impossible to have a 
viable scale for insurance schemes to work. The 
insurance companies should also not be allowed to 
perform selection based on pre-existing conditions. It 
will be important for regulators to avoid using price 
control like settings of  premium which will discourage 
competition in the sector.
Bangladesh is not atypical of  the conditions (or lack 
thereof) that would probably inhibit the growth of  
private health insurance industry. The available data 
show that the contribution of  the private health 
insurance companies in healthcare financing has 
remained very low and the trend has been fairly flat. The 
products offered in the market are quite homogeneous 
and even the highest coverage is incapable to cover very 
large (possibly catastrophic) health spending. A specific 
case study also suggests that people's knowledge and 
understanding of  the insurance products is generally 
low and utilization has remained only at a modest state.
There are cases (e.g. Germany) where a country has 
benefited much from competition of  the private health 
insurance providers. They can provide a necessary 
conduit through which health financing need for the 
masses are fulfilled. But government's provision and 
regulation provide a conducive environment for the 
private health insurers to grow. In this paper, the role of  
actual health providers (such as hospitals and 
physicians) is not addressed although they are also 
important players in the overall delivery of  healthcare. 
Bangladesh has been growing at a healthy pace in the 
past two decades and the demand for quality healthcare 
will become a more pertinent issue in the coming years. 
Through proper guidance and regulation private health 
insurers can finance the healthcare cost of  people with 
higher willingness to pay, easy access through the 
formal sector employment, and more sophisticated 
consumer for whom the cost of  delivery will be low and 
a viable private insurance market for healthcare is likely 
to exist. The for-profit private health insurance can 
4. This analysis assumes that healthcare is essentially a normal good with a growing fraction of  income spent on this “product” as income grows (healthcare as a 
luxury good). People's willingness to pay for better health increase as income grow and a higher healthcare demand is conducive to the growth of  a private 
voluntary health insurance market as third-party payers can keep the transaction cost of  delivery low for per unit healthcare provided to the clients.
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benefit a lot from participation of  the private sector 
employers. While there are long run implications, the 
nascent industry can initially take off  with support and 
proper guidance from the policy makers and regulators 
5by motivating the large employers  in the formal sectors 
to take up group insurance. The insurance companies 
will be able to tap into a niche which will probably have a 
higher willingness to pay for health care. The cost of  
reaching out and pooling risk will also be low. As such, 
private health insurance market can essentially 
complement the government's and other non-profit 
sectors' effort to provide universal health coverage in 
Bangladesh.
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ANNEX  
Annex Table 1. Global aggregate and per capita health expenditure in 2008 by sources of  financing 
 Aggregate (billion USD) Per capita (USD) 
Total  5,793.90 864.39 
Sources of  Financing   
Public 3,502.56 522.55 
Out-of-pocket 1,034.23 154.30 
Private health insurance 1,013.88 151.26 
Non-profit 94.29 14.07 
External 9.42 1.40 
 Note: WHO National Health Accounting Data. Health Expenditure 
Annex Table 2. Per capita health expenditure (in US Dollar) by different financing sources in 2008  
Total  Public Private health insurance Non-profit Out-of-pocket External 
High income: 
OECD 4,753 2,959 920 83 657 0 
High income: 
non-OECD 959 657 46 6 220 0 
Upper middle 
income 535 294 65 7 166 1 
Lower middle 
income 93 41 3 0 47 1 
Low income 25 10 1 2 12 6 
 
Note: WHO National Health Accounting Data. Health Expenditure 
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INTRODUCTION
his paper dwells on health shocks, which are Tbelieved to be a major source of  vulnerability for 
the poor and near poor. The economic cost of  illness is 
two-fold; the cost of  medical care and the loss of  
income associated with reduced labour supply and 
productivity. Short-run self-insurance mechanisms 
such as the depletion of  savings, sale of  assets, loan 
from moneylenders and exhaustion of  current income 
flow may typically allow the victims to ride out smaller 
events, but not major health events that compromise 
the capacity to perform activities of  daily living (Gertler 
and Gruber 2002). The resultant exposure to 
consumption shocks may increase vulnerability, i.e., the 
likelihood of  a non-poor household falling into poverty or the poor 
1getting poorer in the near future . Emphasizing the expectation 
of  poverty would help to shift policy focus towards 
designing measures that prevent (better, eliminate) 
poverty, thereby interrupting the transmission of  
poverty from one period (generation) to another than 
merely dwell on remedial measures of  poverty 
alleviation. 
While improvement in health infrastructure has the 
potential to soften the income shock, the overwhelming 
evidence in developing countries such as Bangladesh is 
that public investment in this area has not met the 
demands of  the poor (See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of  
this volume). As a result they mostly end up accessing 
rural private facilities offering services of  questionable 
quality at a relatively high cost. The resulting impact on 
household expenditure averages at about 6 percent or 
more of  total annual expenditure as seen from large-
2scale sample surveys (Ahsan and Hamid 2011) .  
In the intermediate term (say next 10-15 years), it is 
doubtful if  public resources in the Bangladesh context 
would be sufficient to both widen and deepen the 
network of  public health services to allow meaningful 
universal health coverage (UHC). One must therefore 
look for alternative options toward achieving UHC. 
Insurance is one such tool as will be explained more 
fully below.
Insurance, by permitting households to shift risks to 
more competent risk carriers, allows them to adopt 
more productive use of  their resources and time. 
Conceptually however 'insurance' contracts whereby 
premium collected from many is used up to pay for the 
cost of  treating the afflicted few, are poorly understood 
generally, and more so, among the ill-informed.   
Micro health insurance (MHI) is merely health insurance 
designed for the poor, where the risks need not be small 
vis-à-vis those facing the better-off. However, the poor 
typically access rural/district level services, and would 
thus generally incur significantly lower costs than those 
prevalent in major urban facilities. 
The d ichotomy between microcredi t  and 
microinsurance is curious. Microcredit has flourished 
partly on account of  the usurious rates charged by the 
moneylenders. But growth of  insurance has not taken 
off  despite that the implicit risk premium associated 
with informal or self-insurance can be even more 
exorbitant (indeed, infinite). 
Apart from the awareness issue, the low demand for 
MHI emanates from the fact that there is a paucity of  
products that can meaningfully address the shocks 
1. Reportedly 100 million of  world population fall into poverty annually due to health emergency (WHO 2010).
2. However the annualization of  health expenditure is uninformative; when the shock arises, costs have to be incurred immediately; the poor do not have 
the luxury to smooth these expenditures over the 12-month horizon.
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faced by the poor and are at the same time affordable. 
However, well designed insurance products that secure 
efficient risk-pooling are widely believed to be capable 
of  delivering the needed care at a moderate cost, the 
actual allocation of  such costs among the stakeholders 
may however be a separate topic of  discussion. Scaling 
up successful models may therefore be a path to UHC 
in the intermediate term. 
While it appears straightforward that larger the size of  
the 'risk pool' the lower would be the unit cost of  
insurance coverage. However, at the same time, a large 
pool would require access to appropriate technology to 
manage the information flow. Moreover the probability 
of  various insured events need not dictate an 
excessively large group in order to reach the cost-
efficient scale in each case. In health context, since the 
actual size of  the efficient pool would be subject to the 
terms of  the policy coverage and the incidence of  
illnesses in a given location, it can only be established 
with adequate information and upon experimentation. 
But it is common sense that such a pool is going to be 
'large' and may also require geographic diversity in 
coverage.  Prac t i t ioners  eng aged  in  f i e ld  
experimentation often suggest 20,000 households as 
the minimum size for effective pooling of  health 
shocks. For life and livestock coverage, the desirable 
figure is likely to be much higher.
This paper analyzes how the microinsurance delivery 
mechanism as well as the regulatory regime may be 
designed so that it becomes feasible for an insurer 
and/or an implementing agency to offer insurance 
coverage at low costs. Without the cost advantage, it 
would be hard to obtain a sustainable and scalable 
microinsurance market in a developmental context. 
While in much of  the discussion we refer to health, 
most of  the analysis would also apply to other types of  
insurance (e.g., life, crop/weather or property). 
With the foregoing serving as the introduction, the rest 
of  the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we 
examine the choice of  the delivery channel and explore 
the factors that render it compatible with an efficient 
insurance market. In the following section, we propose 
a set of  regulatory directives appropriate for the 
emergence of  a viable MHI market in Bangladesh. This 
discussion is conducted in light of  the recent 
experience in contemporary developing societies (e.g., 
India and the Philippines) where regulation has been a 
major catalyst in bringing about innovations with health 
insurance products. The role of  the public sector in 
terms of  actual marketing of  insurance, provision of  
medical services and in providing a facilitating 
environment for the orderly growth of  the industry are 
put forward in the concluding section. Related policy 
recommendations are also included there.
The principal institutional arrangements for delivering 
microinsurance include (a) the partner-agent model 
(partnerships between an insurer and distribution 
agents), (b) the community-based model whereby the 
risk-carrier is the network of  savings and credit 
cooperatives, (c) the full-service model, where the 
insurer and the implementation agency is one and the 
same, but may rely on external service providers for 
specific components, and (d) the provider model, 
where the service provider is also the risk carrier. We 
explore below how each of  these maybe best taken 
advantage of  in specific developmental contexts with a 
3special focus on Bangladesh .   
The partner-agent model 
Under this model two parties come to a 'partner-agent' 
agreement of  a fiduciary nature primarily to achieve a 
superior allocation of  risk in the conduct of  business 
that they jointly intend to carry out. Here the 'partner' 
(or the 'principal') is typically the risk carrier (insurance 
company) that underwrites the risk and, often in 
collaboration with the agent, designs and innovates 
4upon the product . The 'agent' in most cases is a 
microfinance institution (MFI), a non-governmental 
organization (NGO) or a self-help group (SHG), which 
facilitates the relationship between the insurer and the 
third party, namely microinsurance clients (policy 
5holders) . Often the product (at least in its rough form) 
CHALLENGES IN THE DELIVERY 
MODALITY OF MHI
3. While in a much abbreviated form, the material described in this section relies heavily on Ahsan and Mahmud (2011).
4. Strictly speaking, the 'partner' or 'principal' is the party who has the claim to residual profit/loss, while the agent works for a pre-assigned fee (e.g., a 
share of  the premium or fees paid by the insured). Thus, if  an insurer engages an MFI to sell its products for a fee, the latter is the 'agent'. However, if  
the MFI in question designs a product and engages a risk-carrier for a fixed fee, the former is the principal or ('partner') and the insurer is the agent.
5. From here on these entities are denoted MFIs since at a minimum they are all in the microinsurance arena, where the term 'microfinance' is understood 
to be be broader than just credit.
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is developed by the agent, which is fine-tuned in terms 
of  actuarial calculations, by or in collaboration with the 
insurer. Clearly, for the partnership to be on an equal 
footing, the agent must also be able to speak the 
insurer's language, so to speak. The former would thus 
be at an advantage if  they too have staff  comfortable 
with actuarial calculus. 
Typically the agent operates by dealing with sales and 
the servicing of  the product in line with the terms and 
conditions stipulated in the agreement drawn up with 
its partner (the insurer). Thus, one of  the agent's roles 
lies in representing its partner to the clients. The 
concept of  the 'agent' in partnership with an insurer as 
discussed above is in line with the use of  the term in the 
modern economic theory of  contracts, where the 
primary driver of  the mechanism is  risk shifting from 
one party to the (more eligible) other. Though McCord 
(2006) said otherwise, this is materially different from 
the notion of  traditional 'sales agents' employed by life 
insurers who typically move door-to-door marketing 
the latter's products for a pre-assigned commission or 
fee. This latter type of  'agents' serve under the direct 
supervision of  staff  that the parent company appoints, 
which is in effect an example of  a company outsourcing 
some of  its chores to freelance staff  to achieve cost 
efficiency (e.g., as in the modern day 'call centre' idea).
The strength of  this model is that the agents (i.e., MFIs) 
are usually able to exploit their existing relationship of  
trust with the poor already established in providing the 
credit or saving services thereby allowing the marketing 
of  the insurance services a lot easier than otherwise 
(Pauly 2008). Indeed, unfamiliarity with insurance 
products and their modalities often stand in the way of  
membership growth, and the role of  a trusted agent 
may be of  material help. Depending on the circums-
tances, the MFI in question may offer its entire pool of  
members overcoming the scale issue, and if  marketed 
on a compulsory basis, it also eliminates adverse selection, 
6both of  which are prerequisites for cost efficiency . The 
distribution potential of  the MFIs with the institutional 
capacity of  an established insurer, who collaborates in 
designing and delivering the product, would thus create 
a 'win-win situation'. Unlike traditional insurance sales 
agents, MFIs having experience of  past dealings with 
the members, would actually be in a better position to 
identify client needs, their willingness and capacity to 
pay for services, and thus be able to devise prototype 
insurance products, and approach the insurer for 
further refinement (McCord 2006).
The partner-agent model is often claimed to be the 
simplest, cheapest and quickest way for an MFI to start 
offering insurance products to its clients outside 
traditional credit and savings products. For example, 
SEWA and ASA in India, who are in partnerships with 
national public insurance companies and private 
insurers such as Bajaj Allianz, provided integrated 
insurance schemes covering broad ranges of  risks such 
as sickness, death, widowhood, maternity, and losses 
 7due to flood, fire, and riots to its clients . In the Indian 
market, since all insurers are required by law to be in the 
micro business, MFIs have an advantage in its 
negotiations with the insurer over premium rates, and 
often the insurer is let go by the MFI due to a lack of  
accommodation. Similarly in Ghana, even without the 
regulatory help as in India, CARE used a bidding 
process that proved to be effective for an MFI to get the 
product that it wanted under the most favourable terms 
(McCord 2006).
However, as the insurer underwrites risk, the agent also 
stands to lose the trust of  its clients should the product 
fail. Thus, it is in the interest of  both parties in the 
partner-agent model to keep the cost of  the insurance 
attractive enough for the poor so that they can enter and 
remain in the market while also addressing the insurers' 
concern of  the low returns of  microinsurance (McCord 
2006). Insurers, in principle gain access to hundreds of  
thousands of  low income policy holders usually 
through a single group policy. The low income policy 
holders would in turn stand to benefit from affordable 
and professionally managed insurance products, which 
they are otherwise unlikely to have. Moreover, being 
clients of  an MFI, policy holders do not have to unduly 
worry about disputes with insurers in dealing with 
policy coverage.  
Among other advantages, the partner-agent set up has 
also the potential of  developing a client friendly claim 
settlement process. Many MFIs often advance the claim 
6. Adverse selection describes the tendency of  the risk-prone to seek insurance cover with greater enthusiasm than the rest of  the population, especially if  the 
product is subsidized.
7. Many other MFIs have met the insurance needs of  their clients by partnering with a variety of  insurers. For example, Grama Vidiyal, an MFI in Tamil 
Nadu, provides life insurance through Bajaj Allianz and AMP Sanmar (UNDP 2006). BASIX in India began by working with ICICI Prudential and 
currently works with AVIVA Life Insurance Company.
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even when the insurer is yet to settle it pending receipt 
of  documents such as the death certificate. Competent 
field staff  can assess the veracity of  the event as they are 
in regular contact with the insured and members of  the 
community. Similarly this institutional arrangement 
also comes in handy in implementing health insurance 
that allows hospitalization in third party facilities (i.e., a 
service provider). Here field staff  can direct the insured 
to appropriate facilities and mediate in dealings with the 
service provider, all of  which can improve client 
satisfaction with the product.
In the partner-agent model, while MFIs sponsoring the 
product benefit from risk shifting, especially the smaller 
units, which are more numerous vis-à-vis the handful 
of  large entities, are likely to be handicapped by their 
limited command over the insurance contract, pricing, 
8etc. due to lack of  qualified personnel . It would also be 
costly for them to train staff  and make them conversant 
with the insurance issues that would be necessary to 
provide clients with effective after sale service. Shortage 
of  skilled personnel would also hamper liaising with the 
service providers in ensuring that the agreed-upon 
treatment protocol be made available, in processing 
transactions and in building insurance awareness 
among the poor. There are several avenues of  dealing 
with such a situation, one of  which is to propose a 
variant of  the partner-agent model whereby an MFI-
owned brokerage is added to the chain such that the 
broker would acquire the necessary insurance expertise 
(and be licensed if  appropriate) in order to assist MFIs 
to negotiate the best deals with commercial insurers. In 
the Bangladesh context PKSF/InM/CDF, severally or 
jointly, may serve such a role, which may however 
9require regulatory approval . Another awkwardness of  
the partner-agent model is the potential conflict 
between their core business (typically, credit) and 
microinsurance. The former is a revenue earner while 
the latter is unlikely to be profitable. The pressure to 
achieve break even status may lead them to neglect the 
insurance portfolio. 
 
Overall, the net advantage of  the partner model in the 
Bangladesh context would be the existence of  many 
large and successful MFIs who are well trusted by their 
members. They would also have the capacity to allocate 
staff  to be trained up in insurance modalities. Success 
of  this mode of  delivering insurance services would 
depend on the capacity of  the organization to 
seamlessly deal both with the insurer as well as service 
providers, namely the network of  local hospitals and 
clinics.
The community-based organization (CBO) 
model 
In many contexts a cooperative entity is legally 
constituted as a 'cooperative' or 'a mutual society', the 
latter often being preferred due to its advantage vis-à-
vis cooperatives in terms of  the formal regulatory 
stance. The organizational nature of  cooperatives has 
several variants; (i) stand alone variety, which are usually 
large mutual insurance companies and which are not 
part of  any network of  mutual institutions (e.g., CARD 
in the Philippines); (ii) mutual insurance company that 
can be the insurance arm of  a network of  financial 
cooperatives (e.g., savings and credit cooperatives, 
'SACCO') providing service to members of  the 
network (MUSCCO in Malawi and ServiPeru in Peru); 
(iii) network of  mutual insurance associations that 
creates its own hierarchy, such as Union Technique de la 
Mutualité Maliennne (UTM). In the cooperative 
network model, i.e., SACCOs, insurance is an add-on to 
the portfolio of  services, for which the network 
engages a risk carrier, which creates and underwrites the 
insurance products, while the cooperatives serve as the 
distribution network as well as the market (Fischer and 
Qureshi 2006).
Strictly speaking, it is the third type of  cooperative 
organizations, namely a network of  mutual insurers, 
where insurance is the core service, which is ordinarily 
referred to as the community based organization 
(CBO) approach, though in common parlance, any 
cooperative framework is often cited as CBOs. In the 
discussion below, we follow the more heuristic 
approach and refer to all types mutual/cooperative 
insurance arrangements as CBOs. In common with the 
partner-agent model, the CBO framework allows the 
network of  cooperatives to jointly develop and 
distribute their own insurance products to the members 
in a cost effective manner without the intermediation 
of  outsourced sales staff. In both set-ups, community 
involvement and peermonitoring reduces information, 
8. About 75% of  MFIs in Bangladesh are categorized as 'very small', namely with membership below 20,000 (IFC 2009).
9. The Philippines Insurance Commission (PIC 2010) provides for several categories of  licensed agents or brokers to facilitate the distribution of  
microinsurance products. 
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enforcement & transaction costs, the risk of  adverse 
10selection and moral hazard . Studies have shown that 
community participation achieves better targeting 
outcomes and reduces the administrative costs of  
handling financial transactions (e.g., premium 
collection and claim settlement). Given that members 
are actively involved in management and decision 
making, they can directly influence the scope of  
coverage and the size of  contributions. As they are also 
better informed about the needs of  the insured, the 
members can design the product accordingly. Here the 
interests of  individual members are aligned with those 
of  the group, as members share the benefit from profit 
as well as the loss. Thus, the model potentially 
strengthens social cohesion in the group. The higher 
the extent of  social cohesion the greater the potential 
for reducing costs associated with fraud, adverse 
selection and moral hazard.
The critical difference between the CBO and the 
partner-agent models lies in the risk-sharing aspect. In 
the latter context, by engaging a registered commercial 
insurer, the NGO/MFI in question gets to divest itself  
of  all risks. CBOs, by contrast, pool, manage and 
absorb the risk themselves, though frequently by 
forming an insurance company. Here the risk-carrier is 
created for the express purpose of  delivering insurance 
services to network members, and where the former is 
owned and controlled by the CBO and member policy-
holders. Hence the risk is borne by the insured, who 
11themselves are the owners of  the scheme . The policy 
holders manage the insurance programme and 
negotiate with external service providers (e.g., hospital 
chains as in health insurance) as relevant.
Other presumed advantages of  the CBO structure 
include the non-profit mode of  operation, thereby 
leading to low premium cost. Of  course, for the latter to 
be feasible it is essential to reach a risk pool of  efficient 
size. A cursory look at the well known CBOs indicates 
that most networks have less than 100,000 members 
(exceptions being CARD of  Philippines and Yeshasvini 
Trust of  India, which are in the million-plus categories). 
Well-known partner-agent examples (e.g., SKS or 
BASIX in India) boast of  million-plus membership 
12pools . The larger size allows the latter to bargain 
effectively over the terms of  contract with external 
service providers (suppliers) as for example required for 
health insurance.
In terms of  ground reality however, community-based 
organisations often lack managerial resources as well as 
reserve funds due to their geographic location and the 
level of  attendant social and economic advancement. 
Community characteristics (e.g., in terms of  ethnicity, 
gender, kinship, geographical boundary, social 
networks or wealth) may have an impact on the level of  
inclusion in the insurance scheme. These factors may 
well limit the number of  policy holders and 
compromise risk pooling. Absent access to reinsurance, 
insurance affiliates of  smaller CBOs would generally 
fail to cover covariate or sporadic risks due to 
inadequate reserves (Maleika and Kuriakose 2008). 
However, if  the insurer is publicly listed as some larger 
ones are (e.g., ALMAO and Columna), it may have 
access to shareholder capital thus alleviating the 
concern to an extent (Fischer and Qureshi 2006). 
Radermacher and Dror (2006) also note that typical 
CBOs would encounter challenges in acquiring 
specialist knowledge necessary to design, implement 
and run a successful insurance programme.  
In the Bangladesh context, there is a scope for smaller 
NGOs to form a mutual pool; however, the lack of  
expertise in insurance matters would suggest that such 
an entity could effectively run an insurance program 
13only if  aided by a third party such as noted above .  
On balance, we note that in principle the community 
based model of  microinsurance has the advantage of  
being entirely non-profit, where members exert direct 
influence in the design of  the coverage, costs and 
implementation. But such benefits may only be fully 
exploited by a few of  the larger entities. 
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10. Moral hazard is distinct from fraud; it is the inclination to change behaviour after insurance protection is bought (e.g., to take less precaution against theft 
after having purchased such coverage).
11. Often the risk bearing department of  the cooperative network is transformed into a full-fledged mutual insurer (e.g., witness the case of  ALMAO and 
Sanasa societies of  Sri Lanka).
12. Fischer and Qureshi (2006) summarize the data for 10 major cooperative network models (Table 36, p337), where the median figure for the membership 
strength is seen to be 56,000.
13. MIME life insurance program, run under the auspices of  INAFI, is an example of  a mutual arrangement. However it is yet to establish itself  as a viable 
entity (Ahsan et al. 2011).
The Provider model
Under the provider model, the insurer and the service 
provider are one and the same entity (e.g., hospitals or 
doctors offering policies to individuals or groups). 
Most microinsurance programmes in Bangladesh are 
examples of  the provider model run either by 
commercial insurers (typically in the case of  life or 
livestock) or by MFIs (loan/life and health). The 
products offered by the latter are usually coupled with 
credit, for example, typically to insure against default 
risk. Here the risks faced by an insurer are the same as in 
the full service model. While similar to the full service 
model, the insurer is responsible for all aspects of  
designing and delivering the service, but the 
responsibility of  actual provision of  service becomes a 
new element. Thus, for urban commercial insurers, 
provision of  micro-insurance in this mode is even more 
difficult than in the full service format. Because, it has 
not only to sell insurance, it also needs to operate as a 
service provider, which is rather extensive in non-life 
coverage. For life products, there is little distinction 
between the two institutional structures.
But a more fundamental design incongruity of  the 
provider model is that (say in the case of  health 
insurance) the health care provider is involved in 
developing the business model and the financial plan. 
For health coverage, the care provider's control over the 
benefit package makes it clearly distinct from an 
insurance company employing a service provider or 
setting up its own health care facility (Radermacher and 
Dror 2006). The provider is handicapped by the 
incentive to under-provide or compromise on the 
quality of  care. Unifying the roles of  provider and 
purchaser of  services would thus be seen as creating a 
potential conflict of  interest. This feature allows the 
provider-driven scheme to restrict the client's choice to 
the provider's facility or designated health professionals 
as we saw in the case of  those offering MHI in 
Bangladesh. 
Just as in the full service model, the single largest 
shortcoming of  a non-insurer provider is the scarcity of  
competent professionals to determine the actuarial 
basis of  the plans. Moreover for such providers, the lack 
of  access to re-insurance significantly compromises the 
prospect of  long term sustainability of  the insurance 
mechanism in a competitive environment. 
How to choose among delivery modes?
Since no single delivery model of  micro-insurance 
appears free from disadvantages, which implies that 
there is scope for one model to incorporate the 
The full service model 
In this model, basically non-commercial but registered 
organizations operate their own insurance scheme. The 
organization fully absorbs the risk, profit and loss. The 
insurer here is in full control but would typically engage 
a provider (another NGO) to provide the service for 
example in health care. The provider here has no claim 
on any residual profit or loss. The insurer is responsible 
for all aspects of  product development, sales, servicing 
and claims assessment. The insurers are responsible for 
all insurance-related costs and losses and they retain all 
profits. The insurer provides the full range of  insurance 
services-product development, product distribution, 
risk absorption- thereby reducing processing time and 
allowing strong controls over the system. Full service 
models require substantial investment in human and 
financial resources and acquisition of  actuarial 
expertise before becoming operational, which limits its 
popularity in most developing countries.
Alternatively, if  commercial insurers plan to enter the 
field of  microinsurance in the full service mode, the 
bottleneck arises in liaising with the potential insured 
who are in 'remote' locations, and to whom these urban 
entities are unknown and generally not trustable. Selling 
of  insurance and provision of  follow-up services (e.g., 
verification and settlement of  claims, and extending 
help in assisting clients registered for health insurance 
in accessing the service) become extremely difficult and 
cost ineffective. For example, DELTA life, a full service 
operator in Bangladesh, spends about 3 to 4% of  the 
sum assured (endowment policies) as administrative 
expenses, while the similar cost for SKS of  India (in 
partner-agent set up with Bajaj-Allianz) is below 1% 
between the insurer and the agent for a retail 
endowment product that has 2.7 million subscribers 
(Ahsan and Hakim 2010).       
For the reasons cited above, it is hard to find successful 
examples of  the full service model. Historically 
speaking, the Self-Employed Women's Association 
(SEWA) and SPANDANA, both of  India, started to 
offer insurance along the principles of  the full service 
model. SEWA while starting off  as a woman employees' 
union in 1972, has been more ambitious, offering a 
broad range of  insurance coverage (life, disability, 
health, and property) initially all provided under a full 
service model. However, following IRDA stipulations 
of  2005, SEWA's solo initiatives have given way to 
partnerships with various insurers (e.g., ICICI Lombard 
in weather insurance, LIC in life, Aviva and Bajaj-
Allianz for other non-life coverage). 
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advantageous features of  another. For example the 
partner-agent model can be strengthened by 
incorporating some features of  the community-based 
model such as involving the target group in designing 
the benefit package. Similarly the community-based 
model, if  the risk pool is large enough (e.g., as in the 
SEWA network), can always engage high quality 
professionals conversant in insurance knowledge with 
regards to the issues of  technical and operational 
sustainability.
On cost efficiency, given that different delivery modes 
have different cost implications, unless these costs are 
minimized, an optimal choice that matches the best 
possible benefits and most affordable premium to poor 
households cannot be achieved. Moreover, since not all 
micro insurers typically market the same product, the 
product type needs to be distinguished and the issues of  
'after-sales service' ought to be considered. Ahsan and 
Mahmud (2011) have proposed five principal criteria 
for choosing among delivery models in terms of  their 
potential, which focus on the twin goals of  the 
adequacy of  the service and premium affordability. 
These are 'awareness building', 'building trust', 'cost 
efficiency', 'satisfactory and timely settlement of  claims' 
and 'subscriber inclusivity'.
Among major microinsurance products, health 
insurance is most difficult to implement as it requires 
considerable managerial as well as actuarial capacity. 
The (health) insurers need to have a sound 
understanding of  risk management techniques and the 
solutions to the problem of  adverse selection. Accurate 
verification of  the incidence of  illness turns out to be 
difficult and rather subjective. Moreover, for effective 
implementation of  any health insurance programme, it 
is necessary to secure access to locally existing 
infrastructure of  health service providers, where policy 
holders can obtain immediate service. Only events that 
cannot be handled locally need to be treated in referral 
facilities. These elements imply that the provider mode 
of  offering MHI would be generally untenable since the 
capacity to carry risk need not imply an equal advantage 
in implementing and servicing the products. In the 
Bangladesh context, it can arguably be stated that both 
BRAC and Grameen are facing real challenges in 
keeping up the subsidized MHI programmes (à la 
14provider set up) they launched some years ago . 
Although the partner-agent and/or the CBO model are 
advocated on grounds of  operational efficiency, there 
are several areas of  concern that need to be addressed 
before going to policy holders. In particular, the role of  
each party (insurer and agent or, between the insurer 
and service provider, as appropriate) should be clearly 
understood and spelled out on the basis of  the 
comparative advantages each has in performing various 
chores. MFI agents, in partnership with commercial 
insurers, need to perform a dual role by ensuring their 
own institutional requirements in terms of  distribution, 
cost recovery, capacity requirements as well as 
representing the client and their needs. Studies have 
shown that MFI clients often have little understanding 
of  the insurance products they have purchased non-
voluntarily (Churchill 2006). This accounts for the 
failure of  MFI staff  to promote products and provide 
adequate information. Due to such lack of  
commitment and/or orientation on the part of  delivery 
agents, policy holders will only find themselves 
discontinuing subscription for voluntary products and, 
for non-voluntary products, would tend to perceive 
insurance to be an additional cost of  borrowing. This 
situation maybe largely corrected by engaging trained 
and dedicated staff  to serve the insurance portfolio. If  
MFIs become too focused on their loan portfolios to 
maximize their earnings, neither the provider model 
nor other types of  delivery channels would be able to 
provide meaningful insurance products that maximize 
value to the policy holder. 
Moral hazard and fraud are more likely in health and 
livestock coverage than in life. In most cases, low-cost 
means of  reaching a large client pool would be difficult 
without the full participation of  MFIs, i.e., a partner-
agent or a 'mutual' type of  structure. Hence Bangladesh 
would appear to be suitably poised to experimenting 
with these two schemes. A general comparison of  
different delivery channels in terms of  the key 
indicators cited above is shown in Table 1. 
14. Both Gonoshasthaya Kendra (GsK) and Sajida Foundation have advantages in this regard since they run full-fledged hospitals of  their own. The tension 
between cost containment and offering quality care still exists. However in their environment, (especially Sajida), the insured still bear a majority share 
of  all treatment costs, and thus the conflict issue is not as obvious as it would otherwise be. See chapter 5 for further analysis of  MFI-run MHI 
programmes.
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FILLING THE REGULATORY VACUUM
It may be perceived that in an emerging context as in 
Bangladesh, MHI is in its infancy, and therefore, one 
can wait before dwelling on the regulatory issues. 
However such a view may be shortsighted for the 
reason that regulation itself  may be a force that 
catapults microinsurance into a mainstream activity of  
both NGO-MFIs and commercial insurers as for 
15example has already occurred in India .
 Insurance contracts entail a relationship between a 
fiduciary (or trustee) and a principal (or beneficiary) that is 
primarily of  trust and legal nature. These two features 
are common to all legal financial transactions. 
Therefore, regulation is important for consumer 
protection since the product (a promise of  certain 
benefits due upon the occurrence of  certain events) is a 
contingent one. Accordingly, most stakeholders 
strongly believe that the emerging microinsurance 
Table 1. Choosing among delivery channels* 
 Partner-Agent  CBO  Full service  Provider  
(a) Awareness  A: Campaign led by local 
staff  belonging to the 
community  
A: Campaign led by local staff  
belonging to the community  
A:  A:  
D: Prior and specialized 
training is a pre-requisite  
D: Prior and specialized 
training is a pre-requisite  
D: Generally, lack of  eligible 
local staff  except where the 
insurer is a CBO/NGO-
MFI  
D: Generally, lack of  
eligible local staff  except 
where the insurer is a 
CBO/NGO-MFI  
(b) Trust   
      Building  
A: Clients are already in a 
trust relationship with the 
agent as micro lender  
A:  Clients are already in a 
trust relationship with the 
CBO affiliates  as  micro 
lender  
A: Trust relationship exists 
only if   the insurer is a 
CBO/NGO-MFI affiliate  
A: Trust relationship exists 
only if   the insurer is a 
CBO/NGO-MFI affiliate  
D:  D:  D:  D: Conflict of  interest 
since insurer is the buyer 
of  service  
(c) Lowering  
     Transaction    
     Costs  
A: Possible to have least 
cost by using trained and 
dedicated staff   
A: Possible to have least cost 
by using trained and dedicated 
staff   
A: Least cost only if   the 
insurer is a CBO/NGO-
MFI affiliate  
A:  
D:  D:  D:  D: Conflict between cost 
control & service adequacy  
(d) Claim 
     Settlement  
A: Friendly & timely if  local 
staff  is in charge 
A:  Friendly & timely if  local 
staff  is in charge 
A:  A:  
D:  D:  D: Slow & stressful if  the 
insurer is not a 
CBO/NGO-MFI affiliate  
D:  Slow & stressful if  the 
insurer is not a 
CBO/NGO-MFI affiliate  
(e) Risk Pool  
     and  
     Inclusivity  
A: Facilitates reaching a 
large pool  
A:  A: May reach a large pool 
only  if   the insurer is a 
CBO/NGO-MFI affiliate  
A: May reach a large pool 
only  if   the insurer is a 
CBO/NGO-MFI affiliate  
D:  D: A large pool may be 
reaching only by large CBOs  
D:  D:  
*By ‘A’ we denote a major ‘advantage’, while ‘D’ denotes a major ‘drawback’  (adapted from Ahsan and Mahmud 2011). 
15. Besides, the Government of  Bangladesh is actively seeking to draft a full-fledged regulatory regime and has employed consultants to help design the 
same (see below).
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market needs a comprehensive but compliance-friendly 
l eg a l  r egu l a to r y  f r amework .  Such  v i ews  
notwithstanding, to date the regulation of  micro-
insurance has largely been rudimentary in many 
contexts including Bangladesh. The recent Insurance 
Development and Control Authority (IDCA) Act of  
March 2010, which replaces the earlier Insurance Act of  
1938 (amended in 1973 and in 1984), promises to 
develop an autonomous entity. While the draft statutes 
of  the IDCA does not employ the term 
'microinsurance' even once, it nevertheless mandates all 
insurers to offer 'life' or 'non-life' products (though not 
together) to the 'rural and social sectors'. 
Turning to MFIs, the Government of  Bangladesh 
(GoB) enacted the “Microcredit Regulatory Authority 
Act, 2006” on August 27, 2006. Under the act, the 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) has been 
established. The MRA Act recognizes insurance 
services of  MFIs as a discretionary component of  their 
activities beyond core activities such as micro lending 
and collecting member deposits. Each licensed MFI, 
therefore, has the authority to “offer different types of  
insurance services … for the loan recipients and 
members of  their families” (MRA 2006, article 24). 
One of  the early challenges, therefore, would be the 
coordination of  insurance services of  commercial 
insurers and NGO-MFIs. Having reviewed a number 
of  areas where there are significant regulatory 
16challenges, we suggest how these can be overcome . 
  
The regulatory challenges identified below presume 
that suitable insurance products are available for 
piloting, experimentation and eventual roll-out that 
meet the adequacy test. In other words, such products 
are capable of  preventing vulnerability to poverty in the 
event of  the occurrence of  the insured-against events. 
The proposed regulatory statutes, though not 
exhaustive, highlight the key goals of  cost efficiency, 
financial viability and inclusivity. They are also aimed at 
fostering innovations in product design and delivery. 
These ought to be implemented in stages depending on 
the maturity of  the industry and the evolving capacity 
of  the regulator(s).
How many regulators?
While India has chosen to regulate micro-insurance 
under a common rubric, this is unlikely to emerge as the 
common practice. In other words, in most contexts it 
will be necessary to address how to coordinate the 
regulatory directives applicable to microinsurance 
activities of  commercial insurers vis-à-vis those 
operated by CBOs and NGO-MFIs. In such a context, 
while a variety of  institutions may provide 
microinsurance services, the regulatory/licensing 
guidelines, if  they exist at all, may be uneven, or may 
only relate to one segment of  the market. In the absence 
of  a coordination process, the provision of  service by a 
heterogeneous class of  insurers may ultimately 
undermine the protection of  the policy holder and 
thwart market development. How can regulations 
relevant to activities of  different types of  organizations 
be coordinated? 
At another level, regulation of  the industry may appear 
difficult because the orientation of  commercial insurers 
(profit-driven) and CBOs/NGOs/MFIs, who operate 
under a variety of  social objectives, differ markedly. 
Given that both IDRA and MRA operate under the 
Ministry of  Finance (MoF), a common set of  guidelines 
may apply to all microinsurance products, where the 
coordination process may also be formalized. The 
MRA stance would, however, have to change if  IDRA 
successfully gains the sole authority to regulate 
microinsurance services. A similar initiative is underway 
in South Africa to create a dedicated regulatory 
framework for microinsurance.
Regulation and delivery
While in 2005 Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA), the Indian regulator, had imposed 
the 'partner-agent' model as the sole means of  
distributing insurance services to the poor and at the 
same time mandated all insurers to serve this market 
within an enforceable time bound modality, this was 
seen by many as heavy handed. It had been feared that 
short circuiting experimentation with the delivery 
mechanism, which had been underway for many years 
at the behest of  major CBOs and MFIs, would harm the 
industry. Five years on, while many still find some of  the 
16. Parts of  the material described in this section draw upon more detailed analysis by Ahsan and Mahmud (2011) and Ahsan, Barua and Tax (2010), which 
have however been updated in light of  relevant developments.
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regulatory statutes out of  date or irrelevant, IRDA has 
dealt with the ground realities prudently and with 
consideration. Not only have many experiments been 
allowed to continue; the regulatory stance has led to a 
proliferation of  products offered by nearly all registered 
insurers in partnership with MFIs/SHGs/CBOs. 
Moreover, nearly all insurers presently happen to be 
organized as joint ventures between the Indian parents 
and major multinationals. The entry of  the latter may 
have been hastened by the demand for skill necessary to 
develop specialized products directed at the poor. 
The primary lesson one can learn is perhaps that 
regulation ought to keep up competition at all levels, 
among delivery channels, among those who are eligible 
to distribute the products, and the mix of  products an 
insurer may want to offer. In this regard, the Philippines 
Insurance Commission (PIC) directives of  2010 are a 
case in point. It allows insurance to be sold by all 
licensees, namely commercial insurers, cooperative 
insurance societies, or Mutual Benefit Associations 
(MBA). While MFIs are authorized to serve as licensed 
agents, nothing stops the larger entities from launching 
a separate insurance company fashioned as MBAs or 
CBOs if  they so choose. 
Definition
It is critical to have a working definition of  
microinsurance as it is distinct from the standard 
insurance. It is, therefore, proposed that the regulator 
determine if  a product developed by a potential insurer would be 
eligible; and only the eligible products may be marketed by a 
licensed microinsurer. The discussion in the literature 
points to the following key elements as characterizing 
the idea. 'Microinsurance' products are (a) targeted at 
low-net worth households, (b) designed to reflect 
pooling of  risk faced by the insured, and (c) priced in 
keeping with the willingness to pay criterion as well as 
being proportional to the likelihood and costs of  the 
risks involved (Churchill 2006), (d) that all phases of  the 
products be developed in close collaboration with the 
communities they are supposed to benefit (MIA 2006), 
and (e) the products must be of  substantive value to the 
poor in terms addressing the issue of  vulnerability to 
poverty (see Ahsan 2009). In essence, therefore, 
microinsurance services are those risk-shifting devices offered by 
insurers that are especially suited to the needs of  low-income 
households and are affordable.
Quantification and standardization
The conceptual definition cited above may not suffice 
for regulatory purposes if  the goal is to encourage the 
development of  a set of  'standard' products, which 
typically promotes competition. Given standardization, 
potential beneficiaries may easily compare products 
available in the market, while at the same time, allowing 
insurers to operate the entire range or specialize to a 
subset of  products depending on their expertise and 
circumstances. Law of  one price is the ultimate test of  
efficiency! Even in the dynamic Indian market (growing 
at about 10% annually) there appears extreme product 
diversification, which are similar but distinct. These are 
telltale signs of  insurers fighting for market share in the 
absence of  true competition.
To allow innovations, it would be useful to offer a 
flexible structure by twinning the size of  the indemnity 
to parameters of  income distribution such as the 
average annual income, poverty line or the size of  
average annual microcredit. Thus, for example, for 
credit/life (term, endowment, etc.) type policies, the benchmark 
products may offer indemnity in a range of  1.5 to 5 times the 
average size of  the annual microcredit loan, which as of  Feb 
172011 stood at about BDT 15,000 . A similar figure may be 
18assigned to health coverage per family as well . Setting 
the limits in this manner does in no way imply that the 
insured necessarily be a member of  a credit group. 
Coverage below the threshold cited here can be 
presumed to offer little value to the average poor/low-
income person since it would be inadequate to offer her 
a chance to overcome the vulnerability due to the loss. It 
would seem that a good portion of  'microinsurance' 
policies currently marketed by commercial insurers in 
developing countries are below the threshold of  the 
quantitative guide proposed above, which will cease to 
be so defined if  such a regulation is passed. 
17. This figure corresponds to the average amount of  loans disbursed by PKSF partner organizations (PO), which is expected to be close to the industry 
average. 
18. By contrast the IRDA definition is far more stringent. It specifies absolute figures typically in a range between 10 and 50 thousand Indian rupees (with 
additional specifications as to family size, individual vs. family coverage for health insurance etc) requiring revisions over time. The Philippines definition 
pegs it to (500 times) the daily minimum wage in metro Manila (PIC 2010).
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Simplicity of  products 
The regulatory directives ought to require that each 
microinsurance product be described, as well as the 
contract be written, in plain language where all benefits 
and documentary requirements for the time-bound 
claim settlement process are clearly stated. Frequency 
of  premium due must be flexible enough to match 
irregular earnings of  the insured. 
Life vs. non-life products
The historical demarcation as to carriers of  life and 
non-life risk has largely disappeared in most developed 
financial systems. The IRDA statutes permit marketing 
of  each other's products, but the carriers are required to 
remain distinct. The Indian scheme allows a life 
microinsurer to act as an intermediary for a general 
microinsurance company (and vice-versa) rather than 
as a risk carrier. Thus in the end, competition is 
curtailed and the poor may suffer as a consequence. 
Perpetuation of  this dichotomy, also embodied in the 
IDCA guidelines in Bangladesh, makes little sense in 
microinsurance, since that may well be one way of  
pooling risk across product lines. Hence it may allow an 
insurer, if  socially deemed fair, to cross-subsidize some 
services by others (e.g., health by life). If  an insurer were 
to specialize in one category, nothing prevents it from 
doing so. Indeed, Philippines Insurance Commission 
(PIC) has approved the bundling of  micro products so 
long as each component of  the bundle is underwritten 
separately (possibly by the same insurer).
Inclusivity
Some countries have targeted inclusivity and sought to 
expand the reach of  microinsurance by requiring all 
insurers to serve the low-income market (as is the case 
in India). The IRDA requirements are that all insurers 
will have to attain a certain share of  premium income 
from policies catered to 'rural areas' and 'unorganized 
workers, economically vulnerable or backward classes 
in urban and rural areas', and failure to achieve the 
targets may lead to financial penalties or even 
cancellation of  the license. Such a heavy-handed 
approach need not be productive at all times. For large, 
nationwide firms, this policy may be practical, but 
certainly not for the smaller entities. Even for larger 
ones, some may specialize in some niche market, and 
dilution of  their business strategy may harm efficiency 
and sustainability. The draft Bangladesh IDCA 
guidelines appear to mandate each insurer to offer 'life' 
or 'non-life' products in the 'rural and social sectors' 
(article 6). In view of  no further elaboration, however, it 
is unclear if  this is a deliberate requirement of  each, 
though the language reads so. 
 
Bester et al. (2008) suggest that in the South African 
context marketing innovations have played an 
important role in promoting inclusivity. These include 
the use of  cell phone as communication and sales tool 
and collaboration with retailer chains or sports clubs as 
distribution channels. Design features such as choosing 
the policy contracts using a “tick-of-the-box” approach 
have led to low transaction costs and the ability to reach 
a large pool of  clients. It would be interesting to 
experiment how similar innovations may be adapted in 
other contexts. 
Separation of  credit and insurance activities
The credit and insurance services ought to be separated 
for financial transparency, though in case of  credit risk 
coverage, this is difficult. If  MFIs merely design and 
market insurance products where the risk is shifted 
onto commercial insurers (as in a partner-agent set up), 
the question of  separation does not arise. However, if  
MFIs are authorized to carry insurance risks, it is 
proposed that they separate microinsurance operations from all 
other activities, and possibly receive a separate license from the 
appropriate regulator to run microinsurance. This separation 
of  credit and insurance is also justified since the 
separate activities of  an MFI would in principle face 
different regulatory directives, especially when it comes 
to prudential matters. Such a step will, therefore, go a 
long way in evaluating the financial situation of  each 
activity of  the same organization, and all arms' length 
transactions will be put on a transparent perspective.
However, there may well be the need for a credit linkage in 
an insurance model. For example, a health line if  credit on 
easier terms, even if  utilized to pay the co-insurance and 
deductible may go a long way in boosting demand for 
coverage. This may not be appropriate for the ultra 
poor, but those a little higher up the ladder may find this 
modality helpful since this would allow broadening the 
range of  services offered under insurance (e.g., day 
surgeries in an otherwise 'in-patient' programme). 
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Reserves 
In commercial insurance, reserves, typically an 
actuarially determined fraction of  net premiums, are 
kept in a more or less liquid form to meet contingency 
payments. However, insurers often neglect the 
important task of  determining the size of  adequate 
reserves against the temporal pattern of  policy 
liabilities (Uddin 2009). This is an area that the regulator 
may address forcefully without necessarily requiring 
full-fledged compliance with the prudential guidelines 
that maybe made mandatory at some stage. Pauly argues 
that “regulations that assure adequate reserves … and 
protection of  customers from arbitrary denial of  
benefits or rate increases are all important” (2008, 
p.1018). It is, therefore, important that experienced 
actuaries be engaged to project the future liabilities of  
microinsurers. Attention maybe drawn to the Centre 
for Agricultural Research and Development (CARD) in 
Philippines, an MFI, which had started offering a 
pension plan in 1996 without any actuarial advice, but 
had to stop (in 1999) due to fast erosion of  the fund. It 
has since then formed a separate entity, a mutual benefit 
association (MBA), known as CARD MBA, which has 
been successfully offering actuarially sound 
microinsurance products, which has recently reached a 
millionplus client pool. 
Capital adequacy and prudential guidelines
Determination of  the required level of  capital for 
microinsurers, which in principle reflects the 
shareholder equity (for publicly traded entities) or 
retained earnings (for mutual insurance companies), is 
far from an exact science. The primary accepted norm 
is that capital adequacy be linked to the riskiness of  an 
insurer's business. Dwelling on the notion of  risk-based 
capital (RBC), capital needed to offset the 'insurance 
risk' alone is often referred to as the solvency margin, 
which is not adequate for the overall risk scenario, but 
19captures an important component . The insurance 
regulator ought to deliberate both the appropriate 
standards, which may well deviate from the current 
Basel RBC guidelines for the banking sector, as well as 
what stage and to what extent such risk stipulations 
should apply to microinsurers. 
In setting the capital requirement, it is relevant to recognize that 
the funding sources are different between commercial insurers and 
NGO-MFIs since the latter do not have access to equity capital. 
Thus, meeting the capital goals would be easy if  smaller MFIs 
were to partner with national level MFIs or with commercial 
insurers for insurance services. The capital issue further 
reinforces our earlier remark that MFIs separate their 
credit and insurance services. Hence, the regulatory 
directives ought to consider that the scale necessary to 
successfully operate credit and insurance services need not be the 
same, and microinsurers may well face a higher capital 
requirement than if  they restricted themselves to only credit and 
saving activities. 
Design, accumulation and investment of  the 
reserve fund
Guidelines would be necessary so that the regulator can 
examine the rationale of  the premium rate, the 
adequacy of  the evolving reserve fund, and 
sustainability of  the programme. Regulatory directive 
would also be necessary to determine the investment of  
reserve funds and rules regarding excess funds and 
disposal thereof. Investment of  the funds should be 
guided by the need to match the time profile of  
investment returns with that of  the stream of  
anticipated claims, an issue that is much more serious 
for life-based (e.g., term or endowment) policies than 
annual health or livestock insurance. The risk 
characteristics of  the investment portfolio are another 
important dimension over which the regulator may 
provide guidance to the insurer. It is conceivable that if  
an MFI insurer has actuarially determined 'surplus' in its 
fund, a portion of  which can be loaned out for its other 
(e.g., credit) services, but in such an event there ought to 
be an explicit understanding of  the terms of  the loan 
20and the collateral . Moreover, in most regulatory 
guidelines, it is generally forbidden for an insurer to 
build-up excess funds not called for by the underlying 
actuarial calculus.
19. Beyond the 'insurance risk', other important categories of  risk include the (a) asset default risk, (b) asset-liability mismatch risk, (c) business risk, and (d) 
operational risk (Uddin 2009). The latter author also proposes the solvency margins as a first step toward adopting a more comprehensive RBC down 
the line.
20. In other words, the insurer (being a distinct business entity from the credit provider) would loan the funds in question to the lending arm of  the 
company under explicit terms.
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Policy delinquency
Microinsurance policies, like other insurance contracts, 
are often discontinued by the insured due to both 
voluntary and involuntary reasons. Regulatory 
directives would be essential to protect the rights of  
both the parties and ensure fairness. In the case of  
registered insurers, the Bangladesh provision is that if  
premiums are paid for at least two consecutive years the 
policy qualifies for a surrender value (Uddin 2009). The 
surrender value is less than the premium paid. If  the 2-
year cap is not met, the policy lapses with no cash 
21value . What would be an equitable benchmark in the 
case of  microinsurance? On the presumption that 
successful programmes would be lowcost operations, 
one would be tempted to suggest that surrender value 
should accrue after 12 months of  consecutive payment 
for micro products.  
Audit and supervision
External audit has been made mandatory for each 
licensed MFI which is to be carried out by an eligible 
chartered accounting firm with experience in 
microfinance activities, and who must follow the 
Bangladesh Standard of  Auditing (BSA) guidelines. 
However, if  these entities also engage in carrying 
insurance risk, the nature and extent of  audit would 
materially change and be comparable to that relevant 
for insurers. It is uncertain what would be the audit and 
supervision regime for the microinsurance industry 
under IDCA's mandate. It is also uncertain at what 
stage of  its development they will acquire enough 
capacity to carry out these tasks in a professional 
manner. 
Reinsurance
As many writers have stressed, microinsurance can only 
flourish when the risks carried by the domestic insurers 
(whether joint ventures or otherwise) are shifted further 
via reinsurance to global firms. To attract reputable 
reinsurers into this market, it would be essential that 
insurers be registered under the regulations in force. 
Here the regulator may facilitate the process by 
encouraging smaller MFIs to choose a delivery 
mechanism compatible with scale efficiency. However, 
the regulatory statutes in turn must also be viewed as 
appropriate as outlined here. 
Educating the regulator 
Many developing country regulators do not have skilled 
manpower who would fully understand how the low-
income insurance market should function and what it 
may strive for. The burden on available resources may 
be too severe, jeopardizing the goals of  regulation. 
Hence, a road map would be necessary to impart and 
endow the regulatory authority with the required 
human resources and training on an ongoing basis. 
 
To date public sector insurance companies have not 
gone into MHI in Bangladesh. In India, by contrast 
both public insurers and public sector health care 
providers have a major presence in the implementation 
of  the state-sponsored Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojona (RSBY). However, given the poorly equipped 
public hospitals in the rural areas and the overcrowding 
of  district hospitals, such an initiative would be difficult 
to implement in the short run in the Bangladesh 
context. In the interim therefore, public sector role in 
promoting MHI can be in the capacity of  a facilitator 
and a provider of  complementary services. Health 
education maybe included in the compulsory 
curriculum in schools, with health advisories 
disseminated on a regular basis via radio, web and cell 
phone.
The government may encourage employer-sponsored 
health insurance (especially company-wide coverage 
encompassing both white and blue colour employees) 
22through the tax code for the business sector . This 
would lead to experimentation at the level of  service 
providers as well as insurers, and thus create a 
workforce appropriately trained for the sector.  
Another important role of  the public sector would be 
to move in a determined fashion to implement a 
suitable regulatory regime as outlined above. Regulation 
itself  has the capacity to jump-start MHI activities and 
lead to orderly growth of  the sector. 
Given the limitations of  existing MHI programmes 
operated by MFIs (see Chapter 5 of  this volume), it is of  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS
21. Uddin (2009) notes that while NGO-MFI-run microinsurance offers no evidence of  the lapse ratio, those offered by registered insurers are suggestive 
of  high ratio of  lapses, discontinuities and low surrender values. Such a scenario is not poor-friendly to say the least.
22. In many companies, there already exist special packages for executive level employees, but rarely one that is inclusive of  all employees. 
107
Bangladesh Health Watch Report 2011
utmost importance that newer and bolder initiatives be 
undertaken so that various parties may start multiple 
'pilot' experiments that feature a variety of  products 
(both health and non-health)   as well as trying out a 
variety of  delivery and distribution modalities. To date 
the experimentation has been only with the provider 
level, while the partner-agent or the mutual modes of  
delivery have remained unexplored. Here again an 
enabling regulatory regime would be an important 
advance.   
Over and above the regulatory help, public sector 
efforts may also be directed at the creation of  awareness 
as to the benefits of  health insurance and its modalities 
by means of  promoting consumer education through 
the media. The latter efforts would also encompass 
messages about the scope of  regulation, and the rights 
of  the insured in dealing with insurers as well as service 
providers.  
Since insurance purchase is an act of  trust, local 
intermediation by the trusted NGO-MFIs and similar 
agents may be seen as indispensable. The element of  
trust also contributes to raising awareness about 
insurance and its scope or limitations, and to help create 
demand for the service so that the poor believe that the 
premium is worth paying for. The available case study 
based evidence is consistent with the above claim.  
Government may also explore an incentive mechanism 
whereby public sector hospitals, to the extent they have 
the capacity to take on additional patients, participate in 
private sector led health insurance activities in their 
capacity as service providers. This may be initially done 
selectively by targeting specific facilities under an 
agreed upon protocol in collaboration with specific 
partners.  
Moreover, affordability relates to scale, careful product 
design and continuous innovation. These suggest that 
registered insurers are perhaps best suited as risk 
carriers, and products should be of  a group nature with 
minimal options/riders and be mandatory to all 
members in a group. The latter feature, namely the 
group orientation, also points to the engagement of  
MFIs/ CBOs/ NGOs/ SHGs as distribution agents 
either on their own behalf  (e.g., as in CBO/MBA set 
up) or for the dedicated risk carriers (e.g., as in the 
partner-agent mode).       
    
Finally note that if  a good fraction of  the poor of  
Bangladesh is to be brought under some form of  MHI 
intervention, we are necessarily talking about millions 
of  households. This task would require the use of  a vast 
network of  rural/district hospitals, many of  which are 
yet non-existent. To facilitate the emergence of  such 
institutions even in the private domain, the country 
would require significant improvement of  road 
communication, provision of  electricity, gas, clean 
water, telecommunication and other means of  
communication. The above would require significant 
public investment, and hence a strong public 
commitment to undertaking the investment would be a 
good point of  departure.
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access to services are dependent.    Indeed, the World 
Health Assembly resolution on Universal Health 
Coverage and Health System Strengthening that was 
passed in May 2011 (WHA 2011), in many ways 
represents the global consensus that unites countries 
with respect to these common challenges.
The chapters in this volume of  the Bangladesh Health 
Watch provide insights with respect to the magnitude 
of  the problem and opportunities in moving towards 
Universal Health Coverage especially as regards efforts 
towards more equitable financing. The purpose of  this 
chapter is to draw together seven common messages 
emerging from the chapters that constitute an agenda 
for action moving forward.  
1. Establishing a shared understanding of 
Universal Health Coverage
While there appears to little disagreement with the idea 
of  Universal Health Coverage, its precise definition is 
difficult to pin down.   Fundamentally, it draws on the 
notion of  a right, or entitlement, to health as is defined 
for example in the constitution of  the World Health 
Organization: "the enjoyment of  the highest attainable 
standard of  health is one of  the fundamental rights of  every 
human being...".In realizing this right, a further question 
is raised related to coverage of  “what”?   WHO 
suggests that two dimensions of  coverage should be 
secured: 1) a comprehensive set of  quality services 
according to need ranging from public health 
prevention to community-based primary care to 
facility-based tertiary treatment and rehabilitation; and 
2) financial protection in accessing care that avoids 
individuals being inhibited from accessing care due to 
cost as well as ensuring that individuals are not 
economically compromised in paying for care (WHR 
2010).
Introduction
n the 40th anniversary of  its liberation, 
Bangladesh is celebrating 4 decades of  O
independence and sustained development. The 
country, once thought incapable of  surmounting the 
enormous barriers to its socio-economic development, 
has defied the skeptics and won the attention and the 
accolades of  the world for its rapid progress and 
accomplishments. The health sector in many respects is 
the poster child of  this success as seen in the evidence 
of  rapid declines in infant, child and maternal mortality 
as well as impressive gains in access to essential services 
such as immunization.
These successes notwithstanding, when projecting 
forward, the next 40 years promise a new and perhaps 
even more daunting set of  health and social 
development challenges. Beyond securing achievement 
of  the health-related MDGs, Bangladesh faces a rapidly 
growing and diverse spectrum of  complex health 
problems related to chronic disease, injuries, 
occupational and environmental threats including 
climate change. Responding to these will require much 
more favorable arrangements related to both the 
effective provision of  health services and their 
equitable financing for the greater than 200 million 
Bangladeshi citizens in 2050.
This country, of  course, is not alone in facing these 
challenges.  Rapidly changing and growing complex 
health sectors with systemic performance deficits are 
endemic to all countries in the world. The dimensions 
of  these common challenges have helped to push the 
health reform agenda beyond the articulation of  a set 
of  essential services and towards securing solid 
foundations for health systems such as health workers 
or information systems and upon which universal 
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These principal axes of  UHC, however, require further 
definition and operationalization in specific contexts, 
Bangladesh being no exception.   Regarding the 
“services” side: what services are included in UHC? 
What services are not included? and how are the 
services provided?   These questions raise a further set 
of  considerations related to governance in terms of  
priority-setting criteria and regulation as well as to 
systems capacities for delivery of  services.    This 
Report deals with some of  these issues in Chapter 2 
through the review of  priorities in health sector plans 
over the last 40 years; and in Chapter 4 with respect to 
the determinants of  universal coverage for inpatient 
care.   Other critical inputs to universal coverage such as 
medicines/supplies, facilities, public awareness and 
demands and health workers are also primary 
considerations in the translation of  UHC.   The 
importance of  these inputs in defining universal health 
coverage cannot be under-estimated as is seen in the 
chronic challenges of  effective supply, distribution and 
retention of  the health workforce (BHW 2007).
The second axis of  UHC, financial protection, raises 
questions that focus on the mode of  financing the 
health sector such as: how much financing is needed? 
for what? from where? how are resources to be 
generated? and effectively disbursed? These questions 
were the primary focus of  the 2010 World Health 
Report on “Financing the path towards Universal 
Health Coverage” (WHR 2010).   The chapters in this 
report touch on some of  these questions  Chapter 3 
looking at the question of  how much money is required 
to publicly finance comprehensive primary health care; 
Chapter 6 examining how financial barriers to maternal 
care can be overcome; and Chapters 5, 7 and 8 
examining the current state of, and future prospects for, 
NGO, and private-for-profit, health insurance options.   
It is important that these two axes of  universal health 
coverage  service coverage and financial protection - be 
brought together as they are in many ways inseparable.   
Conceptually, this is done in the World Health Reports 
2008 and 2010 whereby Universal Health Coverage is 
defined along both the services axis (“depth”  what 
percentage of  total services are provided?) and 
financing axis (“height” - what percentage of  health 
costs are pre-paid?) with respect to a third axis the 
percentage of  the total population covered (“breadth”  
what percentage of  the population is covered by a 
package of  services).   (see figure 1 -below - WHO, 
WHR 2008, 2010).  Beyond the conceptual unification, 
there is an imperative to establish measures and indices 
of  UHC that allow us to know whether universal 
coverage (inclusive of  both services and financial 
protection) is improving or not (also see point 6 below).
Figure 1: Three dimensions of  coverage expansion 
for universal health coverage
Source: World Health Report (WHR), 2010
2. Making a strong case for Universal Health 
Coverage
All of  the chapters in this Report provide important 
perspectives on the many reasons for a concerted 
mobilization towards universal health coverage in 
Bangladesh beginning immediately.  The primary and most 
important rationale relates to shortfalls in coverage in 
the current context. There are three components of  
these unacceptable shortfalls.  The first is the limited 
coverage of  priority interventions such as skilled 
attendance at birth, or screening for modifiable risk 
factors of  chronic disease such as high blood pressure, 
smoking or glucose intolerance. The second relates to 
inequities in the patterns of  coverage: those with more 
resources and fewer health needs are much more likely 
to access care than the poorer and needier segments of  
the population.  The third relates to the shortfalls in 
financial protection arising from a health care system 
that is financed primarily by individual households.   
The estimates of  between 4 and 5 million persons being 
impoverished annually (Doorslaer et al. 2006) due to 
health care payments places this issue as a national 
development priority for reducing vulnerability and 
poverty and not “simply” a health sector problem.  
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Three Dimensions of Coverage Expansion
Direct costs:
proportion
of the costs
covered
Include
other
services
Reduce
cost sharing
and fees
Services:
which services
are covered?Population: who is covered?
Extend to
non-covered Current pooled funds
Missing from this analytic assessment of  the shortfalls 
in coverage, are the daily experiences of  those adversely 
affected. A mother with no coverage of  emergency 
obstetric care who dies due to post-partum hemorrhage 
is not simply a maternal mortality statistic but a real life 
avertable tragedy whose demise spells disaster for her 
newborn and the future well-being of  her family. A 
household with a sick family member faces a grim 
choice between either accessing care with a high risk of  
household impoverishment or forgoing care and losing 
the life of  loved one.   These choices play out in the lives 
of  everyone on a regular basis as is evidenced by the 
frequent e-mails in office settings soliciting financial 
contributions towards the expensive costs of  treating a 
colleague's sick child.  More publicly visible is the 
humiliation of  people begging in the streets with their 
medical bills in hand.
The rationale for UHC also draws inspiration in a much 
more positive way from a spectrum of  opportunities. 
First, universal coverage is possible. A number of  
health services or interventions cover the entire 
population at present. The Expanded Program of  
Immunization (EPI) has developed a decentralized, 
high quality, reliable universal immunization capability 
over the last 25 years (Coverage Evaluation Survey 
MOHFW 2006). The detection and treatment of  
persons with Tuberculosis reaches very high levels of  
coverage through an innovative consortium of  NGOs 
working with the public sector (BRAC Health Program, 
2011). These successes in coverage are strengths to be 
built upon in expanding more comprehensive primary 
care coverage.    
Second, as Bangladesh moves towards a middle-income 
country in the next 10-15 years, its health economy will 
continue to expand at a rapid rate and as such total 
resources for health will grow significantly.  In the 
period, 1997-2007 the nominal growth rate in total 
health expenditure was over 12% per annum.  
Projecting this growth through to 2025, total health 
expenditure will be in the order of  about $US 500 per 
capita per annum (CoE, JPGSPH 2011).   Many 
countries today with that level of  per-capita 
expenditure such as Thailand have been working on 
UHC reforms for over 10 years!  As the World Health 
Report 2008 concluded, the opportunity is to begin to 
harness this growth in total health expenditure for the 
ends of  UHC (WHR 2008).
Third, there is an important opportunity related to the 
growing demand for “integrated” and “portable” care 
amongst the population. Citizens are keen to avoid 
being victims of  the traditional “divides” including 
urban-rural, levels of  care (primary-secondary and 
tertiary); and the public, informal and private sectors. 
The commitment of  the Government to a Digital 
Bangladesh by 2021 provides an important opportunity 
to accelerate applications in health that help to bridge 
these divides in health care.  For example, within the 
design of  the new National Population Register, a 
universal registration system with unique identifiers 
could provide real-time monitoring of  vital events as 
well as coverage of  services through linkages to 
personal electronic health records. (see box on MOVE-
IT Bangladesh and point 6 below).
Finally, there is growing evidence that UHC reforms 
work in terms of  increasing equity in access to services 
and reducing the financial risks of  impoverishment or 
catastrophic asset depletion (Wagner et al. 2010).
3.  Moving towards pre-payment financing is 
imperative.
A top priority in taking action towards UHC is to move 
beyond the current predominance of  individuals paying 
directly for their care at the point of  service. This 
system of  self-payment is unequivocally the most 
inefficient and inequitable way to finance health 
services.  It must be replaced by a system where 
financial contributions are pre-paid and pooled.   Every 
country that has made a concerted effort towards a 
universal health coverage system has taken these steps 
towards “prepayment and pooling” (WHR 2010). What 
options, therefore, should be considered in moving 
towards more pre-payment and pooling of  finances for 
health in Bangladesh?
3a. More and better government financing of  health.
One option - recommended by the World Health 
Report 2010 - is to increase the government budget for 
health.  The current level of  government financing in 
health is low in absolute terms (about $4/capita) and 
represents about 25% of  total health expenditure. 
Chapter 1, acknowledging the very low level of  tax 
collection in Bangladesh identifies other revenue 
generation mechanisms such as earmarked taxes that 
should also be considered to increase government 
revenues (Chowdhury et al. Chapter 1 BHW 2011). But 
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how much more government money is needed?  In 
Chapter 3 of  this Report, the authors calculated that 
provision of  a basic package of  care (costed at 
$24/capita), would require an average annual increase 
of  12% in the government's health budget over the next 
15 years (Haque et al. Chapter 3 BHW 2011).  Given the 
history of  chronic under-spending of  budgetary 
allocations by the Ministry of  Health and Family 
Welfare, any significant increase in government 
financing for health also requires clarity in terms of  
how those monies might be invested to meaningfully 
extend coverage. The findings in Chapter 3 that show 
government financing benefits the rich more than the 
poor, underline the need for careful review and 
prospective equity-impact assessment of  government 
expenditure. Further, it suggests that government 
financing should perhaps be targeted towards the poor 
or “below poverty line” populations as has been done 
for example in the National Health Insurance program 
in India known as RSBY (Haque et al. Chapter 3 BHW 
2011 & RSBY 2009).
Possible avenues for more and better government 
investment might include: 1) building on programs that 
are already providing universal coverage e.g. EPI or TB 
control; 2) enlarging the package of  services covered 
under the voucher schemes known as demand side 
financing (also see below); and 3) establishing an 
independent purchasing authority separate from the 
provision function of  the public sector that might not 
only purchase services from health providers in the 
public sector (with an appropriate payment mechanism 
i.e. capitation), but might also subsidize the service 
packages of  non-governmental providers who are 
building pre-payment and pooling financing 
mechanisms aimed at the poor and disadvantaged. 
3b. Re-designing non-governmental insurance schemes
While this Report has pointed to various NGO-led 
micro-health insurance and private-for-profit health 
insurance schemes, its clear that as a whole they touch a 
very small fraction of  the Bangladesh population with 
little prospect for significant expansion over time.   
This is surprising in a country where its NGOs are 
renowned for going to scale.  Indeed Chapter 5 in its 
evaluation of  NGO-led Micro-Health Insurance 
concludes that they “cover a tiny proportion of  the total 
population” and “remain limited in scope and design” 
(Ahsan et al., p.95 Chapter 5 BHW 2011). In addition to 
classic insurance problems of  moral hazard and adverse 
selection, Chapter 5 identifies eight important 
challenges that are re-grouped here into three major 
categories: 1) Financing of  insurance; 2) Provision of  
services; and 3) Client demand. 
Table 1.    Challenges with Micro Health Insurance 
in Bangladesh
1. Financing of  insurance:
a. Mostly subsidized care, not insurance
b. Inadequate risk pooling and high costs
c. Lack of  financial viability and scalability
2. Provision of  services:
a. Limited range of  services, variable quality
and accessibility
b. Ineffective referral, absence of  network
hospitals
c. Providers not sufficiently separated from
insurers
3. Client demand:
a. Poor understanding amongst clients on
value of  health insurance
b. Difficulty finding cash for premiums     
and co payments 
c. No real protection from medical-care 
poverty
Source: Adapted from Chapter 5, Bangladesh health Watch 2010.
A more detailed analysis of  micro-health insurance in 
Chapter 8 points to further advantages/disadvantages 
associated with diverse structural relationships between 
insurers, providers and clients conceptualized as 
“models” (Ahsan & Mahmud Chapter 8 BHW 2011).  
The analysis suggests that the prevailing models of  
micro-insurance in Bangladesh characterized as “full 
service” and “provider” are less advantageous than 
“partner-agent” and “community-based” or “mutual” 
models in terms of  client buy-in, building trust, 
lowering transaction costs, claim settlement and 
inclusivity. Moving forward these more advantageous 
models should be given higher priority.
Chapter 7 in its analysis of  the status and prospects of  
for-profit private health insurance in Bangladesh points 
to a similar set of  challenges as well as identifying a 
variety of  market conditions that are constraining 
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growth in this sector including: 1) the complexity of  
health insurance contracts; 2) the small proportion of  
the workforce in the formal sector; 3) low willingness to 
pay; and 4) a poorly developed regulatory regime 
(Rabbani Chapter 7 BHW 2011).
Tackling these challenges related to micro health 
insurance, or private for-profit insurance, requires 
significant re-thinking of  the design and scope of  these 
efforts if  they are to become veritable and vital agents 
of  health insurance.   As suggested boldly in Chapter 1, 
this goes well beyond tinkering with the details of  
existing programs to thinking (and acting) out-of-the 
box with for example the “the big players in the NGO 
sector” providing a common health insurance, or 
contributing to a joint pool, that can protect all micro-
credit borrowers and their families (Chowdhury et al. 
Chapter1 BHW 2011).   Such intrepid ideas could be 
further developed by also looking outside and learning 
from the numerous and growing innovations in health 
insurance in other low and middle income countries 
such as Rwanda, Ghana, India and Thailand.  Such 
learning is easier than ever with the emergence over the 
last two years of  a Joint Learning Network for Universal 
Health Coverage to which Bangladesh has recently 
joined (JLNUHC 2011).  
3c. Promoting a more conducive environment for health insurance.
The potential of  both the government and non-
government efforts related to health insurance would 
benefit from a strategy for health insurance that lays the 
foundations for the provision of  insurance.  The 
government could play an important role by revising 
existing insurance regulations to cater more effectively 
to both the special provisions related to health 
insurance (as opposed to other types of  insurance) as 
well as the special insurance needs for the poor.   
Indeed, there are a broad range of  issues such as 
minimal pool size, fair adjudication of  benefits, reserve 
ratios, capital adequacy, policy delinquency, audit and 
accountability criteria among others that require the 
attention of  a robust regulatory authority. Such 
regulatory regimes for health insurance in the 
Philippines and India are identified in Chapter 8 as 
“major catalysts (to)…innovations with health 
insurance products” (Ahsan & Mahmud Chapter 8 
BHW 2011).   
Beyond regulation, the government could also provide 
incentives and co-financing to stimulate more and 
better health insurance initiatives, be it employer-based, 
private-for-profit, community-based or micro-
insurance. As recommended in Chapter 1, 
identification of  a list of  priority population groups for 
health insurance such as state employees or borrowers 
from micro-finance institutions will help to accelerate 
more discrete activity and appropriate options for 
health insurance (Chowdhury et al. Chapter 1 BHW 
2011).
3d. Shifting official development assistance towards health 
insurance
Official development assistance for health in 
Bangladesh represents about 8% of  total health 
expenditure and about 30% of  government health 
expenditure (BNHA 1999 - 2007). As a significant 
minority financier of  health with even greater influence 
on policy, its priorities, or lack thereof, related to pre-
payment and pooled financing are important.  Over the 
last 30 years, the donor sector has moved from 
“project”-based financing of  health to a sector-wide 
approach (SWaP) that pools donor funds to 
government in support of  jointly agreed strategy as 
seen in the recently completed HPNSDP 2012-2016. 
Despite this evolution in the way donors finance the 
health sector plan, there have been only minimal efforts 
by the international community to tackle the bigger 
picture of  unfair financing that prevails in Bangladesh 
(Ensor 2007, ILO 2008, Sabina & Barkat Chapter 2 
BHW 2011). In part, this reflects uncertainty and 
disagreements on how to move forward, be it through 
taxes, social health insurance etc., and whether health 
insurance is affordable. It also reflects that attention is 
focused on other priorities such as achievement of  the 
health related MDGs.  Paradoxically, the strong 
evidence that health care payments are a major source 
of  impoverishment and hence a constraint to the 
poverty reduction targets of  MDG 1, seems not to have 
registered as something that requires immediate 
attention among the donor community.   
Nevertheless, with the publication of  the WHR 2010 
on health systems financing  the path to Universal 
Health Coverage - and the adoption of  the World 
Health Assembly 2011 resolution on financing 
universal health coverage, the global community 
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appears more interested than ever in figuring out a 
value-added role (WHR 2010; WHA 2011).  As a 
concrete first step, the ODA community could assist 
the Government of  Bangladesh in preparing a UHC 
financing strategy.   This would involve stepping up the 
financing policy capacity and leadership within the 
MOHFW and establishing strong links to the Ministry 
of  Finance.  Such a strategy could assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of  a variety of  pre-payment and 
pooling options, define the different roles for 
government involvement (from purchaser to provider 
to regulator) and identify the requisite investments in 
establishing functional government institutional 
capacities for example related to regulation or 
accountability.   The experience of  other countries in 
establishing these institutional capacities emphasizes 
both their importance and their affordability  meaning 
that they are not costly relative to the overall cost of  the 
system (Catalyzing Change 2010). 
A second step for the ODA community to consider 
would be to examine how their current donor flows 
could be (re-)channeled to support more pre-payment 
and pooling of  finances for health.   The donor 
community, for example, could build on its efforts 
related to “demand side financing”.  In essence, 
demand side financing is insurance put in the hands of  
the people for a priority intervention e.g. maternal 
health. As suggested in Chapter 6, the planned 
extension of  demand-side financing in the new Health 
Sector Plan (HPNSDP) might provide an opportunity 
to expand the package of  services that are included 
such as basic care of  newborns and children and STIs 
(Huque Chapter 6 BHW 2011).   This expansion might 
be done drawing on the experience of  innovative 
insurance efforts in India that have provided health 
entitlements to below the poverty line populations e.g. 
RSBY (RSBY 2009).   Furthermore, donors might look 
at the financing reforms undertaken in Rwanda 
whereby Global Fund monies for HIV/AIDS, TB and 
malaria were channeled through a common health 
insurance mechanism rather than through separate 
national programs. Finally, building on the early 
experience related to financing micro-health insurance 
pilots, donors might look at investing in more and larger 
demonstrations with built-in monitoring and 
evaluation to facilitate lessons learned.
4.  Educating and Empowering Beneficiaries
A critical dimension of  the financing reforms directed 
toward greater pre-payment and pooling relates to the 
consumer or client or so-called “beneficiary”.   As 
many experts have pointed out in this Report and 
elsewhere, the value of  health insurance to the 
consumer is not immediately clear, especially if  it entails 
finding scarce cash to pay premiums when one is 
otherwise healthy. This under-appreciation of  benefits 
dampens demand for health insurance and erodes the 
sustainability of  voluntary membership schemes.
There are a number of  options for managing this 
challenge that involve educating and empowering 
beneficiaries (see Figure 2).  First, is to develop clear 
communications or education messages related to the 
advantages of  the pre-payment system illustrating how 
medical indebtedness has been avoided and how better 
and more timely care has been accessed. Second, is to 
have active engagement of  representatives of  
consumers in the design of  benefits packages such that 
there is understanding and awareness of  consumer 
needs and expectations. Third, is to make premium 
payment simple and sustainable. There are a number of  
options including a) looking at how premium and co-
payments can be appropriately tailored to the economic 
means of  the client i.e. their ability to pay, (this includes 
provisions in the design of  the financial protection to 
include secondary or extra protection should ceilings be 
surpassed in the context of  catastrophic illness 
requiring extremely expensive interventions); b) 
removing premium payment from being contingent 
entirely on individual choice and more a function of  a 
compulsory collective, or group, membership scheme: 
e.g. micro-credit members of  garment factory workers, 
etc.; and c) looking at ways to facilitate premium 
contributions from groups in such a way that they don't 
entail a separate financial transaction e.g. as part of  a pay 
slip or as part of  microcredit transaction. Fourth, is the 
importance of  ensuring that all insurance members 
experience “benefits” (not just payment of  premiums) 
through for example health promotion and wellness 
check-ups (Sinha et. al. 2007). Fifth, is to expedite the 
claims adjudication process with innovations like 
prospective reimbursement thereby minimizing time 
waiting for claims to be processed with cash out of  
pocket (Ranson et.al. 2007a). 
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5. Accelerating provision of more equitable and 
efficient health services
More and better prepayment financing systems for 
health care that are well understood and friendly to 
clients of  different economic means and health needs, 
are critical ingredients to UHC but on their own 
insufficient.   A further vital input is the robust, high 
quality and trusted provision of  health services.   
Should health services be of  low quality, health 
providers absent or unresponsive to the needs of  
patients, or inaccessible due to informal systems of  
under-the-table payments, then the trust in any pre-
payment system will evaporate very quickly.   
Therefore, the identifying what services are covered 
and how they are delivered is an extremely important 
part of  any systems striving for UHC.
The first question relates to what services to provide. 
Ideally, a package of  services should reflect the health 
needs of  the population and be informed by the 
availability of  services that have high efficacy and can 
be provided at reasonable cost.   This needs-based, or 
rational, approach can be adjusted to different localities 
and also incorporate expectations of  the population 
through discussions on the contents of  the package.   
The number of  services in any package  its depth - will 
also be a function of  the size of  the population being 
covered  its breadth  and the size of  the benefits pool - 
its height (WHR 2010) figure.   These parameters come 
together to frame two strategy extremes that are useful 
to policy-makers with a fixed budget: 1) shallow and 
broad; or 2) deep and narrow.  In the first scenario  a 
small number of  services would target a very large 
population i.e. a set of  primary care interventions that 
are delivered in every community in the country.  In the 
second scenario a large number of  services target a 
narrow segment of  the population i.e. a comprehensive 
package of  primary, secondary and tertiary services for 
the ultra-poor. 
These trade-off  challenges associated with what 
interventions to include in a package, however, appear 
simple when compared to the complexity of  organizing 
their delivery.   Successful delivery  the right services, at 
the right time in the right place with the right providers 
and right commodities -- brings together a diverse set 
of  inputs in a complex management soup that traverses 
levels of  care (primary through tertiary) and the 
spectrum of  care-givers (public-private, informal-
formal, rural-urban etc.). Unfortunately, these sorts of  
integrated delivery models are the exception and as such 
require concerted attention in the context of  financing 
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Figure 2: Options to educate and empower health insurance beneficiaries
systems for universal health coverage.   Important to 
such delivery models is the concept of  “networks of  
providers” that span both the community and facility-
based delivery of  services.   Provider networks must 
recognize the importance of  orienting services around 
the needs of  individuals, integrating care and ensuring 
continuity (WHR 2008).  In addition, the delivery of  a 
comprehensive, integrated, package of  services 
requires a much stronger “team” approach to provision 
of  services whereby the work of  front-line community 
agents is recognized and valued as highly as facility-
based services.   Beyond appropriately skilled 
professionals for the provision of  individual services, 
there is a high demand for team management skills, 
gatekeeper and referral capabilities in order to ensure 
the most appropriate use of  care.
Chapter 3 in this volume, for example, points to the 
challenges of  in-patient care (Haque et al. Chapter 3 
BHW 2011).   It notes the massive under-supply of  
hospital beds and skilled health workers in Bangladesh 
relative to other countries and their increasingly 
inequitable rural-urban, public-private and rich-poor 
distribution.   Private-for-profit hospitals, for example, 
are largely clustered in urban centres, account for 80% 
of  the 3,100 hospitals in Bangladesh and only 50% of  
the total 85,000 hospital beds.   Furthermore, this 
public-private skew is growing with about 100 new 
private hospitals and clinics and 200 new diagnostic 
centres opening every year.   While public sector in-
patient provision is more proportionately distributed 
across administrative boundaries of  the country, it is 
plagued with an inability to cover facilities with the 
requisite skilled health workers.   Amongst the public 
sector sanctioned nurse posts, for example, 96% of  
class 1 posts; 68% of  class II posts and 20% of  class III 
posts are vacant!    These health care supply challenges 
to rural areas are also contingent on meaningful 
extension of  the underlying power, transport, and water 
infrastructures as recommended in Chapter 8 (Ahsan & 
Mahmud, Chapter 8 BHW 2011).
These shortfalls in the supply of  in-patient health care 
are indicative of  a more systemic challenge related to 
public-private mix or Mixed Health System Syndrome 
(MHSS) that plagues many countries (Nishtar 2010).  In 
short, MHSS characterizes the pervasive and ominous 
trend towards high quality private services for the rich 
and poor quality public services for the poor.  Universal 
health coverage must find a way to bridge these two 
solitudes of  public and private provision towards more 
equitable and efficient services responding to the 
population's needs.   For example, government 
provided services might focus more narrowly on public 
health priorities with a subsequent outsourcing of  
comprehensive personal care services through a third-
party financier to the NGO and private sectors.  
Agreeing such a division of  labor requires tackling 
sticky issues related to the organization, management 
and accountability of  health services as well as attention 
to more structural issues related to the composition of  
the health workforce, procurement and supply chains 
of  commodities, and the role and authority of  
regulatory institutions. While there is no substitute for 
more concerted attention and capacity to address these 
complex issues, there is growing experience that 
innovative financing arrangements e.g. demand-side 
financing, may help to bridge these supply-side gaps in 
services (WHO 2009).   Furthermore, there is evidence 
that certification of  qualified providers or identification 
of  “preferred providers” can assist health insurance 
members access better quality services (Ranson et al. 
2007b).
6. Transforming Information and Evidentiary 
Systems 
The information, measurement and evidence demands 
related to health insurance systems add significantly to 
the complexity of  information systems in the health 
sector.   Identifying, or designing, a package of  services 
requires information on the health needs of  the 
population covering the major causes of  mortality and 
morbidity, the costs and cost-effectiveness of  
interventions to deal with those needs, the service 
expectations of  the populations covered and their 
ability/willingness to pay. Delivering such a package 
through a network of  providers, collecting premium 
payments and adjudicating claims requires a very 
sophisticated management information system.  
Finally, evaluating outcomes for UHC necessitates data 
and measures for assessing effective coverage of  
services and the degree of  financial protection for 
service users.  On all of  these fronts - from design to 
delivery to performance assessment  the demands on 
the information and measurement systems often 
overwhelm their ability to respond.  
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Bridging these information and measurement gaps 
requires first and foremost investment in the 
development of  an information strategy to support 
UHC.   This strategy would involve at a minimum i) 
strengthening the basic information systems required 
for design of  packages; ii) building management 
information systems for insurance premiums and 
claims; and iii) developing more reliable and valid 
measures related to effective coverage of  health 
services and protection from impoverishing health care 
expenditure. 
A second priority is to seize the transformative 
opportunities related to the digital age innovations in 
health information.   The experiences in India and 
other countries with electronic health records and 
payment of  claims has proved that paperless and 
cashless insurance systems are not only possible but 
offer attractive benefits in improving access to services 
and in reducing graft and corruption. Tapping this 
experience, together with the national “Digital 
Bangladesh” strategy, could lead to the design and 
implementation of  “e” and “m” health innovations that 
not only support UHC initiatives but contribute to 
strengthening health information systems more 
generally (see MOVE-IT box below). 
Box 1.   MOVE-IT Bangladesh: Universal Registration of  
Mothers and the Children
Text: Drawing on the Government of  Bangladesh's 
commitment to Digital Bangladesh 2021 and the health 
sector priority to scale-up maternal, neonatal and child health 
programs, MOVE-IT Bangladesh is a multi-stakeholder 
collaborative process that aims to register all pregnant mothers 
and their children in Bangladesh in a unified electronic 
information system that tracks vital events (births, deaths, 
causes of  death), non-fatal health events, and coverage of  
priority services. Through the development of  common 
standards for unique identification of  mothers and children 
and agreement on a minimal data set, MOVE-IT 
Bangladesh is harnessing the power of  mobile and electronic 
health technologies to ensure that all mothers and children are 
part of  a universal vital events and health information system.   
Such a system promises to transform traditional paper-based 
approaches to vital statistics and health records with the 
prospect of  real-time, continuous reporting on the health and 
well-being of  mothers and children.
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A third priority is to develop common frameworks and 
approaches to monitor ing and evaluat ing 
implementation of  UHC programs.  With the advent 
of  real-time information systems, there are 
opportunities to incorporate research designs into 
implementation of  UHC efforts.  In Mexico, for 
example, a major social protection reform entitled 
“opportunidades” benefited from a built-in research 
design that identified more effective ways to deliver 
services (Frenk 2007). These and other scientific 
approaches to testing different implementation 
packages enhance rapid learning of  what works and 
what doesn't and how to accelerate scaling-up.
A fourth and final priority relates to establishing a 
learning environment for UHC among government 
policy-makers, program implementers, researchers, 
multi-laterals and bilaterals. Recognizing that there is no 
blue-print or simple recipe for UHC, there is a need for 
a forum that facilitates joint learning on the range of  
difficult policy/program questions that are invariably 
encountered in advancing UHC reforms.  These 
include questions and “choices” related to source of  
financing, the type of  payment mechanism for 
providers, the scope of  coverage, the service delivery 
system and institutional structures (see JLN table 
below).  To this end, a "Bangladesh Forum for 
Universal Health Coverage" should be created.  This 
Forum would meet regularly to discuss specific 
challenges and opportunities related to UHC and to 
promote information exchange and the development 
of  a common agenda inclusive of  both the evidence 
and competency dimensions above.   The Forum, 
drawing on a common framework for UHC, would 
focus its interactions on a mutually agreed agenda of  
priority topics around UHC e.g. strategies for getting 
clients to pay premiums, mechanisms for cross-
subsidization, or regulating quality amongst providers 
etc.
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Table 2.  Options and choices in designing systems for universal health coverage.
Source:  Adapted from www.jointlearningnetwork.org
7.  Acquiring Core Competencies for Universal 
Health Coverage
Designing, implementing and evaluating efforts 
towards UHC places special demands on the health 
professional workforce that go well beyond those 
related to clinical provision of  services.    These include 
the need for highly specialized professionals like 
actuaries to inform insurance design, to a wide range of  
practical skills involved in implementation like 
premium collection and pooling; benefit identification; 
provider payment; cross-subsidization mechanisms, 
and a diverse set of  management skills at various levels 
related to policy and design, sustainable and 
accountable financing, and effective information 
systems.   A full inventory of  these skills needs is 
required to inform the scope and design of  appropriate 
training programs.  The implementation of  such 
programs should be led by education institutions in 
Bangladesh as part of  a more ambitious set of  reforms 
aimed at acquiring systems competencies for health 
stequity in the 21  Century (Frenk et al. 2010).
Summary
In summary therefore, a seven point agenda for UHC is 
proposed drawing on the key recommendations 
emerging from the Chapters of  this report of  the 
Bangladesh Health Watch that includes:
1. Establishing a shared understanding of 
Universal Health Coverage
2. Making the case for UHC 
3. Moving towards pre-payment financing is 
imperative.
a. Increasing and improving government financing
b. Redesigning non-governmental insurance schemes
c. Promoting a conducive environment for health 
insurance.
d. Shifting official development assistance towards 
health insurance
4. Educating and empowering beneficiaries
5. Accelerating provision of equitable and 
efficient services
6. Transforming Information and Evidentiary 
Systems 
7.  Acquiring Core Competencies for UHC
This seven point agenda for UHC is not meant to be a 
blueprint or invoke some sort of  “cookie-cutter” 
approach to UHC.  Rather it is meant to stimulate 
discourse and guide debate to inform decisive actions 
towards a more equitable and just health system in 
Bangladesh.
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